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1 
LABOR AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE POSTWAR WELFARE STATE 
 
The first decades of the postwar period undoubtedly represent a crucial epoch in the 
development of the modern welfare state. Within a time span of only two to three 
decades, all nations of the advanced industrial world created intricate systems of social 
protection that raised entire groups of the feeble out of poverty, significantly reduced 
market-generated income disparities, and greatly diminished the financial consequences 
of labor market risks like unemployment, sickness, disability, and old age. In the 
immediate postwar period, the bulk of the population living in the advanced industrial 
world relied on grossly inadequate levels of protection against hardships resulting from 
labor market risks. By the 1970s, most of them could count on very generous protection 
against such hardships. During this decade, more people were entitled to more generous 
levels of protection against labor market risks than ever before – and arguably ever 
since.  
 Compared to previous time periods, the welfare achievements of the first half of the 
postwar period were truly remarkable. Yet they were by no means equally remarkable in 
all nations of the advanced industrial world. While all advanced industrial nations 
experienced sharp increases in both public and private social expenditure during the first 
half of the postwar period, they differed markedly both in the overall level of this 
increase and, perhaps more importantly, in the division within what is popularly known 
as the ‘public and private mix’.
1
 As a result, societies came to differ greatly in their 
ability to protect their members against the risks of economic misfortune and 
dependency. Most importantly, they came to differ greatly in their ability to provide 
adequate levels of social protection for all their members. This study is concerned with 
understanding this difference, which is deeply rooted in the ability of societies to foster 
social solidarity. 
Despite the existence of a vast literature on the development of the postwar welfare 
state, scholars still struggle to account for differences in the ability of societies to offer 
adequate social protection to all their members. In this study, I argue that our 
understanding of welfare state variation cannot be improved without a fundamental 
reappraisal of the role of organized labor in welfare state development. I argue in 
particular against the convention of seeing welfare state development as part of the 
emancipation struggle of the worker movement. This view has resulted in a strong 
tendency to view labor unions as natural proponents of the welfare state and to see the 
success of welfare state development as dependent on labor’s relative power resources 
against capital. In this study, I argue against this view by emphasizing that welfare state 
                                                
1
 For some excellent recent accounts that emphasize the importance of the distinction between public and 
private provision, see Jacob S. Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: the Battle over Public and Private 
Social Benefits in the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Matthieu 
Leimgruber, Solidarity Without the State? Business and the Shaping of the Swiss Welfare State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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development is mainly about redistribution of income and risk among different 
categories of employers, the self-employed, and most of all, different categories of 
workers.  
This study emphasizes the importance of the organizational blueprint of labor unions 
for the development of welfare states. Its main objectives are to show how the 
involvement of labor unions in welfare state development – and through this, the 
involvement of other interest groups like employer associations – are shaped by the way 
workers’ interests are structured, and how these involvements themselves shape welfare 
outcomes. To demonstrate the importance of union structure, I compare the involvement 
of labor unions in the development of the British and Dutch welfare states from roughly 
the early 1940s through the late 1970s. Throughout this period, the British and Dutch 
labor union movements were key players in the creation and expansion of public 
provision for the elderly, unemployed, sick, and disabled. Yet because of differences in 
their organizational blueprints, their stances toward and consequently their involvement 
in the development of these programs differed in important ways. In this study I analyze 
these differences, and show how they led to very different welfare outcomes in the two 
nations. 
So far, the comparative literature on welfare state development has paid scant 
attention to the importance of the organizational structure of labor unions to their 
involvement in welfare state development. In the first section of this introduction, I 
show why this has been the case. In the rest of this introduction, I present my argument 
about how the organizational structure of national labor union movements matters to the 
ability of societies to achieve adequate levels of social protection for all their members.  
 
REVISITING THE ROLE OF LABOR IN WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT 
In the comparative literature on welfare state development, labor associations have 
always played a prominent role. As the main purpose of the welfare state has always 
been to protect workers from labor market risks, the importance attached to organized 
labor’s involvement in the development of welfare states is unsurprising. What is quite 
surprising, however, is that all this attention has not resulted in a strong awareness of 
the very diverse and often conflicting nature of different groups of workers’ demands 
for security against labor market risks. In much of the literature on welfare state 
development, workers are treated as a homogenous group with united interests in the 
introduction and expansion of public welfare programs. This has resulted in a rather 
one-sided treatment of the involvement of organized labor in welfare state development. 
Labor union support for this development is often assumed, but rarely tested.
2
 Welfare 
state development itself is often seen as a political victory of labor over capital, and 
                                                
2
 For some references on this assumption from prominent scholars over the years, see Gaston Rimlinger, 
Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America, and Russia (New York: John Wiley and Sons 
Inc, 1971) 9; Hicks and Swank, “The Political Economy of Government Domestic Expenditure in the 
Affluent Democracies, 1960-1980,” American Journal of Political Science 32:4 (1988) 1125; Gøsta 
Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) 
22-26; Bo Rothstein, Just Institutions Matter: the Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare 
State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 151; Alex Hicks, Social Democracy and Welfare 
Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999) 82. 
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seldom as an outcome of the willingness of labor associations to redistribute income and 
risks within the labor category.
3
 And finally, cross-national differences in welfare state 
programs are generally explained by looking at the degree to which workers organize 
into labor unions, as opposed to the manner in which they do so.
4
 
 This view of the involvement of organized labor in welfare state development has 
been put forward most forcefully, although by no means exclusively, by the adherents 
of the so-called “power resources” perspective of welfare state development. This 
perspective rose to prominence in the welfare state literature in the 1970s, and remains 
so today. As a derivative of class analysis, the power resources perspective views 
welfare state development as primarily involving distributive conflict between workers 
and employers. One consequence of this emphasis on class as an explanatory concept 
for welfare state development is a strong tendency to view workers, but also employers 
and the self-employed, as homogeneous groups in which group members share similar 
risks and resources, and thus similar interests.
5
 Another consequence is a strong 
tendency to define labor as a “subordinated” or “disadvantaged” group that needs to be 
“compensated” or “emancipated” by the welfare state.
6
 In this perspective, the outcome 
of welfare state development depends principally on labor’s relative “power resources” 
compared to those of the “bourgeois” or “capitalist” forces.
7
 
 Over the years, the power resources perspective has been criticized for many sins of 
omission. Often, these criticisms began with the observation that labor’s relative power 
resources alone – whether defined in terms of union density levels, social democratic 
parties’ electoral strength or their participation in government, or the weakness of 
                                                
3
 See, for example, Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds, 22; Michael Shalev, “The Social Democratic 
Model and Beyond: Two Generations of Comparative Research on the Welfare State, Comparative Social 
Research 6 (1983) 320. 
4  For some prominent studies that emphasize the importance of union strength, see Gøsta Esping-
Andersen and Kees Van Kersbergen, “Contemporary Research on Social Democracy,” Annual Review of 
Sociology 23 (1992) 191; Rothstein, Just Institutions Matter, 151; Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, 
Development and Crisis of the Welfare State. Parties and Policies in Global Markets (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2001) 1; and Duane Swank, Global Capital, Political Institutions and Policy 
Change in Developed Welfare States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 42-43. 
5
 According to Walter Korpi, for example, “at the most general level we can distinguish three socio-
economic classes: employers, employees, and the self-employed. Although internally quite heterogene-
ous, these broad categories define similarities in actors’ opportunities and constraints, resources, and 
risks.” Walter Korpi, “Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare 
States and Varieties of Capitalism,” World Politics 58 (2006) 174. According to Gøsta Esping-Andersen 
and Roger Friedland, in Sweden “more than in any other European nation...the working class has been 
capable of initiating and imposing its policy preferences.” Gøsta Esping-Andersen and Roger Friedland, 
“Class Coalitions in the Making of Western European Economics.” In Esping-Andersen and Friedland, 
Political Power and Social Theory. Volume III (Greenwich: Jai Press, 1982) 18-19. 
6
 According to Walter Korpi, the main aim of the welfare state is to “compensate labor for its 
disadvantaged position on the labor market.” According to Gøsta Esping-Andersen, it is to “emancipate 
workers from market-dependence.” Walter Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1983) 83; Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds, 22. 
7
 According to Gøsta Esping-Andersen, “labor’s power advantage lies in its numbers.” According to 
Walter Korpi, “through its political and union organizations, the working class can decrease its 
disadvantage in power resources in relation to capital.” Korpi, The Democratic, 83; Esping-Andersen, The 
Three Worlds, 22-26. 
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bourgeois or capitalist forces – cannot explain welfare state outcomes in many nations.
8
 
Some scholars have used this shortcoming to argue for the importance of Christian 
democracy as an active force in shaping welfare state outcomes.
9
 Others have used it to 
criticize the power resources perspective for focusing only on workers’ interests in 
welfare state development. To fully understand cross-national variation in welfare 
patterns, these scholars have argued, it is necessary to look to the welfare demands of 
other societal groups like farmers and the (otherwise) self-employed as well.
10
 More 
recently, a group of scholars has even come to challenge the assumption of employer 
hostility to welfare state development.
11
  
 In this work, I criticize the power resources perspective in a different and, arguably, 
more fundamental way. This criticism starts with the belief that workers, like employers 
and the self-employed, do not constitute a homogenous group with similar interests. 
Perhaps more than any other societal group, workers as a group hold multiple and partly 
contradictory interests when it comes to welfare state development. Different 
occupational categories of workers differ greatly in terms of income and the degree to 
which they are exposed to labor market risks. As a result, they also differ greatly in their 
welfare demands. There are many workers who do indeed have a “disadvantaged” 
position on the labor market; but there are also many workers whose position on the 
labor market is by contrast quite comfortable. Whereas the former clearly have an 
interest in welfare state development, the latter often do not. This makes it questionable 
whether the concept of class is the most useful lens with which to examine welfare state 
development. It certainly means that the conventional preoccupation of scholars with 
labor’s organizational strength is unwarranted.  
 This study proceeds with the recognition that the main purpose of the welfare state is 
neither to “compensate labor for its disadvantaged position on the labor market,” nor to 
“emancipate workers from market-dependence.”
12
 Instead, it is to redistribute risks and 
resources among society’s more and less privileged members. In this regard, a crucial 
distinction has to be made between private and public solutions for provision against 
labor market risks. Even the purest form of social security differs from private insurance 
                                                
8 For these definitions of labor’s relative power resources, see, among others, John D. Stephens, The 
Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (London: Macmillan, 1979); Francis Castles, “The Impact of 
Parties on Public Expenditures.” In Frances Castles, The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in 
Democratic Capitalist States (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982); Huber and Stephens; Development and Crisis; 
and Hicks, Social Democracy. 
9
 Ever since Kees Van Kersbergen’s (1995) seminal study on the impact of Christian democracy on 
welfare state development, power resources scholars have argued that the presence of a large confessional 
party might produce a generous welfare state when this party is in competition with leftist political parties. 
See Kees van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism: a Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State 
(London: Routledge, 1995). 
10
 See, for example, Peter Baldwin, The Politics of Social Solidarity. Class Bases of the European 
Welfare State 1975-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
11  See, for example, Peter Swenson, Capitalists against Market: The Making of Labor Markets and 
Welfare States in the United States and Sweden (Oxford: Oxford University, 2002); Colin Gordon, New 
Deals: Business, Labor and Politics in America, 1920-1935 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994); Idem, Dead on Arrival: the Politics of Health Care in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003); Isabela Mares, The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State 
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
12
 Korpi, The Democratic, 83; Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds, 22. 
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in an important way: public pooling of risks allows society’s more risk-prone members 
to receive the same level of protection as its less risk-prone members. The redistributive 
feature of this lies in the reapportioning of risks; after all, when all members share in the 
common risk pool on equal terms, ‘good’ risks effectively subsidize ‘bad’ risks. Most of 
the time, the redistributive nature of social security programs does not end here, as all 
members seldom share in the common risk pool on completely equal terms. The 
systems of contributions and benefits of most social insurance programs work to the 
advantage of their poorer members – who tend to be society’s more risk-prone members 
as well. 
 As a result of their tendency to focus on class divisions, scholars often fail to 
examine how these redistributive consequences affect the distribution of income and 
risk in society. Rarely do they mention that redistributive welfare state development 
mainly affects the distribution of income and risk among different categories of workers. 
This is nevertheless evidently the case for two reasons. First, in modern capitalist 
societies, nearly all breadwinners are workers and most of the national income is 
divided among workers. This means that workers also pay the brunt of welfare state 
expenditure, either as contributors, as taxpayers, or, when employers contribute to social 
security as well, as consumers. Second, and as mentioned before, workers differ to a 
vast degree in income and exposure to economic risk. Skilled manual workers typically 
enjoy higher wages and greater job security than do semi- or unskilled manual workers. 
Some categories of white-collar workers enjoy even higher wages than skilled manual 
workers, and are even less exposed to labor market risks. Finally, other categories of 
white-collar workers earn wages and have a degree of job security that more closely 
reflect those of skilled manual workers or even of semi- and unskilled manual workers. 
When these different categories or groups of workers join the same risk pool, or come to 
belong to a pension scheme with a system of contributions and benefits that works to 
the advantage of its poorer members, the result is a massive redistribution among them.  
 Based on the above, I put forward a view of the involvement of organized labor in 
welfare state development that differs markedly from conventional views – especially 
from those put forward by power resources theorists. This view starts with the claim 
that labor union support for redistributive welfare state development cannot be taken for 
granted. Whether labor unions support redistributive welfare state development, I argue, 
depends on the kind of workers they organize. Do they mainly organize skilled workers 
with a strong position on the labor market? Or do they also organize many workers who 
can only achieve adequate security against risk through risk redistribution and a 
redistributive contributory system? Depending on the risk and income profile of their 
members, unions will value public welfare solutions, and especially their redistributive 
consequences, in quite different ways. It is for this reason that I argue against the 
“consensus in the literature that the policy efficacy of left parties depends on the extent 
to which they can count on strong trade unionism.”
13
 More important than the 
organizational strength of labor unions is whether they are united in their support for 
                                                
13
 Esping-Andersen and Van Kersbergen, “Contemporary Research on Social Democracy,” 191. Italics 
added. 
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redistributive welfare state development. This, I argue here, depends on the way in 
which they are organized.  
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF UNION STRUCTURE FOR 
WELFARE STATE DEVELOPMENT 
There are two ways to understand the impact of labor unions on welfare state 
development. The first is by emphasizing the importance of the extent to which labor 
unions organize workers. As a result of their tendency to focus on labor unity and 
strength against capital, this is how most scholars approach the involvement of labor 
unions in welfare state development. A second approach to the impact of labor unions 
on welfare state development centers on the ways in which unions organize and 
represent workers. In this work, I argue that the way in which workers organize into 
unions matters more to the ability of societies to achieve adequate levels of social 
protection for all their members than the extent to which they do so. In other words, I 
argue for the importance of the organizational structure of labor unions over that of 
their organizational strength. 
There are several ways to look at the organizational structure of national labor union 
movements. National labor union movements differ from each other mainly in the 
degree to which they are fragmented along regional, religious, sectoral, and occupa-
tional lines. In this study, I focus mainly on this last source of fragmentation. This is not 
to say that other divisions do not affect the stance of labor unions towards welfare state 
development. On the contrary, religious divisions, in particular, can be quite important 
to labor union’ attitudes vis-à-vis the welfare state. Subsequent chapters of this study 
will show, for instance, that protestant, catholic and ‘socialist’ union federations in the 
Netherlands have on occasion held markedly different attitudes towards government 
intervention. Yet I argue that regional and religious divisions impact the stance of labor 
unions on welfare state development much less than do occupational divisions. This is 
because no type of union organization lays the competing interests of different 
categories of workers with regards to redistributive welfare state development so clearly 
bare as does the organization of workers along occupational lines.  
The distinctive feature of occupational unionism is that it organizes workers accord-
ing to skill or occupation. This type of union organization neatly divides the labor 
movement into unions that represent workers who do and those that represent workers 
who do not depend on redistributive, and thus public, welfare solutions to achieve 
adequate insurance against labor market risks. After all, the risk and income profile of 
workers, and thus their ability to achieve adequate security against risk without a 
redistributive effort from other workers, depend greatly on their skill or occupational 
profile. Skilled manual workers, for example, are generally quite able to obtain adequate 
security against risk through private bargaining – or at least, through a combination of 
public and private provision that involves no redistribution of risks or introduction of a 
redistributive contributory system.
14
 Semi- and unskilled manual workers, on the other 
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hand, usually cannot obtain adequate security in the same way. Likewise, different 
occupational categories of white-collar workers differ greatly in their ability to do so.
15
 
When all these different occupational categories organize into separate unions, the 
union movement naturally becomes divided in its welfare preferences. Unions 
representing privileged occupational categories may support public welfare develop-
ment solutions for a variety of reasons; for example, their members may appreciate the 
ability of public welfare schemes to provide pay-as-you-go financing.
16
 Yet they will 
have little reason to support any initiative that redistributes risks and resources, as this 
goes against the interests of their entire membership. In this, they will differ strongly 
from unions that organize large numbers of lower-skilled, and thus lower-paid and more 
risk-prone workers.  
Crucially, no other type of union organization leads to such a clear division between 
more and less privileged workers. Even where regional, religious, or sectoral divisions 
are strong – and the latter is typically the case in nations where occupational unionism is 
weak – the union movement will be characterized by unions with quite diverse 
membership profiles in terms of income and risk. A central argument of this study is 
that such unions differ markedly in their stance on redistributive welfare state 
development from occupationally-organized unions that limit their membership to 
privileged workers. The crucial distinctive feature here is that unions that seek to 
organize workers regardless of skill and occupation emphasize broad worker solidarity 
as opposed to occupational identity. When seeking to improve the protection of their 
members against labor market risks, such unions will be far more likely to consider 
redistributive welfare solutions. This means that in nations in which the union 
movement is organized along ‘vertical’ as opposed to ‘horizontal’ lines, it will be far 
easier to achieve adequate levels of social protection for all workers.  
Despite their tendency to focus on labor’s struggle with capital, some scholars have 
recognized the importance of the distinction between union organization along 
occupational and union organization along sectoral lines. In fact, the importance of 
union structure seems to have been recognized most fully in the early works of some 
power resources scholars. In The Democratic Class Struggle, for example, Walter Korpi 
mentioned that “it is of significance whether workers are organized on the basis of craft 
or industry.”
17
 In The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism, John D. Stephens noted 
that “the character of labor organization once it develops in a country…also has an 
                                                                                                                                          
Hugh Clegg, The Changing System of Industrial Relations in Britain (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979) 436-37; 
Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman and John McIlroy, “The Post-War Compromise: Mapping Industrial 
Politics, 1945-64.” In Campbell, Fishman, and McIlroy, British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics. 
Volume One: the Post-war Compromise, 1945-1964. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) 77-78; Gary Marks, 
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Century,” Comparative Politics 22:1 (1989) 84. 
15  On the diversity of the white-collar category, see, for example, Michael P. Kelly, White-collar 
Proletariat. The Industrial Behaviour of British Civil Servants (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1980). 
16
 Private pension plans often cannot offer pay-as-you-go financing and are generally based on funded 
contributions. The appeal of pay-as-you-go financing for privileged workers is that it does not require 
saving, since current benefits are paid for by current contributions. For poorer workers, the added appeal 
is that it can also easily be used to redistribute among different categories of workers. 
17
 Korpi, The Democratic, 39. 
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important effect on class formation and class consciousness.”
18
 Finally, in Politics 
Against Markets, Gøsta Esping-Andersen emphasized the importance of “vertically 
organized and nationally centralized trade unionism” for the social democratic road to 
victory in Norway and Sweden, since “class unity is more difficult to achieve under 
conditions of competition between craft workers, unskilled industrial laborers, and the 
rural proletariat.”
19
  
Yet in the view of these power resources scholars, the importance of union structure 
lay foremost in the degree to which it extended labor’s organizational power against 
capital.
20
 As a result, they either ranked it secondary in importance to union strength in 
their attempts to explain cross-national variation in welfare outcomes, or neglected it 
completely. Esping-Andersen, it must be acknowledged, did cite the relative importance 
of craft unionism in Denmark and the lack thereof in Norway and Sweden to show that 
the industrial proletariat in the latter two nations was “better situated to invoke broad 
class solidarity.”
21
 Yet Korpi, in his chapter on social policy, examined only union 
density and the governmental inclusion of left parties in his attempts to account for 
welfare variation among nations. Stephens, in turn, explained the absence of a generous 
welfare state in the United States only through the “very low level of labor organization 
and the absence of a major reformist labor party.” And despite the fact that the division 
of labor’s share of the national income clearly involves a conflict of interests among 
different categories of workers, he directly linked cross-national differences in wage 
equality to cross-national differences in union strength.
22
  
More recent attempts to explain cross-national patterns of welfare state development 
have arguably paid even less attention to union structure. Often, welfare state scholars 
do not even mention the nature of union organization in the country or countries that 
they investigate. So have recent writings on the involvement of employer interest 
groups in welfare state development paid scant attention to the possibility that the nature 
of this involvement may be shaped by the attitudes of labor unions towards the 
redistributive consequences of attempts to create adequate provision for all workers – as 
will be shown at length in chapter 2. This is surprising, as one variant of this scholarship 
seems well aware of the fragmented nature of worker interests regarding redistributive 
welfare development.
23
 Likewise, in his otherwise seminal work on the involvement of 
the “middle classes” in the development of several European welfare states, Peter 
Baldwin has not mentioned the importance of differences in union structure between 
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 Stephens, The Transition, 45. 
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 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Politics Against Markets: the Social-Democratic Road to Power (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985) 88. 
20
 According to Korpi, for example, “Working-class power resources can be expected to be greatest where 
the labour movement is well integrated and has strong support from wage-earners.” Korpi, The 
Democratic, 39. 
21 Esping-Andersen, Politics Against Markets, 88. 
22
 Stephens, The Transition, 149. 
23
 See, for example, Mares, The Politics of Social Risk, 47; Swenson, Capitalists Against Markets, 8. 
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these nations – even though these matter immensely to the way in which the interests of 
the largest middle class group, namely privileged workers, are represented.
24
 
This neglect of the importance of union structure to welfare state development has 
led to an inadequate understanding of cross-national differences in welfare state 
development. So are the generous nature of public welfare provision in the Netherlands 
and the opposite in the United Kingdom seldom linked to the dominance of vertically 
organized unionism in the former and the dominance of horizontally organized 
unionism in the latter. As a result, scholars have often wondered how the Netherlands, 
where labor’s relative “power resources” have always been so weak, could develop such 
a generous and redistributive welfare state. They have also struggled to reconcile the 
British welfare state’s continual inability to provide adequate public benefits with 
labor’s relatively strong “power resources” there.
25
 Of course, scholars also widely 
assume labor union support for the introduction and expansion of public welfare 
programs in the United Kingdom.
26
 
The neglect of the importance of union structure by welfare state scholars has been 
most detrimental to our understanding of welfare state development in nations – like the 
United Kingdom – in which the labor union movement is largely organized along 
occupational lines. In such nations, labor union support for welfare state development 
cannot be taken for granted. Yet welfare state scholars nevertheless tend to do so. When 
confronted with cases in which labor unions displayed little interest in welfare state 
development, or even outright opposed welfare initiatives, scholars have focused on 
several explanations that all fail to take into account the redistributive consequences of 
such initiatives. The most popular way to explain such instances is by referring to an 
ideological commitment of labor unions to “voluntarism” – the idea that the state has to 
abstain from direct intervention in the labor market. This commitment is then in turn 
explained as the outcome of union anxiety over the consequences of allowing a 
potentially hostile “bourgeois” state to undermine union functions.
27
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 In this work, I take a different view on such cases of union disinterest in or 
opposition to welfare state development. This view begins with the recognition that 
unions that display little interest in welfare state initiatives often represent skilled and 
thus privileged workers who strongly oppose any initiative that results in a redistribu-
tion of risk or income among different categories of workers. Most welfare initiatives, 
and many other instances of government intervention in the labor market, do exactly 
this. This means that the voluntarist inclinations of unions are often rooted as much in 
union anxiety over the consequences of government intervention on wage differentials 
among different categories of workers as in worries about allowing a potentially hostile 
state to undermine union functions. In the following chapter of this work, I will explain 
this at length.  
 
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK 
Although the aim of this work is to develop an argument on the importance of union 
structure that is broadly applicable, for reasons of expediency the main comparison in 
this work is between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The choice of these two 
countries can be easily defended. Differences in both the organizational strength and 
structure of their labor union movements make them ideally suited to illustrate the 
importance of the latter. In terms of pure organizational strength, the British labor union 
movement has outperformed its Dutch counterpart throughout the entire postwar 
period.
28
 I noted above how difficult it has been for scholars to reconcile this with the 
continual inability of the British welfare state to provide adequate protection against 
labor market risk to all workers, and the very generous and redistributive nature of the 
Dutch welfare state. Had they realized the importance of the strength of occupationally-
organized unionism in the United Kingdom and its almost complete absence in the 
Netherlands, then they would surely have found this to be less difficult. In the United 
Kingdom, nearly all skilled manual and white-collar workers are organized into their 
own craft and occupationally-organized white-collar unions. Barred from membership 
in these unions, semi- and unskilled workers, who often lack a strong occupational 
profile, have mostly come to rally in separate general unions. In the Netherlands, by 
contrast, such divisions hardly exist. Here, nearly all workers rally in industrial unions – 
a union type that is virtually absent in the United Kingdom.
29
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 In this book I aim to show how differences in union structure mattered to welfare 
outcomes in the two nations. The book is organized into seven chapters, of which this 
introduction is the first. Chapter 2 begins with an analysis of the organizational 
differences between the British and Dutch labor union movements, and puts these 
differences in historical perspective. It then explores how these differences lead to the 
development of very different labor market features in the two countries. One of the 
main purposes of this section is to show how the stance of unions towards redistribution 
of income among workers shaped their attitude toward state intervention in the labor 
market – which often has a redistributive aim, and nearly always has redistributive 
consequences. The chapter ends with a survey of recent writings on the involvement of 
employer interest groups in welfare state development, and shows how union structure 
affected this involvement.  
 Chapters 3 through 6 analyze the introduction and expansion of the major postwar 
social security programs in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These chapters 
form the empirical ‘core’ of this book. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 show how the organizational 
structure of the British and Dutch labor union movement affected the development of 
public welfare programs for, respectively, the elderly, the unemployed, and the sick and 
disabled in these countries. These chapters cover a period ranging from roughly the 
early 1940s to the late 1960s. Chapter 6 explores how some of these programs came to 
be used for early retirement purposes during the 1970s. As this development took place 
to a much greater degree in the Netherlands than in the United Kingdom, this chapter 
focuses mainly on the Dutch case.  
 Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of this work and looks at their most important 
implications. The chapter first summarizes my findings on the importance of union 
structure for welfare state outcomes in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In so 
doing, the chapter also summarizes the implications of this importance for the 
involvement of employer interest groups in welfare state development. Building on this, 
it then explores the implications of my findings for our understanding of welfare state 
development in other countries – whereby special attention will be paid to the situation 
in the United States. Finally, it examines the implications of my findings for our 
understanding of the causes of national variation in labor market institutions and the 
related subject of wage equality.  
 
A NOTE ON SOURCES 
The comparison of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in this book draws on a 
variety of secondary and primary sources. The use of the latter demands some 
clarification. The search for primary sources to support my argument sent me to both 
sides of the North Sea. Most valuable for this research were the minutes of various 
committees of the major union (con)federations in the two countries. In the United 
Kingdom, these minutes came from the Trades Union Congress (TUC). In the 
Netherlands, these union federations were (in order of influence): the socialist Dutch 
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Association of Trade Unions
30
 (Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen, henceforth 
NVV); the Catholic Workers Movement (Katholieke Arbeidersbeweging, henceforth 
KAB); its successor, the Netherlands Catholic Trade Union Federation (Nederlands 
Katholiek Vakverbond, henceforth NKV); and the protestant Christian Union 
Federation (Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond, henceforth CNV). When important 
decisions in the field of welfare were to be made, the social security experts and 
leadership of these federations often met in the Council of Trade Union Federations 
(Raad van Vakcentralen, henceforth RVV).  
 Both because one of the purposes of this work is to show how union structure 
matters to the involvement of employer interest groups in welfare state development, 
and because the records of such groups also provided valuable information on the 
actions of unions, this work also draws heavily on the minutes of various committee and 
board meetings of important employer federations. In the United Kingdom, these 
federations were: the Federation of British Industries (FBI); the British Employers’ 
Confederation (BEC); and their predecessor, the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI). In the Netherlands, there were so many employer federations that it would take 
too much space here to list them exhaustively. Of most importance for this research 
were the minutes of the liberal Central Social Employers’ Federation (Centraal Sociaal 
Werkgevers Verbond, henceforth CSWV) and those of its successor, the Federation of 
Dutch Industries (Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen, henceforth VNO). Of 
slightly less importance were the minutes of the Catholic Federation of Employers’ 
Unions (Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, henceforth KVW) and 
the General Catholic Employers’ Federation (Algemene Katholieke Werkgevers-
vereniging, henceforth AKWV); the Federation of Protestant-Christian Employers in the 
Netherlands (Verbond van Protestantsch-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, 
henceforth VPCW); and the general-confessional Federation of Catholic and Protestant-
Christian Employers’ Unions (Federatie van Katholieke en Protestants-Christelijke 
Werkgeversverbonden, henceforth FCWV) and Christian Employers’ Federation 
(Nederlands Christelijk Werkgeversverbond, henceforth NCW). As was the case with 
their union counterparts, the social security experts and leadership of these various 
employer federations often held meetings in a common platform, called the Council of 
Directors in Labor Affairs (Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, or RvBA). 
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 Other primary sources also proved useful. The research on the United Kingdom 
relies on various government records found in the Public Record Office. Of particular 
importance were minutes of meetings and correspondence from officials of the Ministry 
of Pensions and National Insurance, the Department of Health and Social Security, and 
departments that were responsible for labor and unemployment matters. For the 
discussion on superannuation in the United Kingdom, I also used records from the Lifes 
Offices’ Associations (LOA), the main representative of the British insurance industry. 
Finally, I used several publications issued by various Labour governments, employer 
federations, and individual unions. For the research on the Netherlands, I interviewed 
several social security experts and leaders from important unions, and utilized records 
from the Ministry of Social Affairs. For the discussion on the use of social security 
programs for early retirement purposes in the Netherlands in chapter 7, I made extensive 
use of archives from organizations responsible for the implementation of these 
programs, including the Common Medical Service (Gemeenschappelijke Medische 
Dienst, or GMD), the Federation of Industrial Councils (Federatie van 
Bedrijfsverenigingen, or FvB), and the Social Insurance Council (Sociale Verzekerings-
raad, or SVR).  
2 
LABOR DIVIDED 
 
In 1951, in an article on the growing importance of white-collar unionism in the United 
Kingdom, the British economist Guy Routh published a survey of the “distribution of 
the gainfully occupied population of Great Britain.”
1
 In this survey, ninety-five percent 
of all economically active persons were characterized as “workers.” These were divided 
into nine occupational categories. First on Routh’s list were unskilled manual workers 
who, according to the survey, represented twelve percent of the economically active 
population. Second on the list stood the largest occupational group, semi-skilled manual 
workers, who represented some twenty-eight percent of the gainfully occupied 
population. These were followed by skilled manual workers, who represented an 
additional twenty-five percent of the economically active. All other worker-occupations 
mentioned in the survey belonged to the white-collar category. Although representing 
only about thirty percent of the economically active at the time, this category was by 
then already so diverse that the survey subdivided it into six different occupational 
groups, ranging from shop assistants, to foremen, to clerical workers, to managers, to 
higher professionals, and to lower professionals. In the years after Routh presented his 
survey results, the white-collar category would grow rapidly. In 1951, it accounted for 
roughly thirty-two percent of all workers. By 1971, this had increased to forty-three 
percent.
2
  
Routh’s survey is mentioned here because it so neatly demonstrates the relative size 
and diversity of the British worker category at around the time of Britain’s first postwar 
social security reforms.
3
 Among those ninety-five percent of all economically active 
persons classified as “workers” were unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers, who 
held, respectively, very weak and fairly weak positions in the labor market. But the 
broad category of “workers” also included skilled manual workers, whose qualifications 
enabled them to earn much higher wages and made them much less prone to labor 
market risks such as unemployment. Other workers belonged to the “high-end” white-
collar category of “higher professionals,” who earned an even higher income. Finally, 
many others belonged to the growing “low-end” white-collar legion of nurses, typists, 
waiters, telephone operators, and messengers, whose income and risk profiles were 
more comparable to those of semi-skilled or perhaps even unskilled manual workers 
than to those of their more privileged white-collar counterparts.
4
 The interests of these 
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different occupational categories regarding redistributive welfare state development 
were by no means similar. So, for example, were most unskilled and semi-skilled 
manual workers, and many low-end white-collar groups of workers, only able to 
achieve adequate levels of unemployment insurance through risk redistribution with 
other occupational categories. In this, they differed from skilled manual workers and 
other white-collar categories who, as we will see in chapter 4, were generally quite 
capable of achieving adequate provision through collective bargaining. Finally, some 
white-collar workers occupied such secure occupations that even the need to pursue 
occupational provision against unemployment may have seemed redundant for them.  
In the literature on welfare state development and industrial relations, the divergence 
in interests among these different categories of workers is seldom fully acknowledged. 
Scholars often fail to examine this divergence even when explicitly focusing on 
occupational differences among workers. A good example of this is an investigation of 
the growth of white-collar unionism in the United Kingdom undertaken by the industrial 
relations expert George Sayers Bain during the mid-1960s. Following the convention of 
placing the distinction between labor and capital at the center of the analysis, Bain 
argued that the British labor union movement had to develop its membership among 
white-collar workers in order to avoid becoming “the increasingly outdated representa-
tives of a declining industrial minority.” If the labor union movement failed to do so, 
Bain continued, “its ability even to advance the interests of its manual membership will 
be seriously impaired.”
5
 In coming years, the labor union movement did indeed absorb 
more and more white-collar workers. Especially from the mid-1960s on, an increasing 
proportion of white-collar workers unionized. Because white-collar employment 
numbers were also increasing rapidly, by the mid-1970s, two out of every five unionists 
belonged to the white-collar category, as compared to one out of every five only three 
decades earlier.
6
  
One might, however, wonder how this was to increase the interests of the “manual 
membership” of the British labor union movement exactly. Of those white-collar 
workers who organized, nearly all did so within their own white-collar unions, of which 
membership was generally limited to certain privileged occupations. (Higher-educated 
white-collar workers were far more likely to be unionized than their lower-educated 
counterparts).
7
 These unions bargained separately from other unions, guarded wage 
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differentials as jealously as did craft unions representing skilled manual workers, and, 
mainly because of these differentials, took a stance towards government interference 
that was quite different from unions that also represented many lower skilled workers. 
In fact, and as we will see below and in the following chapters, in their resistance 
towards redistributive government intervention, they often sided with employer interest 
groups. In short, there is good reason to argue against the view that in the United 
Kingdom strong union organization among one occupational group of workers helps to 
advance the interests of other groups of workers as well. 
Bain’s belief that unionization of white-collar workers would help to advance the 
interests of their manual worker counterparts can be attributed to one of two mistakes 
that are still often made by industrial relations and welfare state scholars: he was either 
not aware of the vast differences in interests among different occupational categories of 
workers, or he assumed that worker movements by necessity display some degree of 
worker solidarity. Yet different categories of workers have many competing interests 
and worker solidarity cannot be assumed – at least not in nations in which occupational 
divisions within the union movement lay these competing interests so clearly bare. Such 
occupational divisions matter a great deal here. Had Britain’s white-collar workers 
organized themselves predominantly in unions that catered to multiple occupational 
groups, then Bain’s argument would have been valid. Yet, because of a series of 
coincidental circumstances grounded in Britain’s industrialization process, they did not.  
A crucial feature of the British labor union movement is that it almost completely 
lacks unions that cater to a wide range of different occupational groups or skills. There 
are only a few unions in the United Kingdom that could qualify as industrial unions, and 
even these organize fewer grades of workers than do their counterparts in northwest 
continental Europe. The most complete industrial union in the United Kingdom is the 
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). Even in this industry, however, ‘privileged’ 
white-collar professions like managers and under-managers, foremen, overmen, 
deputies, shotfirers and colliery clerks all organize in separate organizations.
8
 The same 
holds for the only other unions that could qualify as industrial unions in the United 
Kingdom, the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) and its 
most prominent predecessors, the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) and National 
Union of Seamen (NUS). In other industries, skilled manual workers also rally in their 
own unions, leaving unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers to organize in separate 
general unions. While most of these unions are members of the TUC, this union 
confederation has done little to diminish the occupational divisions that exist within the 
British labor union movement. In fact, and as we will also see below and in the 
following chapters, it is mainly because of these occupational divisions that the TUC’s 
                                                                                                                                          
throughout the postwar period. In fact, it is for this reason that economists and labor market scholars 
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The Economics of Trade Unions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); John S. Pettingill, Labor 
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authority over its members is notoriously weak, and that its function is mostly limited to 
lobbying government.
9
 
In the sharp differentiation of its unions along occupational lines, the United King-
dom closely resembles those countries that were once part of its economic and political 
sphere of influence, like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland 
– all countries that through no coincidence are known for their ‘liberal’ labor market 
and welfare features.
10
 At the same time, it differs starkly in this from its continental 
European counterparts. To be sure, occupational unionism also exists among the 
countries of continental Europe – and to a greater extent in some of these countries than 
in others. Yet crucially, its importance is nowhere as great on the European continent as 
in the Anglo-Saxon world. In most continental European countries a certain proportion 
of organized white-collar workers rally in separate white-collar unions. Yet contrary to 
in the United Kingdom, many of these white-collar unions are organized predominantly 
along ‘vertical’ lines.
11
 Perhaps even more important, in only three European countries 
did a strong craft tradition remain in existence during the postwar period. These 
countries are the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark – with craft unionism being 
much weaker in the latter than in the former two.
12
 Finally, all continental European 
countries have strong industrial unions that aim to organize workers regardless of skill 
or profession. 
It could be argued that of all continental European countries, the Netherlands has 
historically differed most from the United Kingdom in terms of the occupational-
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Trade Unions; Jelle Visser, In Search of Inclusive Unionism. A Comparative Analysis (Deventer: Kluwer, 
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Ferner and Richard Hyman, Changing Industrial Relations in Europe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1998) 
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industrial divide. As a result of its much later industrialization, the subsequent power of 
socialist ideals during the formative period of the labor union movement, and the impact 
of religious cleavages, occupational unionism never managed to establish a firm footing 
in the Netherlands. In contrast to their much longer established counterparts in the 
United Kingdom, nearly all Dutch craft unions that came into being in the late-
nineteenth century came to expand their membership by integrating unskilled and semi-
skilled manual workers at the turn of the century.
13
 Many white-collar unions were 
initially more hesitant to merge with industrial unions representing mainly manual 
workers or to open their membership to lower skilled white-collar workers, but were 
eventually forced to do so under strong pressure from the three main union federations, 
the socialist NVV, the protestant CNV, and the Roman Catholic Workers’ Federation 
(Rooms-Katholiek Werkliedenverbond or RKWV) – and the RKWV’s predecessors the 
KAB and NKV.
14
 Throughout the postwar period, these three industrially organized 
union federations have represented some eighty percent of all organized workers.
15
 
Although they still represent separate white-collar unions, these are now organized 
exclusively along sectoral lines. 
Of course, occupational-based worker organization never completely disappeared 
from the Netherlands. But as it remained present only in unions who did not belong to 
the “big three,” its role has historically been quite small. Up to the late 1970s, when a 
new union federation called the Federation for Middle and Higher Level Personnel 
(Vakcentrale voor Middelbaar en Hoger Personeel, henceforth MHP) was awarded a 
single seat on the Social-Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad, or SER), these 
three federations had a complete monopoly on labor’s side of the bargaining table in the 
country’s many corporatist bodies. Today, they still hold nine out of ten seats in the 
Social-Economic Council, since the MHP has never organized more than eight percent 
of all workers.
16
 This means that throughout the period under investigation here the 
industrially organized big three have served as the exclusive voice of labor in all matters 
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concerning the development of protection against labor market risks for workers – and 
for other members of society.  
The above-analyzed distinction between the strong occupational nature of unionism 
in the United Kingdom and the overall industrial nature of unionism in the Netherlands 
is well described in the industrial relations literature. The origins of this distinction are 
equally-well documented and understood by labor historians.
17
 Even many of its 
consequences are well-described. So are scholars well aware of the different ideological 
affiliations of British craft and general unions, with the former sometimes leaning 
towards the liberal end of the political spectrum and the latter displaying a strong 
socialist orientation.
18
 Moreover, the opposition of British craft and occupationally 
organized white-collar unions against attempts to decrease wage differentials has so 
often been noted by scholars that it is now textbook knowledge.
19
 A similar opposition 
has been noted by scholars working on labor relations in the Netherlands, who 
explained both the low organizational level of white-collar workers and the rise of the 
MHP there by the aversion of affluent white-collar workers to the wage-leveling 
tendencies of industrial unions.
20
 Finally, several historians working on different 
countries have noted instances in which unions representing privileged workers resisted 
attempts to merge their occupationally organized insurance schemes into broader public 
schemes.
21
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Yet because of the tendency of scholars to focus on class divisions, these conse-
quences have not made their way into the broader literature on welfare state develop-
ment and industrial relations. In the preceding chapter, I have already described how the 
dominant research tradition on the development of welfare states views the involvement 
in this process of labor unions. In other scholarly fields, a similar view can be discerned. 
Despite the above-mentioned efforts of many British unions to preserve, if not increase, 
wage differentials between their members and other workers, in much of the literature 
on industrial relations, labor unions are simply assumed to bring an egalitarian agenda 
to the bargaining table that includes wage compression among different categories of 
workers.
22
 It is for this reason that differences in wage equality among nations are 
commonly explained as an outcome of cross-national differences in union density levels 
– and rarely as the result of cross-national differences in union structure.
23
 
 Apparently, the portrayal of labor unions as the natural defenders of the disadvan-
taged has become so ingrained in the scholarly imagination that scholars often fail to 
spot obvious signs or flat-out facts that point to the contrary. A very obvious, and 
important, example of this lies in the ideological commitment of the British labor union 
movement to voluntarism. Existing studies have explained this commitment in many 
ways. None of them have, however, done so by pointing to the British labor union 
movement’s particular organizational features, and the resulting resistance of a large 
part of its membership against any attempt to redistribute income among different 
categories of workers. This resistance naturally has also had important consequences for 
attempts to provide adequate provision against labor market risks. For this reason, and 
because traditional voluntarist explanations like union suspicions of the ‘bourgeois’ 
state are often used to explain instances of trade union opposition to welfare state 
development (see also chapter 7 on this), the next section of this chapter takes a look at 
the voluntarist inclinations of the British labor union movement. In so doing, it argues 
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that these inclinations cannot be understood without taking into account the opposition 
of craft and occupationally organized white-collar unions to any attempt to redistribute 
income between their members and lower skilled workers. In the following sections, I 
discuss the consequences of this for our understanding of welfare state development.  
 
REVISITING BRITISH VOLUNTARISM 
It is a well-known fact that the British labor union movement has historically been quite 
reluctant to accept government intervention in the labor market. In the literature on 
industrial relations, the British labor union movement’s aversion to government 
interference in the labor market is known as its commitment to voluntarism, or free 
collective bargaining. This commitment has been particularly visible in the area of wage 
bargaining. The TUC, for example, never lobbied for a statutory extension of collective 
bargaining outcomes. For an extremely long time, it resisted the introduction of a 
statutory national minimum wage. It has always strongly opposed the introduction of a 
long-term incomes policy and has seldom proven willing to moderate wage demands in 
exchange for public welfare development. Finally, and as acknowledged by only a few 
scholars, in comparison to many of its foreign counterparts, it has taken a quite reluctant 
stance towards major public welfare initiatives.
24
 Such remarkably strong opposition to 
nearly any form of statutory interference with the wage bargaining process cannot be 
found anywhere in the by industrial unions dominated countries of northwest 
continental Europe.
25
 It can, by contrast, be found in many other countries where 
occupational divisions are strong. An excellent example of this is the behavior of the 
largely occupationally organized American Federation of Labor (AFL) during the first 
half of the twentieth century.
26
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In the literature on labor markets and welfare state development, the voluntarist 
inclinations of the TUC, as with those of the AFL, for that matter, are generally 
explained as a natural outcome of union suspicions towards allowing a potentially 
hostile government to undermine union functions. Ever since the eminent British law 
expert Otto Freud-Kahn popularized the term “voluntarism” in the United Kingdom, it 
has become orthodoxy to belief that any instance of trade union opposition to 
government interference with the labour market reflected the belief of unions that “what 
the state has given the state cannot take away.”
27
 In another classic work on the 
“tradition of voluntarism” in the United Kingdom, Allan Flanders noted the popularity 
of attributing the voluntarist tendencies of the British labor union movement to “the 
notion that unions have, as it were, lifted themselves into their present position of power 
and influence by their own unaided efforts in overcoming employer resistance and 
hostile social forces.”
28
 More recently, Geoffrey Finalyson explained the voluntarist 
inclinations of the TUC by arguing: “In working-class memory, the state could well be 
equated with sinister rather than friendly forces…. There remained a suspicion that the 
ulterior motive was to hold the working classes in a subordinate position of tutelage.”
29
 
In full accordance with this line of thinking, Chris Howell recently argued that unions 
come to rely more on the state when they become weaker in terms of organizational 
strength.
30
 
These interpretations of the voluntarist inclinations of the British labor union 
movement fit neatly into the prevailing class-based view of industrial relations. In this 
view, the voluntarist inclinations of the British labor union movement were nothing 
more than the outcome of a natural distrust of a state that had so often proven to side 
with labor’s capitalist enemies. Instead of handing over key union functions to this state, 
unions were therefore better off relying on their own voluntary associations. At the 
same time, scholars often present voluntarism as a key survival strategy of the British 
union movement. They do so by arguing that once unions allow the government to take 
over key union functions, they might very well find it more difficult to attract workers – 
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an argument that, as we will see, British unions often espouse themselves.
31
 Both 
arguments are, as will be demonstrated in chapter 7, commonly used to explain the 
voluntarist tendencies of other labor union movements that are known for their 
occupational divisions as well.  
What are we to make of these explanations? There is certainly some truth in the 
view that labor unions will, where possible, prefer to “go at it alone” than turn to the 
state for help to achieve their goals. It also makes sense that this propensity is at least 
partly grounded in union anxiety over allowing a potentially hostile state to undermine 
key union functions – although the emphasis may then very well lie more on their 
concerns over their ability to attract new workers than on their suspicions of govern-
ment motives.
32
 Yet the issue here is not whether unions have a general propensity to 
prefer to “go at it alone.” Instead, we must strive to explain the British labor union 
movement’s extraordinarily strong opposition to government intervention in the labor 
market. There are several good reasons to doubt that the explanations put forward above 
can convincingly account for this. Two of these reasons can be established immediately.  
One obvious problem is that traditional voluntarist arguments cannot explain why 
the industrially organized labor union movements of continental Europe have generally 
been much more willing to accept government intervention in the labor market. This 
greater willingness cannot be explained, it should be noted, by the argument that unions 
become more willing to accept government intervention in the labor market when they 
become weaker in terms of organizational strength. After all, in countries like Belgium 
and Sweden, for example, a much higher degree of unionization has coexisted with a 
much greater willingness to accept government intervention in the labor market.
33
 Nor 
can it be explained by arguing that the continental European trade union movements 
simply became less suspicious of their governments because the existence of so-called 
“neo-corporatist” policy-making institutions resulted in a more harmonious state of 
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affairs there.
34
 The problem with this line of reasoning is that it might turn the chain of 
cause and effect upside down. After all, one could argue equally well and arguably 
much more forcefully, that the fragmented nature of the British trade union movement 
and its commitment to voluntarism stood in the way of the successful development of 
such institutions in the first place.
35
  
Another problem is that not all British labor unions have always been equally 
committed to the ideology of voluntarism. Over the years, many scholars have for 
example noted instances in which craft unions representing skilled manual workers 
were far more resistant to government intervention in the labor market than were 
general unions representing unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers.
36
 One such 
instance will be treated at length below. Not coincidentally, skilled manual workers 
have a much stronger position on the labor market than do their unskilled and semi-
skilled counterparts. Whereas the former are typically quite able to achieve adequate 
wages and insurance against labor market risks through voluntary bargaining, the latter 
often can only do so after a redistributive effort from other worker occupations. 
Crucially, this gives these different groups of workers a decisively different interest in 
government intervention in the wage bargaining process.  
The differences described above suggest that there may be another explanation for 
the voluntarist inclinations of the British labor union movement besides the ones we 
have seen thus far. This explanation begins with the recognition that government 
intervention in the labor market often has a distinct redistributive aim and nearly always 
has redistributive consequences. Most importantly, these redistributive consequences 
often primarily affect the distribution of income among different categories of workers. 
This is, as we have seen in the previous chapter, obviously the case with public welfare 
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development. It is equally obvious the case with the introduction of a national minimum 
wage. After all, the introduction of a national minimum wage can only result in net 
gains to the lower-paid if the higher-paid are willing to accept a lesser share of the 
national income, or in other words, are willing to accept some degree of wage 
compression. Other examples can be added to this. For instance, even the introduction 
of a long-term incomes policy aimed at achieving wage moderation often has 
consequences that affect the distribution of income among different categories of 
workers. After all, attempts to introduce such incomes policies are often accompanied 
with low pay provisions that allow the wages of the lower-paid to rise somewhat faster 
than those of higher income workers.
37
 
Once we realize these consequences for the distribution of income among different 
groups of workers, and acknowledge that labor unions do not necessarily favor 
redistributive efforts between workers, then the historic commitment of the British labor 
union movement to voluntarism can be understood as the outcome of its organizational 
features as well. An excellent way to illustrate this is by looking at the problem of low 
pay in the United Kingdom. Up to the introduction of the 1998 National Minimum 
Wage Act, the United Kingdom did not have a common floor for wage levels as it 
neither had a statutory national minimum wage nor an effective functional equivalent in 
the form of minimum pay rates made possible by an extensive spread of collective 
bargaining. It did have so-called wage councils that aimed to set minimum wages in a 
limited number of industries. Yet on the whole these councils were quite ineffective.
38
  
Among the many reasons for the absence of a common floor for wage levels, the 
voluntarist inclinations of the TUC surely were among the most important. From the 
mid-1960s, when the then-reigning Labour Party first considered the introduction of a 
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statutory national minimum wage, through the mid-1980s, when the Party dropped its 
already-loose commitment to this from its campaign documents, the TUC strongly 
opposed the introduction of a statutory national minimum wage. Contrary to most of its 
European counterparts, it also never lobbied for a statutory extension of collective 
bargaining outcomes, which could have provided a functional equivalent to the 
introduction of a national minimum wage.  
In the literature on industrial relations, the TUC’s long-standing opposition to the 
introduction of a statutory national minimum wage has received much attention. Over 
the years, many scholars have attempted to explain this opposition, and most have done 
so by relying on traditional voluntarist arguments. The explanation set forth most 
frequently is that Britain’s unions feared that the introduction of a statutory national 
minimum wage would undermine their function and with that their ability to attract new 
workers.
39
 Another common explanation cites union suspicions of government motives 
or, when Labour was in power, bad relations with the government. According to low 
pay experts Chris Pond and Steve Winyard, for example, it was “not difficult to see why 
the TUC came out so strongly against a statutory NMW…. Its relationship with the 
Labour Government deteriorated sharply towards the end of the 1960s.... This, together 
with a long tradition of ‘voluntarism’, made it extremely unlikely that any increase in 
government involvement in the wage determination would be accepted.”
40
 Other 
explanations for the TUC’s opposition to the statutory national minimum wage have 
focused on union fears that such an introduction would put a ceiling on wage increases 
or would be meaningless, since “the trade union movement had no guarantee that 
governments would either introduce, or establish a minimum at a level acceptable to the 
unions.”
41
 
It is possible to criticize each of these arguments on its own merits. For the moment, 
I will, however, confine myself to two general remarks. First, it should be noted that 
these arguments do not explain why some unions, namely those representing many low-
paid workers, did support the introduction of a statutory national minimum wage. Some 
of these unions had held this position long before Labour representatives first 
approached the TUC over a possible introduction of a statutory national minimum wage 
during the mid-1960s – and the TUC rejected this. Already, at the 1946 annual Congress, 
for example, the National Union of Vehicle Builders (NUVB, which would later 
                                                
39
 According to Lewis Minkin, for example, “For years the tradition of free collective bargaining and 
anxiety over a possible undermining of union functions had been major obstacles to the Movement’s 
support for a statutory minimum wage.” See Minkin, The Contentious Alliance, 429. In alignment with 
this view, Chris Howell noted that statutory national minimum wage “may possibly weaken unions 
because workers can make gains through legislation rather than collective action.” See Howell, Trade 
Unions and the State, 181. See also David Metcalf, “The British National Minimum Wage,” British 
Journal of Industrial Relations 37:2 (1999) 172; Michael Terry, Redefining Public Sector Unionism: 
UNISON and the Future of Trade Unions (London: Routledge, 2000) 157; 
40
 Pond and Winyard, The Case, 36; Jill Rubery and Paul Edwards, “Low Pay and the National Minimum 
Wage.” In Paul K. Edwards, Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003) 460. 
41
 Sheila Blackburn, “The Problem of Riches: From Trade Boards to a National Minimum Wage,” 
Industrial Relations Journal 51:2 (1988) 131. See also Stephen Keevash, “Wage Councils: An 
Examination of Trade Union and Conservative Misconceptions About the Effect of Statutory Wage 
Fixing,” Industrial Law Journal 14:1 (1985) 217-32. 
  
32 
become part of the largest general union of the United Kingdom, the Transport and 
General Workers’ Union or TGWU) had demanded the introduction of a legally 
enforceable national minimum wage. This NUVB demand was eventually rejected in a 
vote in which skill cleavages played an important role.
42
 During the 1960s and 1970s, 
the TGWU and the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE), which also organized 
many lower-paid workers, seem to have been among the staunchest supporters of a 
statutory national minimum wage.
43
 In other words, when unions also represented many 
low-paid workers, they were often much less fearful of handing over a key union 
function to a potentially hostile government. And neither did the idea that a statutory 
national minimum wage might put a ceiling on wage increases apparently deter these 
unions from demanding its introduction. In this, they were quite different from 
traditional craft unions and occupationally organized white-collar unions which, as we 
will see below, quite eagerly used these arguments to underscore their support for 
unfettered free collective bargaining. 
A second problem with the explanations given above has already been mentioned in 
the context of the British union movement’s overall insistence on voluntarism. This 
problem is that these explanations do not show why the trade union movements in most 
other European countries did not display such deep misgivings about the introduction of 
a statutory national minimum wage. In the Netherlands, for example, the three trade 
union federations successfully pressed for the introduction of a statutory national 
minimum wage when they were at the peak of their organizational power in the mid-
1960s.
44
 In many other continental European countries as well, statutory national 
minimum wages have long been an accepted feature of the industrial relations 
systems.
45
 
To be sure, the United Kingdom was by no means the only European country not to 
have a statutory national minimum wage during most of the postwar period. To date, 
Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland, Germany and Austria still rely 
completely on employer organizations and labor unions to set adequate minimum 
earnings levels through voluntary collective bargaining. Yet this does not mean that the 
absence of a statutory national minimum wage in the United Kingdom until 1999, and 
these other countries until the present day, can be explained in the same way. A crucial 
difference here is that all of these countries have been far more successful in setting a 
common floor for wage levels through functional equivalents, made possible by very 
high collective bargaining levels. Finland, Denmark, Switzerland, Germany and Austria 
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have done so through a statutory extension of collective bargaining agreements, while 
Norway and Sweden have relied exclusively on their very high union membership 
levels to achieve this. Either way, all these countries have been more successful in 
addressing the problem of poverty in employment than the United Kingdom has been.
46
 
 To illustrate this difference, although it is not one of the main country cases exam-
ined in the following chapters, it is necessary to examine the Swedish case here, briefly. 
Like the United Kingdom, Sweden does not have a statutory extension of collective 
bargaining outcomes; and like the United Kingdom up to 1999, it lacks a statutory 
national minimum wage. Among the many reasons for this is surely the fact that 
Sweden’s main trade union federation, the Landsorganisationen I Sverige (LO), never 
pressed for either of the two. Partly as a result of this, the LO has over the years also 
gained a reputation for its reluctance to accept government interference in the labor 
market. It certainly has been more reluctant to accept government interference than 
most of its continental European counterparts have been – even though it is also 
organized on an industrial basis.
47
 One could argue that this presents a problem for my 
argument that much of the TUC’s resistance against government intervention in the 
labor market can be explained, not by traditional voluntarist arguments like union 
anxiety over allowing a potentially hostile government to undermine union functions, 
but by its occupational features, and the resulting resistance of unions representing 
privileged workers against the redistributive consequences of government intervention 
in the labor market. Yet to do so would be to miss that that voluntarist inclinations of 
the LO have been decidedly different from those of the TUC – both in scope and in 
nature. 
To understand this, it is first necessary to point out that both the TUC and LO have, 
despite their voluntarist inclinations, accepted and even pushed for many instances of 
government intervention in the labor market over the years. This of course raises the 
question of why union anxiety over allowing a potentially hostile government to 
undermine union functions would have led both union organizations to reject 
government intervention in the labor market in some instances, but not in others. 
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Despite its apparent suspicion of government motives, the TUC has, for example, 
supported many instances of legislation in the area of trade union recognition; despite 
its fears that government intervention would undermine key union functions, it has 
supported legislation aimed at regulating work hours and physical conditions. 
According to Flanders, therefore, the TUC has “at times or in areas of industrial 
weakness [displayed] the greatest readiness to resort to the method of legal enactment, 
either because collective bargaining was unavailable or because its results were 
unacceptable.”
48
 Yet crucially, the TUC hardly ever displayed such readiness to accept 
government initiatives that related to the crucial era of wage bargaining, let alone when 
these had strong redistributive consequences.
49
 In this respect, its stance has been quite 
different from that of the LO.  
Like the TUC, the LO has supported legislation aimed at matters like trade union 
recognition and the regulation of working hours and physical conditions of work. Yet 
contrary to the TUC, it has also given its full support to many initiatives that had 
important consequences for the distribution of wages among different categories of 
workers. Compared to the TUC, the LO has, for example, played a far more active and 
constructive role in the expansion of redistributive welfare programs.
50
 Contrary to the 
TUC, it pressed for the development of a coherent and expansive labor market policy.
51
 
Finally, in contrast with the TUC, the LO approached its government during the 1970s 
with several legislative initiatives designed to support its solidaristic bargaining aims. 
The most well-known of these was its request to set up so-called “wage bargaining 
funds.”
52
 All of these LO actions had strong consequences for the distribution of income 
among different categories of workers. This means that, in contrast with the TUC, the 
voluntarist inclinations of the LO cannot be explained through the resistance of (some 
of) its members to the redistributive consequences of government intervention in the 
labor market.  
Of course, this does raise the question of why the LO then never lobbied for the 
introduction of, for instance, a statutory national minimum wage or an extension of 
collective bargaining outcomes. A crucial part of the answer to this question seems to be 
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that there simply never was a real need to do so. First, due to the combination of 
industrially organized unionism and exceedingly high union density rates, there was no 
need to push for a statutory extension to reach collective bargaining rates that were as 
high as those in other continental European countries.
53
 In the immediate postwar period, 
Swedish unions already organized sixty percent of all workers – a number higher than 
the current collective bargaining rate in the United Kingdom.
54
 Second, because of its 
ability to decrease wage differentials, the LO did not need to push for a statutory 
national minimum wage to address the problem of poverty in employment. During the 
first decades of the postwar period, it made enormous progress in decreasing the 
problem of poverty in employment through voluntary bargaining.
55
 
In this, it differed starkly from the TUC. There are several ways to illustrate the 
comparative success of the Swedish voluntary approach to solving the problem of 
poverty in employment. By the early 1970s, to take one example, the official poverty 
rate in Sweden had been reduced to a mere three percent – contrasting with eight 
percent in the United Kingdom.
56
 On top of this, there were far more people who lived 
just above this poverty line in the United Kingdom than in Sweden. This suggests that 
poverty in Sweden was more frequently the result of incidental circumstances, whereas 
in the United Kingdom, poverty to a very large extent stemmed from the British unequal 
wage structure. Further evidence of this is found in the fact that nearly a quarter of all 
British citizens whose income ranked below the official poverty line in 1979 lived in 
families where the breadwinner was in full-time work.
57
 Some full-time workers, in fact, 
earned a pre-tax income that was less than thirty percent of average male earnings in 
manufacturing industry in the same year.
58
 
Under such circumstances, the introduction of a statutory national minimum wage 
would certainly have improved matters for the low-paid in the United Kingdom. The 
TUC nevertheless came out in firm opposition to the minimum wage when it was first 
proposed by a Labour government during the mid-1960s, and continued to do so until 
the late 1980s. Why did the TUC oppose its introduction for such a long time? Was this 
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truly because it feared that a statutory solution would undermine its “function” to 
improve matters for the low-paid voluntary means? Given its complete inability to 
improve matters for the low-paid in the first decades of the postwar period, this seems 
quite unlikely.
59
 It is much more likely that the TUC opposed the introduction of a 
statutory national minimum wage for so long for the same reason it proved unable to 
improve matters for the low-paid in the first place. This reason was the strong 
opposition of unions representing privileged workers against any attempt to reduce 
wage differentials between their members and lower-paid workers. 
This alternative view is certainly reinforced by the long period of TUC apathy 
toward the problem of poverty in employment. During the first two decades of the 
postwar period, the General Council devoted little attention to this problem. In fact, 
there was not even a separate workgroup to address the problem of low pay. Of course, 
given the strong opposition of occupationally organized unions to any attempt to reduce 
wage differentials between their members and lower-paid workers, it is unclear what 
such a workgroup could have achieved. A good example of how this opposition shaped 
the TUC’s stance in all matters related to wage bargaining is found in the TUC’s 
response to government calls for voluntary wage restraint during the late 1940s. When 
government representatives approached the TUC General Council with this request, the 
Council itself exhorted them to “recognize the need to safeguard those wage differen-
tials which are an essential element in the wages structure of many important industries 
and are required to sustain those standards of craftsmanship, training and experience 
that contribute directly to industrial efficiency and higher productivity.” Ironically, the 
General Council at the same time asked the government to “admit the necessity of 
adjusting the wages of those workers whose incomes are below a reasonable standard of 
subsistence.” Perhaps unaware of the obvious contradiction of this, the General Council 
stated its willingness to deliver wage restraint if the government was willing to do 
both.
60
  
It seems that the problem of low pay only became an important issue for the TUC in 
the mid-1960s, when the then-ruling Labour Party began contemplating the introduction 
of a statutory national minimum wage. When TUC officials consulted their main union 
affiliates on this issue, they soon noticed how divided these were. As had been the case 
in 1946, this division strongly correlated with skill cleavages. Whereas the General and 
Municipal Workers Union (GMWU), for example, expressed strong support for a 
statutory minimum, craft unions like the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC) 
stated their fear that this would “retard progress in improving the wages of those 
workers whose earnings were above the statutory minimum.” White-collar unions like 
the National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO), whose members 
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were generally also well-off, added to this that “wage negotiation was a field in which 
statutory interference could not be tolerated.”
61
 
Why did unions like the GMWU, ISTC and NALGO oppose the introduction of a 
statutory national minimum wage so strongly? As these unions often did not even allow 
low-paid (officially, “unskilled”) workers as members, one could hardly argue that their 
opposition stemmed from fears that a statutory minimum would undermine a key union 
function and with that their ability to attract new workers. The real reason, then, lay in 
their opposition to the potential consequences of its introduction for wage differentials 
between their members and lower-paid workers. Craft unions like the ISTC made this 
abundantly clear when it justified its opposition by citing the strong opposition of its 
membership, to a suggestion made “some years ago”, to concentrate wage increases on 
the low paid. To introduce a statutory national minimum wage, ISTC officials argued, 
would have the same effect, as this would “retard progress in improving the wages of 
those workers whose earnings were above the statutory national minimum.” The Civil 
Service Pensioner Alliance (CSPA) justified its opposition even more clearly by arguing 
that its “membership was unwilling to sacrifice the maximum rate in any contraction of 
increment scales in order to help those at the lower levels, essentially because many of 
those at the top felt low paid themselves.”
62
 
In the face of such strong opposition from a large and powerful part of its member-
ship, the TUC General Council had no choice but to oppose Labour’s plans for the 
introduction of a statutory national minimum wage. One reason for this was surely that 
it did not want to alienate its more privileged membership. But another consideration 
has to be mentioned as well. Since unions representing relatively affluent workers 
opposed the introduction of a statutory national minimum wage mainly because of its 
redistributive consequences, they would surely attempt to undo any decrease in wage 
differentials resulting from its introduction by demanding higher wage increases during 
future negotiations. The General Council was well aware of this, and an internal note on 
the subject summed up its consequences quite neatly: “The problem is that simply 
raising basic rates may raise the wages of all workers by a proportionate amount; this 
general effect will limit the amount that can be allocated to the lower paid in the sense 
that there is an overall limit on what firms can afford to pay without raising prices. If 
they do raise prices, this will have a disproportionately adverse affect on the real 
incomes of the lowest paid workers in the economy in general.”
63
 Under these 
circumstances, the introduction of a statutory minimum wage would not only be 
“costly,” it would also have little effect, since “differentials would be rigidly maintained 
and…prices increased to an extent that would wipe out the effects of the initial increase 
in low payment incomes.”
64
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Once the TUC spoke out firmly against the introduction of a statutory national 
minimum wage, the Labour government decided to drop it. Its awareness of the rigid 
attachment to preserving wage differentials certainly played a role in this. In 1969, a 
government working group published a Green Paper in which it advised against the 
introduction of a national minimum wage “through statutory means.” According to the 
working group, the costs of a statutory national minimum wage would depend on the 
repercussions on the earnings of those who were not lower-paid. While the Green Paper 
did not contain an exact estimate of these costs, it did point out that “manual workers’ 
differentials have been remarkably stable over the last eighty years.”
65
 Table 2.1 shows 
that this statement was no exaggeration: while having made small gains in the two 
decades following on the onset of the Second World War (during the 1940s, flat rate 
increases for all workers, which had the effect of narrowing pay differentials, were quite 
prevalent; after this, percentage increases again became the norm), the lowest-paid 
workers were actually worse off in 1982 than they had been in 1886 in terms of their 
share of the pre-tax income distribution among manual workers.
66
 It should be noted 
that there is little reason to assume that pay differentials between different categories of 
white-collar workers followed a different pattern in this period.
67
 
 
Table 2.1: Dispersion of weekly earnings of full-time male manual workers, 1886-
1980 
Year % median 
lowest decile 
% median 
lowest quartile 
% median 
upper quartile 
% median highest 
decile 
1886 68.6 82.8 121.7 143.1 
1906 66.5 79.5 126.7 156.8 
1938 67.7 82.1 121.7 145.2 
1960 70.6 82.6 121.7 145.2 
1970 67.3 81.1 122.3 147.5 
1982 68.3 81.8 123.5 152.6 
Sources Chris Pond (1981) “Low pay – 1980s style,” Low Pay Review, 4 (1981) 1-10; Chris 
Pond and Steve Winyard, The Case for a National Minimum Wage (London: LPU, 1984). 
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In following years, the introduction of a statutory national minimum wage remained 
an official policy stance of the Labour Party. But this did not result in concrete actions 
when it returned to power in the mid-1970s. The unremitting opposition of the TUC, 
and Labour’s awareness of the implications of the insistence of a large part of the trade 
union movement on maintaining wage differentials, must have played a crucial role in 
this. In its response to the problem of poverty in employment, the TUC merely began to 
suggest minimum wage targets. It did so even though internal reports were quite clear 
about the limitations of voluntary action in solving the problem of low wages.
68
 Some 
TUC affiliates – in particular, the general unions – continued to lobby for the 
introduction of a statutory national minimum wage at various Congresses. Yet this also 
merely resulted in calls for the introduction of a national minimum through voluntary 
means.
69
 
Given the TUC’s internal acknowledgement that the problem of low pay could not 
be solved through voluntary means, it is interesting to note the reasons TUC officials 
gave for their continued resistance to a legislative solution. In their dealings with 
Labour representatives, TUC officials often resorted to traditional voluntarist arguments. 
One wonders whether many of these arguments were not simply offered out of 
convenience. When TUC officials argued, for instance, that the introduction of a 
statutory national minimum wage would be disastrous for collective bargaining for the 
low-paid, Labour representatives knew this argument to be invalid, because collective 
bargaining had done nothing to improve the position of the lower-paid in the last thirty 
years.
70
 When TUC officials much later argued that a statutory national minimum wage 
might make it more difficult to recruit lower-paid workers, Labour representatives were 
equally unimpressed. To them, the experience with the wage councils had already 
shown that this did not have to be the case.
71
  
The TUC did eventually come to support the introduction of a statutory national 
minimum wage. In 1986, a TUC Congress successfully passed a vote on this for the first 
time since 1924.
72
 It is hard to say why a majority of trade union members now proved 
willing to consider its introduction. Perhaps their willingness resulted, as Lewis Minkin 
has argued, from a weakening of the industrial role of the trade union movement, 
coupled with leadership changes in key unions.
73
 Or perhaps the continual erosion of the 
wage councils convinced unions that had been previously opposed to a statutory 
minimum wage that its introduction was now inevitable.
74
 Whatever the reasons, it 
should be noted that it still required “some adroit work by the TUC staff to create a 
majority at the Congress,” since many unions remained staunchly opposed to the 
introduction of a statutory national minimum wage. Tensions within the trade union 
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movement over the issue were apparently so great that when the General Council finally 
did manage to agree on it in the context of an incomes policy, the Labour Party turned it 
down as undeliverable.
75
  
Among the unions that were still opposed to the introduction of a statutory national 
minimum wage were the usual craft suspects, such as the Electrical, Electronic, 
Telecommunications and Plumbing Union (EETPU), which complained of having been 
“bounced towards acquiescence” on the issue.
76
 At the same time, it seems that the 
TGWU, which had always been one of the greatest supporters of a statutory minimum 
wage, now also had its doubts. The hesitation on the part of the TGWU leadership 
seems to have been the result of a genuine concern that statutory interference might 
undermine its ability to attract new workers.
77
 Yet crucially, this did not stop it from 
supporting the introduction of a statutory national minimum wage in the end – just as it 
had supported its introduction in previous years. That the opposition of the EETPU 
against its introduction was in fact motivated by other concerns became fully clear in 
later years when its successor, the Amalgated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU), 
warned that it would strive to reverse any resulting reductions in wage differentials that 
its members might experience.
78
  
When the introduction of a statutory national minimum wage finally became possi-
ble after the election of New Labour in 1997, many commentators noted that its hourly 
rate was set well below both the level demanded by some unions and the level promised 
by Labour when it was still in opposition. During the early 1990s, the Labour Party had 
committed itself to a minimum wage that equaled to half of average male earnings, a 
percentage that was to increase to two-thirds over the years. When the statutory national 
minimum wage finally came into effect in April of 1998, its level was between forty-
three and forty-six percent of average male earnings.
79
 This lower level, and Labour’s 
refusal to allow for an automatic yearly increase of the hourly rate, drew protests from 
several unions.
80
 Yet given the rigid attachment of unions like the AEEU to existing 
wage differentials, it is hard to see how a much higher rate could have been feasible. It 
seems hard to disagree with David Metcalf’s assessment that this change in policy 
resulted from Labour’s concern that a level equaling half of male earnings would “have 
serious adverse economic effects” and its belief that it “would be a political and 
economic mistake to allow the level of the minimum wage to be determined in a way 
that took no account of wider economic and social circumstances, such as employment 
levels and income distribution.”
81
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SHAPING SOLIDARITY: UNION STRUCTURE AND THE 
REPRESENTATION OF WORKERS’ INTERESTS 
The above account of the TUC’s longstanding opposition to the introduction of a 
statutory national minimum wage served mainly to illustrate how the insistence of a 
powerful section of the British labor union movement on maintaining wage differentials 
complicated attempts to improve matters for the lower-paid. Since labor’s share of the 
national income is to a very large extent fixed by economic conditions that are beyond 
its exclusive control, efforts to improve matters for lower-paid workers must involve a 
redistributive effort between different grades of workers. The most obvious way to do 
so is through wage leveling. Yet, in the United Kingdom, powerful craft and other 
occupationally-organized unions opposed any attempt to level wages between their 
members and lower-skilled or otherwise lower-graded workers.  
By complicating attempts to improve matters for the lower-paid, the resistance of 
these unions to wage leveling also indirectly made it more difficult to provide adequate 
social protection from labor market risks for less affluent workers. This difficulty arose 
in many ways. Resistance to wage leveling, for instance, made it more difficult for 
lower-paid workers to finance adequate social protection against risks like unemploy-
ment and sickness, or to save for old age. It also made it more difficult to set minimum 
benefit levels that comfortably exceeded relative poverty levels, because these benefits 
then exceeded the wages of those workers who earned an income that was below the 
official poverty level. In 1981, according to the Low Pay Committee, nearly sixteen 
percent of all male manual workers aged eighteen and over earned an income that was 
lower than what they would have received if they had been enrolled in the supplemen-
tary benefit program (the official social assistance program at this time). This 
percentage would have jumped to twenty-six if overtime pay were excluded.
82
 This 
clearly compelled policy-makers to be conservative in setting social assistance levels. It 
also led to the introduction of a “wage stop” for beneficiaries with large families whose 
social assistance income exceeded their previous wage too comfortably.
83
 
At the same time, the resistance of craft and occupationally organized white-collar 
unions to any attempt to reduce wage differentials between their members and other 
workers also complicated efforts to provide adequate social protection for all workers in 
a more direct way. After all, if a union opposes any attempt to reduce wage differentials 
between its members and other workers, it will also oppose any welfare initiative that 
results in risk redistribution or the creation of a redistributive contributory system. Yet 
without some degree of ‘leveling’ of risk and income, efforts to provide adequate social 
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protection for all members of society cannot succeed. In the remainder of this chapter, I 
will examine the consequences of this.  
In the mid-1960s, shortly after the TUC General Council first came out against the 
introduction of a statutory national minimum wage, the Council received a letter from 
Sir Lincoln Evans, formerly the General Secretary of the craft union ISTC, and now 
spokesman for the Save the Occupational Pension (STOP) action group. STOP’s 
purpose was to prevent the introduction of the so-called Crossman Scheme, a 
government pension plan that aimed to improve matters for the roughly fifty percent of 
Britain’s working population that did not belong to a private pension scheme, and could 
thus look forward only to the dismally-low state pension after retirement. In his letter, 
Sir Evans stated that “the TUC recently declared against a legal minimum wage on the 
ground that it was not the business of the state to usurp the functions of the trade unions. 
In this its instinct was right. But if this view applies to wages it applies with equal force 
to occupational pensions, which are part of the parcel of the conditions of employment, 
often involving considerable deductions from wages and salaries.”
84
 Evans ended his 
letter by urging the TUC to reject the Crossman Scheme – just as many of its members 
had already done. 
It is of course possible that Evans argued against the Crossman Scheme only be-
cause of an ideological aversion towards state interference with the domain of industrial 
relations. After all, the resistance of occupationally organized unions representing 
privileged workers to any redistributive welfare initiatives is often defended through 
traditional voluntarist arguments – both by welfare state scholars and by these unions 
themselves.
85
 Yet given the fact that those unions that represented many workers 
without membership of private pension schemes univocally supported the Crossman 
Scheme, this is highly unlikely. The opposition of STOP to the Crossman Scheme more 
likely resulted from its redistributive features – to which I will return at length in the 
next chapter.  
For the Labour Party, which had produced the Crossman Scheme, the actions of 
STOP presented an uncomfortable truth. Just as the problem of poverty in employment 
in the United Kingdom could not be solved without higher-paid workers having to 
accept a lower share of the national income, so could many lower-paid workers not 
obtain an adequate income in old age without a redistributive effort from higher-paid 
workers. Yet, as Evans’ letter made abundantly clear, those unions that resisted any 
attempt to level wages also had little inclination to accept the redistributive implications 
of the Crossman Scheme. As we will see in the following chapters, they also resisted 
most of Labour’s proposals to improve the financial security of less affluent workers 
against the risks of unemployment, sickness, and disability.  
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The case of STOP’s opposition to the Crossman Scheme neatly illustrates the 
problem with scholars’ tendency to emphasize union strength. It is clearly wrong to 
focus only on union density when the union movement is itself thoroughly divided on 
issues of welfare and wage setting. When the Crossman Scheme was put forward, 
British unions organized more workers than they had ever done before. Yet this was of 
little help to the Labour Government that attempted to implement the Scheme. On the 
contrary, most of the growth in union membership was accounted for by occupationally 
organized white-collar unions, which, together with many of their craft counterparts, 
strongly resisted the Crossman Scheme. Instead of focusing on union density rates, then, 
we have to examine possible divisions within the labor union movement. The critical 
issue here is whether or to what degree unions are willing to support, or strive for, a 
redistributive effort between different grades of workers. In the United Kingdom, many 
of them were not willing to do so at all. 
At roughly the time when the TUC first rejected Labour’s proposals for the introduc-
tion of a statutory national minimum wage and many of Britain’s unions voiced their 
opposition to the Crossman Scheme, two similar initiatives were underway in the 
Netherlands. First, in 1968, the Dutch government introduced a statutory national 
minimum wage for all workers. Then, one year later, it announced its intention to raise 
the flat rate level of the state old age pension benefit to that of the minimum wage by 
increasing earnings-related contributions to the pension scheme. Both initiatives not 
only received full support from the three main union federations in the Netherlands; 
they were in fact demanded by them.
86
 The big three did so despite the strong 
implications of both initiatives for the distribution of income among different categories 
of workers. In fact, the introduction of the statutory national minimum wage was 
accompanied by such stringent wage leveling efforts that the Netherlands was soon to 
boast one of the most equal pre-tax wage distributions in the western world.
87
 
Moreover, it was these three unions which proposed to raise the level of the old age 
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pension benefit by increasing earnings-related contributions – which increased the 
already strong redistributive nature of the pension’s contributory system. To be sure, 
these contributions were completely paid for by workers. 
So far, I have paid much attention to the British labor union movement and little to 
its Dutch counterpart, although both are equally important actors in the following 
chapters. The reason for this is that, contrary to their occupationally organized British 
counterparts, the industrially organized unions of the Netherlands have always acted in 
a way that is completely in line with the prevailing view of union involvement in labor 
market and welfare state development. According to the plethora of existing writings on 
labor market development, unions are supposed to bring a redistributive agenda to the 
bargaining table – and this, as demonstrated by a plethora of empirical literature, is 
exactly what Dutch unions did.
88
 According to the prevailing wisdom on welfare state 
development, unions are the natural supporters of welfare state development – and this, 
as we will see in the following chapters, is exactly what Dutch unions were. Yet, this 
does not mean that they were such enthusiastic supporters for the same reasons that are 
generally put forward in the literature.  
It is important to note here that the willingness and ability of Dutch industrial unions 
to reduce wage differentials and, as we will see, to push for redistributive welfare 
solutions cannot be explained by arguing that all their members stood to gain from this. 
All three union federations in the Netherlands organized a wide variety of different 
grades of workers.
89
 These various groups had very different welfare state interests. 
While most of them probably had an interest in insuring themselves against labor 
market risks like unemployment, sickness, disability and old age, not all of them 
necessarily had an interest in doing so through public means. On the contrary, to 
achieve adequate insurance for all their members, the three union federations often 
opted for redistributive public solutions that were clearly to the detriment of their more 
privileged members. The leadership of these federations and their industrially organized 
union members were acutely aware of this. They nevertheless pushed forward with 
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initiatives that aimed to redistribute risks and introduce redistributive contributory 
systems. In doing so, they emphasized the importance of worker solidarity.
90
 
One can even wonder whether the solidaristic stances of Dutch industrial unions 
stemmed directly from the interests of the majority of their members. In the literature on 
wage bargaining, unions are generally assumed to bring a redistributive agenda to the 
bargaining table because of what is often called the “median voter model.” This model 
is based on the idea that in situations in which the mean wage is higher than the median 
wage (which is typically the case), a majority of members will benefit from, and 
therefore favor, wage compression.
91
 On those rare occasions in which the difference 
between the stance of unions representing higher-skilled workers and the “broader 
confederation of the labor movement” has been noted, a similar argument has been put 
forward.
92
 This line of reasoning can be criticized in many ways. One possible problem 
is that union membership might be concentrated among skilled workers and thus among 
the higher-paid half of the earnings distribution.
93
 A more pressing problem is that both 
wage leveling and redistributive welfare measures often do not affect the highest 
income brackets, which makes it doubtful whether the median member necessarily 
stands to gain from them. Then finally, it is crucial to note that the most probable 
median union member, the skilled manual worker, may himself not subscribe to the 
belief that wage leveling and redistributive welfare development are to his advantage. 
 What makes the difference between the British and Dutch labor union movement 
stances on redistributive welfare state development so remarkable is that it cannot be 
explained through differences in interests between British and Dutch unionized workers. 
Instead, the difference stemmed from differences in union structure, which shaped the 
ways in which union leaders represented workers’ interests. An excellent illustration of 
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this is the case of the skilled manual worker. In most countries, and certainly in the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, skilled manual workers have always formed the 
organizational backbone of the labor union movement.
94
 Because of their clear 
“working-class” identity, the comparative literature on welfare state development 
generally treats them as core supporters of redistributive welfare state development. Yet 
the section on British voluntarism earlier in this chapter suggests that this is not 
necessarily the case. Over the years, many scholars have observed that British craft 
unions representing skilled manual workers were the fiercest opponents to any attempts 
to reduce wage differentials – and the strongest supporters of voluntarism.
95
 
 In the United Kingdom, skilled manual workers have always organized themselves 
predominantly in craft unions. In the Netherlands, by contrast, they have since the 
beginning of the twentieth century organized themselves predominantly in industrial 
unions. These unions have taken a decisively different attitude toward wage leveling 
and redistributive welfare state development than their British craft counterparts. While 
British craft unions are known as staunch opponents of any attempt to reduce wage 
differentials, Dutch industrial unions have throughout much the postwar period worked 
hard to achieve exactly this. Crucially, the solidaristic stance of the latter has not 
resulted in mass protests on the part of their skilled manual membership. How are we to 
explain this? Part of the reason may be that industrial unions in the Netherlands were 
successful not only in reducing wage differentials between skilled and unskilled manual 
workers but also in reducing wage differentials between skilled manual workers and still 
higher income categories. Yet there might be more to it than interests alone. In most 
cases, workers themselves are not closely involved in wage negotiations. Under such 
circumstances, it may matter immensely whether they are represented by unions that 
look only to the narrow interests of one occupational category or one that emphasizes 
the importance of solidarity among workers. Tellingly, despite the successful wage-
leveling efforts of Dutch industrial unions, their privileged members – whether white-
collar or manual – have not turned, en masse, to occupational unions that oppose these 
efforts.
96
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 Having identified the importance of union structure for the attitude of unions 
towards redistribution of income among different occupational categories of workers, it 
is now possible to move to a more detailed discussion of labor union involvement in 
welfare state development. One important issue here is how labor union structure affects 
the stances and efficacy of other important players in the welfare state debate. The 
preceding discussion on the introduction of the national minimum wage in the United 
Kingdom has offered a preview of how the political efficacy of left parties depends on 
the extent to which the labor union movement can unite behind their redistributive 
agenda. A recurring theme in the following chapters on the development of old age, 
unemployment and disability insurance is how the British Labour Party has struggled to 
overcome craft and occupationally organized white-collar opposition to its public 
welfare initiatives. In the Netherlands, the emphasis of labor unions on solidarity 
between different grades of workers has made it much easier for parties on the left side 
of the political spectrum to implement their redistributive agenda. One of the reasons for 
this is surely that the solidaristic stance of the union movement increased the relative 
‘power resources’ of the left. At the same time, it can be argued that the solidaristic 
stance of unions made this redistributive agenda more acceptable to groups who were 
naturally inclined to oppose it. One such group is the employer community. In recent 
years, the involvement of employer interest groups in welfare state development has 
received much attention from welfare state scholars. For this reason, the final section of 
this chapter shows how union structure affects this involvement.  
  
UNIONS, EMPLOYERS, AND THE NOTION OF THE SOCIAL WAGE 
In recent years, employer interest group involvement in welfare state development has 
become a popular – and divisive – theme in the comparative and historic analysis of the 
welfare state. This recent surge in scholarly interest has been boosted by a series of 
employer-oriented writings that have raised important questions about the nature and 
extent of business influence on welfare state development. The main purpose of these 
writings has been to show that employers have played a more important and a more 
constructive role in welfare state development than is often realized. They have 
attempted to do so by arguing that the welfare state not only imposes costs and labor-
market rigidities on employers, but also provides direct and tangible benefits to them. 
Other welfare state scholars have raised doubts about these claims or rejected them 
outright.
97
 
Although this recent scholarship on employers is quite diverse, it is possible to 
distinguish two main variants. These arrive at the same conclusion through different 
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paths. According to the first variant, which is part of a broader study of production 
regimes known as the “varieties of capitalism” approach, employers might appreciate 
social policies when these perform a “productive function.”
98
 This scholarship relies 
heavily on the need of firms to attract skilled labor, and its authors assume that 
employers who rely on workers with advanced or specific skills need generous social 
policies to convince future workers to invest in these skills.
99
 The main problem with 
this variant is that organized employer support for welfare state development does not 
follow from this. After all, if higher wages are not sufficient to convince future workers 
to invest in the type of skills that are relevant for firm production, then employers can 
simply create occupational provision for them. Employer support for welfare state 
development can result from this demand for skills only when we add the much more 
dubious assumption that employers cannot provide sufficient insurance for these 
workers on their own. With this assumption, we end up with the second variant, which 
argues that some employers may have an interest in supporting social security programs 
to off-load costs onto competitors or society as a whole.
100
 
By emphasizing that employers may prefer public to private welfare solutions when 
the public solution serves to level the playing field or redistribute costs, this second 
variant has made an important contribution to the literature on welfare state develop-
ment. It has done so by pointing out that employers, like workers and the self-employed, 
do not constitute homogenous groups with similar interests. This is important, because 
it shows that the concept of class is not a useful tool for describing patterns of risk and 
resource distribution among actors in labor markets. Different groups of workers, 
employers, and self-employed do not dispose of similar resources; nor are they exposed 
to labor market risks in similar degrees. As a result, they do not necessarily have the 
same interests.  
Yet I would argue that it is doubtful whether this calls for a radical reinterpretation 
of organized employer involvement in welfare state development. While having been 
quite successful in demonstrating that some employers under certain circumstances may 
prefer public to private welfare solutions, the recent employer-oriented scholarship has 
thus far been much less successful in demonstrating that these interests can actually lead 
to organized employer support for welfare state development.
101
 One possible 
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explanation for this lack of evidence should be put forward here – as it tells us much 
about the involvement of labor unions in welfare state development as well. This 
explanation begins with the observation that employer involvement in wage bargaining 
and welfare state development generally takes shape through large employer federations 
that organize firms of all sizes and from all industries. Crucially, there is little reason to 
assume that such federations will favor a redistribution of risk among their members. In 
this regard, they are critically different from industrial unions that view risk and income 
redistribution as a necessary measure to provide all their members with adequate wages 
and insurance against labor market risk. The difference here lies in the intangible 
concept of solidarity. Whereas industrial unions will tend to defend such redistribution 
among their members by emphasizing the importance of worker solidarity, employer 
federations will tend to opposite it for being inefficient and market-distorting, for being 
unfair and costly to those members who stand to lose from it, and for inducing free-
riding behavior among both workers and employers.
102
 I will demonstrate this at length 
in chapters 4 and 6, which discuss, respectively, the introduction of a state redundancy 
scheme in the United Kingdom in the 1960s and the (mis)use of social security schemes 
for early retirement purposes by Dutch firms during the 1970s and 1980s. 
 The recent employer-oriented scholarship can also be criticized for failing to 
accompany its critical review of organized employer involvement in welfare state 
development with an equally-critical reexamination of labor union involvement in the 
same process. In much of the literature that has so fiercely challenged the assumption of 
organized employer opposition to welfare state development, blanket labor union 
support for its development is still taken for granted. The few scholars who have 
questioned the assumption of labor union support for welfare state development have 
failed to take note of the importance of union structure. Because of their prominence in 
the welfare state debate in the last years, two of these scholars should be mentioned 
here. In The Politics of Social Risk, Isabela Mares noted that different welfare solutions 
“posed distributionally divisive issues for the labor movement.” She concluded from 
this: “In most societies, we observe the emergence of a political conflict over the 
relative advantages of these policy solutions among trade unions representing higher-
skill, higher-earning employees and the broader confederation of the labor move-
ment.”
103
 Yet these differences in interests do not figure in her analysis of postwar 
welfare state development in Germany and France. More importantly, in her more 
recent Taxation, Wage Bargaining, and Unemployment, she completely fails to notice 
                                                                                                                                          
“second-order” preferences. On this, see, for example, Korpi, “Power Resources,”; Swenson, Capitalists 
Against Markets, 13-14; Mares, The Politics of Social Risk, 259; Hacker, “Bringing,” 133. 
102
 It is important to note the difference between supposed organized employer support for redistribution 
of risk through welfare state programs and their support, which is based on sound empirical evidence, for 
a statutory extension of collective bargaining. The crucial difference here is that the appeal of a statutory 
extension of collective wage bargaining for employer interest groups lay in its ability to prevent free-
riding. In the Netherlands, for example, organized employers gave their support to the 1937 law that made 
such a statutory extension possible because they wanted to prevent unfair competition from employers 
with low unionization rates. It nevertheless took employer interest groups over a decade to reverse their 
opposition to a possible statutory extension of collective bargaining outcomes. See, for example, 
Windmuller et al, Arbeidsverhoudingen, 73-4. 
103
 Mares, The Politics of Social Risk, 47. 
  
50 
the United Kingdom’s many trade unions representing “higher-skilled, higher earning 
employees,” and even argues that “the social policy preferences of the British labor 
union movement in the first decades of the Second World War were in no way different 
from the preferences of unions in Germany and Sweden.”
104
 Above, I have already 
demonstrated that as far as Swedish unions are concerned, this was clearly not the case. 
Given the dominance of industrial unionism in Germany, the same can probably be said 
about German unions.
105
 
 Similarly, in his seminal Capitalists Against Markets, Peter Swenson rightly 
criticizes the power resources perspective for arguing that “there is a practical 
equivalence of interests among like classes in different countries, and equivalence of 
conflict across their respective class divides.” Yet in his attempt to explain the very 
different strategies followed by employers in the creation of the American and Swedish 
welfare states, he pays little attention to the dominance of industrial unionism in 
Sweden and the dominance of craft unionism in the United States. Instead, he “first 
analyzes their dramatically different labor market systems” and “then reveals the effect 
of their labor markets on welfare states development.” I would add to this that these 
dramatic differences in labor market systems were to a very large extent an outcome of 
dramatic differences in the organizational blueprint of the union movements in the two 
countries. To understand why “Swedish employers pay about the most egalitarian 
wages” and Sweden is “a vanguard among welfare states,” it is crucial to note that most 
of Sweden’s unions had little difficulty in reducing wage differentials.
106
 To understand 
the opposite in the United States, I will argue in the final chapter of this work, it is 
crucial to note that most of the AFL’s constituents did. Finally, to understand the more 
accommodating stance of the Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen (SAF) towards union 
organization, compared with that of its American counterparts, it seems crucial to note 
the consequences of these differences in union structure as well. I will return to the issue 
of American welfare state development at length in the final chapter. 
 The neglect of union structure in the employer-oriented scholarship is problematic 
because the stance of employer interest groups on welfare state initiatives might depend 
to a great extent on the degree to which the labor union movement supports these 
initiatives. Crucially, when employer interest groups are faced with a labor union 
movement that is united in its support for redistributive policies, they will display a 
much more accommodating stance on welfare state initiatives than when they deal with 
a union movement that is itself divided on this. They might do so for two reasons. First, 
a more unified labor union movement can more effectively apply pressure to employer 
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groups. Second, under these circumstances, public welfare initiatives will also cost 
employers less. Both reasons will be explained below. 
 To an attentive reader, it may have already become clear that there are some 
similarities between the welfare preferences of employer interest groups and those of 
occupationally organized unions representing privileged workers. Most important of 
these is the tendency of both to favor private, group-based insurance over redistributive 
public insurance. It follows from this that the stance of employer interest groups on 
public welfare initiatives may differ depending on whether or not there are powerful 
craft and occupationally organized white-collar unions that oppose these initiatives. One 
reason for this is that employer interest groups will be in a much stronger position to 
oppose public welfare initiatives when there are powerful unions that also oppose them. 
I will demonstrate this at length in the next chapter, which deals, among other issues, 
with the introduction of superannuation in the United Kingdom. The chapter shows how 
the opposition of a powerful part of the British labor union movement to this initiative 
made it easier for British employer interest groups to undermine it. It did so in two 
ways. First, union opposition gave employers a powerful ally at the bargaining table in 
their dealings with representatives from the Labour Party that proposed superannuation. 
Second, it enabled employers to attract full attention to how bad a deal superannuation 
was for higher-paid workers. In the Netherlands, by contrast, employer interest groups 
could not capitalize on divisions within the labor union movement – as there were none. 
The following chapter shows that employers consequently found it far more difficult, 
and ultimately impossible, to resist redistributive public pension initiatives.  
 There is a second, and perhaps more pressing, reason why the stance of employer 
interest groups on public welfare initiatives may differ depending on the presence of 
powerful unions that oppose these initiatives. Where union opposition exists, employer 
interest groups may not only be in a stronger position to oppose a particular welfare 
initiative; they may also find it imperative to do so. After all, when a union opposes a 
particular welfare initiative, it will also be more reluctant to accept that its members 
have to pay for the initiative. As a result, welfare development will be far more costly to 
employers in countries where unions are organized mainly on an occupational basis than 
in countries where they are organized mainly along industrial lines. The difference 
between these types of union organization lies in their effect on the degree to which 
labor unions accept that improvements to public benefits, like improvements to 
occupational benefits, are part of the “social wage.” The notion of the social wage will 
arise often in the following chapters, so it is necessary to spend some time on it here. 
The notion of the social wage has over the years been a very popular, but poorly 
understood, concept in the welfare state literature. The general idea behind it is that 
unions not only care about increasing the wages of their members, but also care about 
improving the security of their members against labor market risks like unemployment, 
sickness and disability, and about enabling them to obtain an adequate income in old 
age. As a result, unions should be willing to accept somewhat lower direct wage 
increases in exchange for increases in non-wage benefits like unemployment, disability 
and old age insurances. If this is the case, then these increases will effectively be 
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financed from the margin of pay increases, so that they can be considered “deferred 
wages.”  
It is not hard to see why the notion of the social wage has proven so popular with 
scholars. After all, it implies that the costs of welfare state expansion can be mitigated 
when labor unions are willing to view social insurances as deferred wages. Over the 
years, many scholars have thus come to argue that the success of redistributive welfare 
state development depends on the willingness of unions to engage in a “political 
exchange” in which they deliver wage restraint in exchange for increased generosity of 
public welfare benefits.
107
 The only problem is that they have found it difficult to 
explain why some union movements have been far more willing to engage in such 
political exchanges than others.
108
 Had these scholars realized the importance of union 
structure, and been aware of the resulting differences in attitudes towards redistributive 
welfare development among different types of unions, they would surely have found 
this less difficult.  
An excellent way to illustrate this is by comparing the attitudes of British and Dutch 
unions on the notion of the social wage. In the Netherlands, the industrially organized 
labor unions have always been quite willing to view public insurances as deferred 
wages to be paid from the margin of pay increases.
109
 In the United Kingdom, by 
contrast, the unions have been far less willing to accept this view. Over the years, many 
scholars have noted the unwillingness of British unions to reduce wage claims in 
exchange for public welfare development.
110
 Below I will go even further, by arguing 
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that many unions in the United Kingdom typically reacted to the introduction or 
expansion of public welfare programs not just with an unwillingness to reduce wage 
claims, but by making higher than normal wage demands.  
In their attempts to explain the unwillingness of British unions to reduce wage 
claims in exchange for public welfare initiatives, scholars have paid scant attention to 
the possibility that many of these unions actually had little interest in, or even opposed, 
these initiatives in the first place. Instead, scholars commonly argue that such initiatives 
were of “vital concern” to the labor union movement.
111
 As a result, they have found it 
difficult to explain instances in which “old age pensions were raised and were 
guaranteed against inflation, food subsidies were introduced, the powers of the Price 
Commission were extended and increased regional and housing subsidies were put in 
place” but government appeals for wage moderation nevertheless “largely fell on deaf 
ears.”
112
 The explanations offered for such instances either focus on specific historic 
circumstances or center around the familiar and unsatisfactory argument of British 
“voluntarism.”
113
 
Once we realize the consequences of occupational unionism in the United Kingdom, 
we do not need to resort to such arguments. We only have to realize that neither an 
increase in food, housing or regional subsidies, nor any increase in the state pension 
benefit or one of the other social insurance benefits was of “vital concern” to the entire 
British labor union movement. Instead, these increases were of vital concern only to 
those unions who represented many relatively low-paid and risk-prone workers. These 
were the workers that needed food and housing subsidies to get by and who were 
completely dependent on the social security system to provide adequate insurance 
against labor market risks. Many other unions represented workers whose income was 
high enough to get by without food or housing subsidies and who could rely on 
supplementary occupational provision. To those unions, an increase in state welfare was 
of vital concern only insofar as it threatened their members. After all, high-end workers 
not only had little need for state welfare initiatives, but often stood to lose from them. 
To understand this, it is first necessary to point out that during the first decades of 
the postwar period, a growing percentage of the British workforce did manage to 
achieve a more-than-adequate level of protection against labor market risk – despite the 
dismally low, below-subsistence, levels of social security benefits. These workers could 
do so because they were able to add occupational provision to these public benefits. By 
the early 1960s, roughly one third of British workers could claim private severance 
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payments when laid off and about half of them were entitled to occupational sick pay. 
Furthermore, about half of all workers belonged to an occupational pension scheme. 
These occupational supplements neatly followed the logic of the social wage, as they 
were financed from the margin of pay increases. Thus, in exchange for more generous 
occupational benefits, which they viewed as deferred wages, the unions that represented 
these workers were quite willing to accept lower direct wage increases. This, however, 
does not mean that they were also willing to do so in exchange for more generous public 
benefits. After all, their members often had little to gain, and much to lose, from public 
welfare initiatives.  
 In the decades after the introduction of the 1946 National Insurance Act, when 
various Labour governments introduced measures to improve public provision for the 
unemployed, sick, disabled, and elderly, they were not concerned with those workers 
who had already achieved adequate provision through a combination of public and 
occupational provision. Instead, and as we will see in the following chapters, they aimed 
to increase the security of those workers who could not rely on private supplements. 
Sometimes, these workers did not have access to private supplements because they 
worked for firms that simply did not offer them. More often than not, a large part of the 
problem was also that these workers, through a combination of high risks and low 
wages, could simply not afford to obtain adequate occupational benefits. To improve 
matters for this group, a redistributive effort among different grades of workers was 
inevitable. Acutely aware of this, most of Labour’s public welfare initiatives either 
extended the risk pool of existing schemes or introduced a system of contributions and 
benefits that worked more to the advantage of lower-income members. Often, they did 
both. As we will see in the following three chapters of this study, such initiatives were 
vehemently opposed by unions whose members had already achieved adequate 
provision through a combination of public and private insurances – as they were the 
ones who stood to lose from the welfare initiatives’ redistributive features. As a result, 
these unions also vehemently objected to any call to moderate their wage demands in 
exchange for the introduction of these initiatives. On the contrary, when they did not 
succeed in blocking these initiatives, they often increased their wage demands in an 
attempt to restore wage differentials, which had been reduced as a result of these public 
welfare initiatives.  
 Under these circumstances, the introduction of public welfare initiatives became a 
very costly exercise for employers, who either had to bear the brunt of its costs or 
engage in fierce wage bargaining. This is why the CBI, which was the main federation 
of employer interest groups from the mid-1960s on, even argued at one point that it was 
useless to ask workers to contribute to improvements to public welfare schemes, since 
“in the long run these increases in employee’s contributions will be reflected in wage 
claims and so far as these are allowed, the whole of the initial increase . . . will be met 
by employers.”
114
 Employer interest groups never complained that unions were not 
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willing to view occupational provision as deferred wages. On the contrary, it seems that 
they very much appreciated the use of occupational provision as an alternative to direct 
wage increases.
115
  
 In contrast to their British counterparts, and as will be shown in the following 
chapters, the mainly industrially organized labor union unions of the Netherlands had 
few difficulties with the redistributive consequences of public welfare development. As 
a result, they were also much more willing to view public, like occupational, insurance 
as deferred wages that had to be financed from the margin of pay increases (in Dutch 
called “loonruimte”). The degree to which they were willing to do so did, of course, 
partly depend on the particular risk at hand. While Dutch unions were quite willing to 
accept that improvements to public provision for the elderly and for non-occupational 
injuries and sicknesses be financed from the margin of pay increases, they were much 
less willing to do the same for improvements in public provision for the unemployed 
and occupational injuries and sicknesses. Because unions blamed unemployment and 
occupational ailments on the employer, they felt that the employer should bear – or at 
least share – financial responsibility for these labor market risks. The next chapter will 
show that the willingness of Dutch unions to accept that public provision, like 
occupational provision, for the elderly had to be paid for by workers themselves greatly 
strengthened their demands for the creation of a generous public pension. Chapter 4 will 
show that disagreements between employers and unions over the financial responsibility 
for unemployment benefits made it far more difficult to achieve quick progress for the 
unemployed.  
 Eventually, Dutch unions did accept that they had to share financial responsibility 
for unemployment benefits – if only because they considered increasing the protection 
of all workers against the risk of becoming unemployed more important than the issue 
of who had to pay for it. It is because of considerations like these that the involvement 
of the industrially organized Dutch labor union movement differed so strongly from that 
of its largely occupationally organized British counterpart. In the Netherlands, it was a 
matter of course that representatives of the three industrially organized union 
federations argued that part of the margin of pay increases go to improvements in the 
public welfare sphere.
116
 It was also common for them to accept a lower-than-normal 
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verhoging van de AOW (FED 650-SV; VU, VPCW, 180: Brief van Minister van Sociale Zaken en 
Volksgezondheid aan SER op 20 november 1967; ARA, CSWV, 2.19.103.06, 134: Verslag van de 
vergadering van de Kring voor Sociaal Overleg gehouden op woensdag 7 september 1966 des namiddags 
om 2.15 uur ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 (1
e
 étage) te ’s Gravenhage; KDC, Nederlands Katholiek 
Werkgeversverbond, 641: Commissie Sociale Verzekeringen, 1961-67, Besluitenlijst van de vergadering 
van de Commissie Sociale Verzekeringen van het Nederlands Katholiek Werkgevers Verbond en het 
Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland gehouden op woensdag 13 oktober 1965, 
ten kantore Biltstraat 101 c te Utrecht. 
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wage increase concurrent with the introduction of a major social security initiative. In 
fact, and as we will see in the following chapter, to strengthen their demands for such 
initiatives, they often offered this concession willingly. In the United Kingdom, it was 
unthinkable for the TUC to make such a concession. Its craft and occupationally 
organized white-collar unions would never have accepted this.  
 The willingness of Dutch labor unions to accept that public, like occupational, 
provision against labor market risk was part of the social wage certainly strengthened 
their public welfare demands. Their stance on the social wage made public welfare 
development less costly and therefore more acceptable to the powerful employer 
community. Up to at least the late 1960s, it seems that Dutch employer interest groups 
were much less worried about the costs of public welfare development than were their 
British counterparts – even though the reach of the public welfare sphere was by then 
already much greater in the Netherlands than in the United Kingdom.
117
 This is of 
course not to say that Dutch employers never voiced objections against public welfare 
expansion. On the contrary, they always did and for many reasons – which will all be 
mentioned in the following chapters. Yet they nevertheless were far more accommodat-
ing than were their British counterparts.
118
 
 Conversely, the unwillingness of unions representing privileged workers in the 
United Kingdom to accept that public, like occupational, provision was part of the 
social wage severely weakened the ability of the TUC to lobby for more generous social 
security benefits. In contrast to its Dutch counterparts, the TUC consistently accompa-
nied its calls for more generous public benefits with the statement that improvements 
either had to be paid by employers or through taxation. Although this was a rational 
stance, considering the opposition of much of its membership against any attempt to 
redistribute income or risk, the position seriously reduced the TUC’s bargaining power. 
Employer interest groups and the Conservative Party naturally resisted any initiative 
that increased production costs, whether through non-wage labor costs or through 
taxation. The TUC’s stance therefore made it very difficult for the Labour Party to 
improve state benefits. It also severely politicized the process of welfare state 
development – as we will see in the following three chapters.  
 
LOOKING AHEAD 
The main purpose of this chapter has been to show how union structure shapes the 
stance of labor unions on redistributive government intervention in the labor market. 
The chapter began with an analysis of the organizational blueprints of the British and 
Dutch labor union movements, emphasizing the distinction between the ‘occupational’ 
nature of unionism in the United Kingdom and the ‘industrial’ nature of unionism in the 
                                                
117
 This was also noted by British employers. See PRO, Lab 10/1824: BEC Bulletin, 196, 19 December 
1962. 
118
 This relatively accommodating stance has often been noted by scholars. See, for example, Göran 
Therborn, who noted: “While on and off expressing worries about increasing costs, the Dutch employers’ 
representatives in the Social-Economic Council, on the whole, supported the rest of the welfare state 
expansion in the 1960s. Occasionally, they even came to declare their principled support of extensive 
social insurance, for social reasons and for reasons of countercyclical economic policy.” Therborn, 
“‘Pillarization’,” 215. 
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Netherlands. It proceeded to demonstrate how the occupational nature of union 
organization in the United Kingdom explains the remarkable reluctance of British 
unions to accept government intervention in the labor market. This section showed that 
the voluntarist inclinations of the British labor union movement cannot be explained 
without accounting for the resistance of a large part of its membership to any attempt to 
redistribute income among different categories of workers. The next section discussed 
the consequences of this for attempts to provide adequate insurance against labor market 
risks for all workers. Because employer interest groups have received so much attention 
in recent years, the final section of this chapter gave special consideration to the way in 
which union structure also shapes the involvement of organized employers in welfare 
state development. 
 By necessity, this chapter has paid more attention to the British labor union 
movement than to its Dutch counterpart. In the following chapters, this imbalance will 
be the erased. Chapters 3 to 6 of this study illustrate the importance of union structure 
by looking at a variety of policy contexts in the postwar development of the British and 
Dutch welfare states. The main purpose of chapters 3, 4 and 5 is to show how union 
structure impacted the success of British and Dutch attempts to create adequate social 
provision for all elderly, unemployed, and sick and disabled workers. Chapter 6 is 
concerned with the use of social security programs for early retirement purposes in the 
Netherlands. Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of this study and explores some of its 
implications. 
3 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF OLD AGE PENSIONS IN THE 
NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
The issue of how to organize old age pension provision has been the major source of 
contention in the postwar welfare state debate in developed nations. This is partly 
because of the immense growth of public and private spending on income maintenance 
for the elderly during the postwar years. In the immediate postwar period, public and 
private spending on old age pensions typically accounted for between two and three 
percent of the gross national product in developed nations. Today, this number lies well 
over ten percent.
1
 Contrary to what recent discussions of an impending pension crisis 
might make us believe, most of this growth occurred during the first three decades after 
the Second World War. The growth in spending on income maintenance in old age has 
dwarfed spending related to all other labor market risks during the postwar period. Old 
age pension provision now typically accounts for nearly half of all public and private 
spending on income maintenance in developed countries.
2
 This means that in terms of 
spending, its importance is as great as public and private spending on insurance against 
all other labor market risks combined.  
 Yet the sheer magnitude of spending on old age pension provision alone cannot 
explain why the matter of its arrangement has been such a major source of dispute 
throughout the postwar period. To understand this, it is crucial to note that much of the 
postwar growth in spending on old age pension provision has occurred with public 
pension schemes, which often have strong redistributive features. During the first three 
decades of the postwar period, all advanced industrial nations took measures designed 
to provide adequate minimum levels of public old age pension provision for all citizens. 
To achieve this, some of them first had to introduce public pension schemes, while 
others could improve existing public schemes by increasing existing schemes’ coverage 
and benefit levels. To create adequate benefit levels, all advanced industrial nations not 
only switched to pay-as-you-go financing, which made intergenerational solidarity 
possible; all of them also introduced features into their schemes that were designed to 
redistribute income from higher to lower earnings. The degree to which they did so, 
                                                
1
 For an excellent comparative overview of public spending on pensions as a percentage of GDP, see 
Richard Minns, The Cold War in Welfare. Stock Markets Versus Pensions (London: Verso, 2001) 9. It is 
more difficult to find a thorough comparative analysis of private spending on pensions as a percentage of 
GDP, but the difference between countries that have flat rate benefits and those with earnings-related 
benefits gives us a good indicator of this. In countries with earnings-related benefits, public spending on 
pensions as a percentage of GDP generally lies well above 10 percent. In countries with flat rate benefits, 
it generally lies well below 10 percent, but these countries have substantial private pension supplements. 
2 For an excellent comparative overview of the share of public spending on income maintenance for the 
elderly within all public spending on income maintenance up to the end of the period under investigation 
here, see Peter Flora, Growth to Limits. The Western European Welfare States since World War II. 
Volume 4: Appendix (Synopses, Bibliographies, Tables) (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987). Again, it is 
more difficult to find comparative data on the share of pension benefits in private spending on income 
maintenance. Yet there is little reason to assume that the share of pension spending would be lower in the 
private sphere. 
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however, differed markedly. As a result, advanced industrial nations also came to differ 
greatly in the degree to which they were able to provide adequate old age pension 
benefits to all citizens. 
 Efforts to provide all members of society with an adequate income in old age differ 
from efforts to provide adequate insurance for all against other labor market risks in one 
important way. While, for example, allowing for adequate insurance against unem-
ployment for all workers necessitates risk redistribution, efforts to provide all members 
of society with adequate income in old age center instead on direct income redistribu-
tion among different income categories. Such direct redistribution can be achieved in 
two different ways. One way of doing so is by financing the public pension scheme 
through progressive general taxation. Another way to bring about redistribution is by 
financing the public pension scheme through a redistributive contributory system. This, 
in turn, can be done in two ways. The first is by combining earnings-related contribu-
tions with flat rate benefit levels. The second is by introducing a minimum ‘floor’ in a 
completely earnings-related scheme under which benefit levels are not allowed to fall. 
By redistributing part of the contributions of higher-earning members, both contributory 
solutions allow lower-earning members to receive more in benefits than they have paid 
for in insurance contributions. As a result, and as in a system based on progressive 
taxation, the public pension benefit can consequently reach a level that it could not 
reach without a redistributive effort from higher earnings.  
 During the first half of the twentieth century, most developed nations witnessed the 
emergence of a debate between proponents of a contributory public pension and those 
who advocated financing through general taxation. By the early postwar period, the 
proponents of a contributory public pension had triumphed in all but a handful of 
nations.
3
 To its proponents, the main advantage of a contributory scheme lay in its 
representation of the public pension as an insurance for which all pensioners themselves 
had to save. Its main disadvantage was that not all workers and self-employed earned 
sufficient income to put aside part of their earnings to save for an adequate income in 
old age. In none of the nations that had opted for a contributory system, however, did 
this disadvantage prompt a switch towards (greater) financing through general taxation.
4
 
Popular opposition to the increased income tax burden that would have resulted and 
fears that such a move would undermine the insurance character of their pension 
schemes stood in the way of this. As a result, the only way forward was to introduce 
strong redistributive elements into the contributory pension schemes.  
                                                
3 A striking aspect of old age pension provision is that all countries in which general revenues became or 
remained important were either British Commonwealth or Scandinavian countries. Among the countries 
of Western Europe, for example, only Denmark, Finland and, to a much lesser extent, Sweden chose to 
finance a large part of their postwar state pension system through general taxation – a choice that is often 
attributed to the combination of exceptionally strong social democracy and the importance of the 
agricultural vote in the Nordic countries. On this, see, for example, Baldwin, The Politics, 137; Esping-
Andersen, Politics Against Markets; Margaret S. Gordon, Social Security Policies in Industrial Countries. 
A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 29-34. 
4 On the contrary, although most of the countries that had opted for a largely contributory system did 
allow for a small subsidy to the scheme to be paid for by general revenues, this subsidy often only 
decreased over the years. The United Kingdom is an excellent example of this. 
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 Yet efforts to improve old age pension provision for lower-earning workers by 
introducing a redistributive contributory system also have a major disadvantage: they 
rely strongly on the willingness of labor unions to accept a redistributive effort among 
different categories of workers. As we have already seen in the previous chapter, this 
willingness cannot be assumed. This chapter shows that the support of labor unions for 
redistributive contributory public pension initiatives depends on their organizational 
blueprint. It does so by analyzing efforts to provide adequate old age pension provision 
in roughly the first three decades of the postwar period in the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. The chapter contrasts the willingness and ability of the industrially 
organized Dutch union federations to push through redistributive contributory initiatives 
with the inability of the British TUC to do the same. It illustrates how the TUC’s 
inability to promote such initiatives resulted from the opposition of its craft and 
occupationally organized white-collar members to any attempt to subsidize the benefits 
of lower-paid workers using contributions from higher-paid workers. The chapter shows 
the resulting amplitude of the public pension benefit in both countries. Finally, it 
explores how the attitudes of labor unions towards redistributive public pension 
initiatives shaped employer interest groups’ positions on these initiatives.  
 
SOLIDARITY VERSUS EGALITARIANISM: COMPARING PENSION REFORM 
IN THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The postwar histories of British and Dutch pension development lend themselves well 
to comparison, because the two countries opted for largely similar old age pension 
systems in the immediate postwar period. In both countries, socialist pressure for a 
universal public pension, a conservative emphasis on self-help or self-responsibility, 
and the problem of the self-employed resulted in a universal flat rate benefit that was 
mostly financed by insurance contributions. In both countries, this formula gained 
acceptance early on because it proved the only outcome behind which all parties could 
unite. The two available alternatives, a tax-financed state pension and an earnings-
related contributory insurance scheme, simply aroused too much opposition from 
powerful segments within society. The universal, flat rate and mostly contributory 
benefit was seen in both countries as an acceptable middle ground between these two 
alternatives that combined the advantages of both and avoided their shortcomings.
5
 A 
contributory system could give an old-age pension benefit as a matter of right and at the 
same time preserve the ‘sense of responsibility’ among workers. A small government 
                                                
5 It should also be pointed out that both countries already had flat rate contributory systems in the prewar 
period. The Netherlands introduced an obligatory, flat rate, invalidity and old age insurance for blue-
collar workers in 1919. The same year saw the creation of a voluntary old age insurance for the self-
employed. The British state pension scheme can be seen as a universal version of the Widows’, Orphans’ 
and Old Age Contributory Pension Act, which was introduced for blue-collar workers in 1925. Up to 
1946, public sector workers were allowed to opt out of the state pension scheme. See, in order: Robert 
Henry Cox, The Development of the Dutch Welfare State: From Workers’ Insurance to Universal 
Entitlement (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 1993); Noel Whiteside, “Historical Perspectives 
and the Politics of Pension Reform.” In Noel Whiteside and Gordon L. Clark, Pension Security in the 21st 
Century: Redrawing the Public-Private Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Lowe, The 
Welfare State in Britain, 131. 
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subsidy allowed for the inclusion into the scheme of the smaller self-employed – a part 
of society to whom the problem of poverty in old age was particularly pressing. Finally, 
flat rate benefits left sufficient room for further expansion of the private pension 
industry. Whereas the public pension was to provide an absolute minimum level of 
income maintenance in old age, private pension schemes offered the opportunity to 
obtain more generous earnings replacement.  
The formula had only one major shortcoming. In principle, the contributory system 
presumed that flat rate benefits were to be accompanied by flat rate contributions, and 
this had the obvious disadvantage of limiting the generosity of the scheme to what the 
poorest-paying contributor could afford. In both countries, representatives of industry 
and the state were acutely aware of this problem. Yet only in the Netherlands was this 
problem solved in a way that eventually guaranteed all members of society an adequate 
income in old age. The Dutch solution came about when the union movement responded 
to the inadequacy of the proposed formula by proposing to combine flat rate benefits 
with earnings-related contributions. Under such a system, higher-paid contributors 
would end up paying more in contributions than they would receive in benefits. As a 
result, lower-paid contributors could receive a benefit level that was higher than they 
could afford to pay on their own. The TUC proposed no such redistributive solution. 
Instead, it entirely supported the combination of flat rate benefits with flat rate 
contributions.  
Over the years, the British choice of a system of flat rate contributions and benefits 
has presented scholars with quite a dilemma. There is now a strong consensus that this 
choice resulted in a “flawed design” that both created the inadequacy of public old age 
pension provision in the United Kingdom and stood in the way of attempts to improve 
it.
6
 Yet in attempting to explain the reasons for this choice, most scholars have not gone 
further than noting that all involved parties supported an “egalitarian” scheme that 
offered equal benefits in exchange for equal contributions.
7
 Many of them have also 
been quite uncritical of the egalitarian rationale behind this. According to Derek Fraser, 
for example, the “flowering of egalitarianism” resulted from a “progressive consensus” 
within British society, which in turn was an outcome of the “spirit of the 1940s 
engendered by the war [that] dictated the necessity of the natural justice of universalism 
                                                
6
 According to Helen Fawcett, for example, the “Beveridge solution” was not only “incapable of securing 
enough revenue to maintain the state pension at an acceptable level”; it also “created a powerful and rigid 
structure for social welfare…[which] proved extremely hard to either abandon, ameliorate or reform.” See 
Helen Fawcett, “The Beveridge Strait-jacket: Policy Formation and the Problem of Poverty in Old Age,” 
Contemporary British History 10 (1996) 22. See also Howard Glennerster and Martin Evans, “Beveridge 
and his Assumptive Worlds: The Incompatibilities of a Flawed Design.” In John Hills, John Ditch, and 
Howard Glennerster, Beveridge and Social Security: An International Retrospective (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994); Rodney Lowe, “A Prophet Dishonoured in his Own Country?
 
The Rejection of 
Beveridge in 1945–1970.” In Hills et al, Beveridge and Social Security, 132; and Hugh Pemberton, 
“Politics and Pensions in Post-War Britain.” In Hugh Pemberton, Pat Thane and Noel Whiteside, 
Britain’s Pensions Crisis: History and Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 42. 
7
 See, for example, Baldwin, The Politics, 122; José Harris, William Beveridge: a Biography (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997) 250-51 and 290; Heclo, Modern Social Politics, 255-56; Kevin Jefferys, “British 
politics and social policy during the Second World War,” Historical Journal 30 (1987) 131; and Stephan 
Leibfried, “Sozialpolitik und Existenzminimum: Anmerkungen zur Geschichte der englischen 
Entwicklung,“ Zeitschrift für Sozialreform, 29(1983) 714. 
  
63 
where everyone was treated in the same way.”
8
 Continuing this line of thinking, Hugh 
Pemberton recently explained the creation of Britain’s state pension by arguing that “the 
war contributed to a solidaristic environment.”
9
 I would suggest a different interpreta-
tion for the British choice to hand out equal benefits in exchange for equal payments. 
Egalitarianism here related little to the spirit of war-time or to progressive thinking; nor 
was it a necessary outcome of the decision to make the social security system universal. 
Instead, it resulted primarily from an aversion to redistribution. Therefore, as we will 
see, the British emphasis on egalitarianism is best understood by contrasting it with the 
concept of solidarity. 
Had there indeed been a strong postwar “solidaristic environment” in the United 
Kingdom, William Beveridge, the founding father of the postwar British welfare state, 
might not have opted for the combination of flat rate benefits with flat rate contributions. 
Perhaps he would have considered an alternative solution suggested to him in the mid-
1940s by organizations like Political and Economic Planning and the Association of 
Approved Societies, which allotted flat rate benefits in exchange for contributions 
graduated by income. But Beveridge did not give serious thought to this alternative, 
which he condemned as the “epitome of the ‘Santa Claus’ state.”
10
 It is important to 
point out here that in his emphasis on exchanging equal benefits for equal payments, 
Beveridge did not stand alone. Conservative backbenchers and employer organizations, 
for example, supported his recommendations only because they entailed little to no 
direct redistribution and did not stand in the way of the private pension industry.
11
 More 
importantly, as it was a Labour government that eventually implemented Beveridge’s 
recommendations in 1946, the TUC supported his scheme for exactly the same reasons. 
If the new pension scheme was to be contributory, the TUC General Council held, then 
it had to operate along egalitarian lines.
12
 
In its emphasis on egalitarianism, the TUC differed starkly from its industrially 
organized Dutch counterparts. Instead of extolling the virtue of egalitarianism, the three 
Dutch union federations argued for worker solidarity. This difference proved to have a 
great effect on the generosity of the new state pension benefits in the two countries. The 
events leading up to the introduction of the 1946 National Insurance Act in the United 
Kingdom, which introduced the universal flat rate state pension, among other things, are 
well documented in the English-speaking literature. On the other hand, there is hardly 
any such literature available on the introduction of the 1955 General Old Age Act 
(Algemene Ouderdomswet or AOW) in the Netherlands. For this reason, it is necessary 
to examine the introduction of this Act in more detail.  
Negotiations on pension reform in the Netherlands got underway almost immedi-
ately after the end of the War. In the first three years of the postwar period, Dutch 
                                                
8 Derek Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State: a History of Social Policy since the Industrial 
Revolution (London: Macmillan, 2003) 252. 
9
 Pemberton, “Politics and Pensions,” 43. 
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 Harris, William Beveridge, 409. 
11 Ibidem, 415 and 424-5. 
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 MRC, MSS.292/150.5/3: Relation TUC General Council Scheme and plan for social security in Sir 
William Beveridge’s Report, 1943. 
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pension deliberations were quite similar to those in the United Kingdom. In the 
Netherlands, employer interest groups, union federations and state representatives also 
broadly rejected an earnings-related system as ill-fitted to existing traditions. In the 
Netherlands, as in the United Kingdom, prewar labor union demands for a completely 
tax-financed old age pension did not return after the War. While the confessional labor 
union federations had always rejected a tax-financed old age pension because of the 
dependence on the state such a pension entailed, the socialist NVV had staunchly 
supported a tax-financed old age pension before the War.
13
 Like the TUC, the postwar 
NVV altered this position, when it realized that worker demands for tax financing 
strengthened conservative calls for means testing.
14
 When the NVV and its political ally, 
the Dutch Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid or PvdA), switched their support to the 
contributory approach, this paved the way for a consensus between both sides of 
industry and the government. In 1947, the government created a means-tested and 
completely tax-financed emergency provision for old age pensioners, but it managed to 
do so only on the condition that it would operate for a maximum of three years. In 1948, 
one year after the creation of the emergency provision, the second Van Rhijn 
Committee secured firm commitment from representatives of industry and the 
government to the creation of a universal and contributory flat rate pension benefit, 
which was to leave sufficient room for voluntary provision. Like the British state 
pension, the Van Rhijn scheme did not attempt to provide full subsistence and promised 
no automatic adjustment to future wage or price increases. Because of this consensus 
two years before the emergency provision was due to expire, the government had good 
hope that it could implement a new pension act before the actual expiration date. Yet 
union pressure for a more generous pension benefit delayed the preparation of the act 
for at least five years. Instead of operating for only three years, as Parliament had 
originally demanded, the emergency provision was thus effective for nine years. 
The NVV led the way in calling for a more generous public old age benefit. The 
NVV had been present in the Van Rhijn Committee, but criticized the group’s 
consensus almost immediately after its publication. This of course led the other 
signatories to reproach the NVV for not knowing what it wanted, which the federation 
rebuffed bluntly, stating that many of its members had disagreed with the Van Rhijn 
proposals from the start.
15
 Over the course of the next year, the NVV leadership worked 
                                                
13 The confessional unions in the Netherlands had always opposed financing through general taxation for 
reasons of self-responsibility. The Protestant CNV, for example, justified its opposition to financing from 
general taxation with the rationale that this would “not lift workers into a position of honour, but reduce 
them to beggars of the state.” See Jan-Peter van der Toren, ‘Van loonslaaf tot bedrijfsgenoot’: 100 jaar 
christelijk-sociaal denken, medezeggenschap en sociale zekerheid (Kempen: Kok, 1991) 90. See also 
Mirjam Hertogh, ‘Geene wet, maar de Heer’: de confessionele ordening van het Nederlandse sociale 
zekerheidsstelsel, 1870-1975 (Den Haag: VUGA, 1998). For the support of the NVV for financing from 
general taxation, see Hueting, De Jong and Neij, Naar groter eenheid, 95-97. 
14 To understand the prewar appeals of unions for a tax-financed pension, it is also important to realize 
that before the War, most workers did not pay income tax. On this, see Howard Glennerster, British 
Social Policy Since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000) 29. According to Helen Fawcett, after the War the 
TUC rejected financing from general taxation not just out fear of a return of the means test, but also 
because it feared that the state might slash benefits in a future economic storm. See Fawcett, “The 
Beveridge Strait-jacket,” 29. 
15
 IISG, NVV codelijsten 1945-1970, 1951 HM4, Notulen Sociale Commissie, 30 augustus 1951. 
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frantically to come up with a solution that could combine a contributory approach with a 
more generous outcome. Meanwhile, a sympathetic social democratic Minister of Social 
Affairs was preparing a public pension proposal of his own at the same time. When this 
Minister showed little sign of interest in its plan, the NVV first turned to individual 
members of the Labor Party, and then looked for support to its confessional union 
counterparts. A little over one year after the publication of the Van Rhijn Report, the 
NVV presented the Catholic KAB and Protestant CNV with a pension plan that 
combined earnings-related contributions with flat rate benefits, contained a provision 
for an automatic adjustment of benefit levels to price and wage increases, and obliged 
all employers and self-employed to join an occupational pension plan. Together, the flat 
rate public benefit and earnings-related private benefit were intended to give all workers 
an old age income of at least seventy percent of their previous wages.
16
  
The KAB was the first to rally behind the NVV-plan. Perhaps the CNV was initially 
more reluctant because of one important feature of the scheme: the collection of 
insurance contributions by the taxation authorities must have sounded much like the 
introduction of a tax-financed pension benefit in Protestant workers’ ears.
17
 Eventually, 
however, the CNV was persuaded that wage-related contributions demanded collection 
by the taxation authorities, and the NKV and CNV put their full weight behind the 
NVV-plan.
18
 Thus, while the TUC had earlier given its full support to an egalitarian 
system with equal benefits and equal contributions, the Dutch union federations, 
working together in the Council of Trade Union Federations, all supported a scheme 
based on income redistribution among workers of different wage groups.  
 Once the Council of Trade Union Federations presented its pension plan, it proved 
relatively easy to convince governing – and other – parties of its merits. One reason for 
this was the support unions received from another extremely influential interest group, 
the employer community. Ironically, the support of the employer community proved 
especially important in convincing governing parties to favor the NVV plan over an 
alternative with a distinct social democratic signature: the plan of the social democratic 
Minister of Social Affairs, Dolf Joekes. Like the British state pension, Joekes’s plan 
combined flat rate benefits with flat rate contributions and contained no provisions for 
an automatic adjustment of benefits to price and wage increases. Unlike the British state 
pension, it entailed a deduction of the individual’s resources from the public benefit. It 
was this latter provision that led the many different employer federations to prefer the 
Council’s plan over the government alternative. According to the NVV, the employer 
federations’ main objection to Joekes’s plan was that the plan “grabbed” what 
occupational plans remitted and thus conflicted with the highest priority of employers, 
which was that the public old age pension not interfere with private provision.
19
 The 
                                                
16 Dutch union federations thought seventy percent to be an acceptable number because this was what 
civil servants were receiving. IISG, NVV codelijsten 1945-1970, 1955 E1, Noodvoorziening Ouden van 
Dagen: Een serie radio-lezingen over de wettelijke ouderdomsverzekering door H. Korte Jr., Algemeen 
Secretaris van het NVV. 
17 See footnote 13 of this chapter. 
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employer federations had far fewer difficulties with the plan advocated by the unions. 
They could accept the combination of earnings-related contributions and flat rate 
benefits, because the subsistence nature of the benefit and the introduction of an income 
threshold over which the taxation authorities levied no contributions limited the 
solidarity this created.
20
 Some of the members of the confessional employer federations 
did have strong objections to the centralized design of the scheme. Yet during 
discussions in the Council of Directors in Labor Affairs, a platform designed to 
facilitate finding a common stance among the many employer federations on labor 
matters, these members were eventually persuaded by counterarguments from 
representatives of other employer federations, who stated that continued principled 
resistance against this feature of the scheme jeopardized the materialization of a 
consensus in industry, which could in turn endanger the continued existence of private 
pension funds. Moreover, many members of the largest employer federation at the time, 
the liberal CSWV, voiced appreciation for the cost-effectiveness of centralized 
administration.
21
 
 All employer federations also proved willing to accept an automatic adjustment of 
the public pension benefit to changes in the level of prices and wages. In the face of the 
continued willingness of unions to accept wage moderation, it must have been very 
difficult for employers to deny wage index-linking of the old age benefit. Representa-
tives of the CSWV justified their support for this linking by pointing to the current 
policy of centralized wage setting, which made an automatic linkage to the wage index 
cheap to administer.
22
 In addition, several employers emphasized that, under the present 
circumstances of allowing wages to rise with prices only, the index-linkage made the 
old age pension benefit merely inflation-proof.
23
 This last motivation suggests that the 
agreement to link the state benefit to increases in the level of prices and wages 
represented a compromise between the employer and union federations. The union 
federations celebrated the provision as a victory for those who wanted old age 
pensioners to benefit from future increases in prosperity,
24
 but later found out that this 
had been somewhat premature. When the policy of centralized wage setting broke down 
in the 1960s, they came to face a long battle with their employer counterparts over the 
question of whether the general old age benefit needed upgrading in line with increases 
in the cost of living alone, or with increased prosperity levels as well. 
 There was only one feature of the NVV plan that the employer federations 
unanimously rejected. They vehemently opposed compulsory membership in 
occupational plans – most of all for the self-employed. The confessional employer 
federations were most adamant on this – which the NVV had anticipated. The three 
union federations were quick to yield on this point. One reason for this was surely that 
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they were ecstatic about the willingness of the employer federations to agree to all other 
points of the NVV plan. Another reason was that compulsory membership in 
occupational schemes also went a bit too far for some of the representatives of the 
CNV.
25
 
 The agreement of both sides of industry paved the way for the introduction of the 
General Old Age Act. As the NVV had already expected, after the KAB and its Catholic 
employer counterparts, the KVW and AKWV, lent their support to the scheme, the 
governing Catholic People’s Party (Katholieke Volkspartij or KVP) followed suit.
26
 
When criticism from the also-governing Labor Party forced Minister Joekes to 
withdraw his own pension proposal, the last hurdle disappeared.
27
 As Parliament 
sanctioned an extension in the operation period of the emergency old age provision, 
negotiations between representatives of both sides of industry and the state in the newly 
created Social-Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad or SER – which was to 
become a very important platform for discussions on public welfare reform in coming 
years) added several features to the plan. Only the two most important of these must be 
mentioned here. First, the negotiation partners decided to exempt the self-employed, 
under a certain income limit, from paying a premium. All workers would have to 
contribute. The union federations accepted this unevenness as the price they had to pay 
for introduction of the state benefit. Moreover, several union representatives expressed 
their sympathy for the hardship endured by many of the self-employed – a group of 
which almost one-third lived below or near the poverty line.
28
  
 Second, and of much more importance to future developments in the field of old age 
pension provision, the union federations accepted that the public benefit had to be 
financed exclusively by worker contributions. This meant formal recognition of the 
principle that public insurance benefits, like occupational insurance benefits, are 
deferred wages, which therefore must be paid for by workers themselves. To confes-
sional unions, this principle was well-suited to their emphasis on self-responsibility. The 
NVV, however, like its counterpart in the United Kingdom, had long insisted that 
employers should also contribute to the public pension benefit.
29
 In constrast to the 
TUC, however, the NVV eventually accepted complete worker financing of the scheme 
though. One reason for its hesitation to accept this was that it had already agreed to keep 
the wages of workers artificially low for many years to facilitate the country’s postwar 
reconstruction. This meant that complete worker financing of the Act would hurt 
workers’ pockets deeply. For this reason, the NVV and its confessional counterparts 
demanded, and received, wage compensation. The result was a classic example of the 
complexity of Dutch wage negotiations in the early postwar period. Employers agreed 
to provide wage compensation because the unions had shown a prolonged willingness to 
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support wage restraint. The unions in turn were willing to settle for less-than-complete 
compensation so as not to endanger the government’s stabilization policy. In the year 
after the creation of the AOW, employers agreed to a supplementary wage charge of 5.6 
percent – a figure just below the 6.75 percent premium paid by workers – on top of the 
normal compensation for price and rent increases, for which employers were partly 
compensated by a reduction in the unemployment premium.
30
  
 
LABOR UNIONS AND THE REJECTION OF A REDISTRIBUTIVE 
CONTRIBUTORY PENSION SCHEME IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
By presenting a plan based on redistribution of income among workers, the three Dutch 
union federations proved themselves to be far more committed allies of pensioners in 
need than their British counterpart, the TUC, had been. Instead of supporting the 
egalitarian principle of equality between worker contributions and benefits, as the TUC 
had done earlier, the Dutch union federations accepted that an adequate old age benefit 
demanded a certain degree of redistribution between higher and lower income workers. 
In following years, the TUC and Dutch union federations reasserted the preferences 
they had demonstrated earlier. In the Netherlands, the union federations continued to 
push for more redistribution among different grades of workers by demanding higher 
worker premiums and an increase in the level of the income ceiling over which no 
contributions had to be paid. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, the TUC’s preference 
for equality over solidarity among workers came ever more to the fore. During the mid-
1940s, its stance could be justified, with some effort, by arguing that the need to achieve 
an immediate increase in the living situation of existing pensioners stopped the TUC 
from proposing a redistributive contributory solution. Yet no such justification existed 
for its lack of enthusiasm for later initiatives to introduce redistributive features into the 
public pension scheme. The first example of such an initiative arrived quite soon after 
the state pension came into operation.  
 Despite its initial positive reception at home and abroad, the shortcomings of the 
Beveridge solution of combining flat rate benefits with flat rate contributions soon 
became clear. Opting for equality in worker contributions had limited the level of the 
state benefit to what the lowest-earning worker could afford, while the absence of 
index-linking gradually eroded its dismally-low real value. Inflation, an aging 
population, and the Labour government’s decision to do away with Beveridge’s 
recommendation for a transition period all exacerbated the shortcomings of the flat rate 
contributory system. Under the circumstances, several successive governments in the 
immediate postwar period saw no room for benefit increases. A Conservative 
government first restored the real value of the state pension to its original level in as late 
as 1955.
31
  
In responding to the inadequacies of the state pension, the TUC’s inability to press 
for worker solidarity came clearly to the fore. Realizing that unions representing well-
paid workers would not accept a more redistributive social security system, the TUC 
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continued to adhere firmly to the flat rate contributory principle. This made a solution 
like the Dutch one impracticable: when Labour politicians in the early 1950s proposed 
to pay for uniform benefits with income-related contributions, TUC representatives 
were unwilling to support this idea.
32
 The inability of the TUC to accept – let alone 
press for – redistribution of income among higher and lower-paid workers greatly 
hampered its objective of achieving an adequate state pension, since it could push only 
for an increase in the Exchequer subsidy to the scheme. Committed as the TUC was to 
the contributory principle for fear of a return of the means test, this was, at most, a 
modest demand. Even if the Exchequer subsidy had reached Beveridge’s original target 
of thirty-three percent of the total costs of the scheme, in the long term this could not 
have produced anything resembling the standards that old age pensioners in the 
Netherlands who relied only on a state benefits were enjoying at the time. More 
important in the short term, the demand proved increasingly at odds with political 
reality. This became clear in 1951, when a friendly Labour government actually reduced 
the Exchequer subsidy to the National Insurance Fund in the face of rising state costs.
33
  
Meanwhile, other parties contemplated alternative measures to mend the shortcom-
ings of the flat rate contributory approach without having to challenge the Beveridge 
doctrine. Faced with the prospect of a doubling in state costs due to inflation and 
demographic change, the Conservatives, after their return to power in 1951, contem-
plated a targeting of the neediest through the means test, but eventually settled for a 
further reduction in the Exchequer subsidy to the old age pension scheme in 1957.
34
 
Three years before, the Phillips Committee, a government-appointed committee 
appointed to investigate the economic and financial problems of provision for old age, 
had adopted the official standpoint of the BEC, recommending that the retirement age 
be raised.
35
 Even more than the Conservatives, employers took it for granted that the 
state pension could not provide a subsistence level in the future; the only question was 
therefore how to solve the scheme’s financial insolvency.
36
 In its evidence to the 
Phillips Committee, the BEC explained this as follows: “those sections of the 
community which are in a strong bargaining position have benefited at the expense of 
sections whose bargaining position has been weak. Elderly persons no longer in active 
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employment must, in the nature of things, inevitably find themselves in this latter 
category.”
37
 
The first challenge to the actual Beveridge doctrine itself came from the Labour 
Party. Realizing the political impossibility of achieving an adequate minimum pension 
by increasing the Exchequer subsidy to the scheme, but not hampered by an inability to 
argue for worker solidarity, Labour’s social security experts became convinced that the 
only viable solution to the problem of poverty in old age lay in the introduction of a 
redistributive contributory solution.
38
 The two alternatives considered by the political 
right – means testing and an increase in the retirement age – were rejected out of hand 
as steps back.
39
 As mentioned above, Labour was the first party to contemplate 
combining uniform benefits with earnings-related contributions. The TUC’s lack of 
enthusiasm for this idea could have sufficed to shoot it down, but Labour’s social 
security experts also must have noted its inadequacy regarding another concern: the 
very low level of occupational pension coverage among workers. Thus, after the TUC 
rejected Labour’s proposal to combine flat rate benefits with earnings-related 
contributions, its social security experts started to consider a solution that was also 
under consideration in Germany and Sweden at the time: national superannuation.  
By the late 1950s, only about a third of the British working population was covered 
by occupational pension schemes. This privileged part of the workforce naturally 
comprised only higher-skilled, and thus higher-paid, workers. Most of these workers 
belonged to the white-collar category. Of all manual workers, only one in four could 
claim some degree of entitlement to pension provision at the time.
40
 Although there is 
little data on the spread of occupational pension coverage within the manual and white-
collar category, it is safe to assume that of those manual workers who could claim 
membership in occupational pension schemes during the late 1950s, nearly all belonged 
to the skilled manual category. As a result of their very low earnings, it is hard to 
conceive of many semi- and unskilled manual workers having been able to afford 
occupational pension schemes membership at the time. Often, employers did not even 
offer them the possibility of membership in these schemes. The same distinction almost 
certainly applied to the white-collar category. 
Labour’s social security experts were well aware of the sharp differences in the 
abilities of different worker categories to save for supplementary occupational provision. 
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They also noted two other shortcomings of the private pension system. First, and 
because of the almost completely absence of industry-wide bargaining in the United 
Kingdom, most pension schemes were quite small. This not only made them financially 
vulnerable; it also made it more difficult to preserve pension rights after a change in 
employer.
41
 Second, and far more important to left wing critics, workers that belonged 
to occupational pension schemes enjoyed very generous tax advantages. According to 
Labour’s academic standard-bearer, LSE professor Richard Titmuss, losses to the 
Exchequer from the generous tax treatment of private pensions actually exceeded the 
costs of state expenditure on National Insurance.
42
 This in itself was a problem, as this 
in effect resulted in rather large tax breaks for higher-paid workers. Because of the 
concurrent inadequacy of the state benefit, Labour’s social security experts viewed these 
tax breaks as intolerable. 
 Labour’s solution to all of these problems was the introduction of superannuation. 
In October of 1957, a Labour study group – headed by rising star Richard Crossman and 
under the intellectual guidance of a group of Titmuss’s circle of LSE intellectuals – 
presented the annual Party Conference with its proposal to create an earnings-related 
and inflation-proof state pension. The scheme contained an immediate fifty percent 
increase in the basic state pension and additional increases for workers depending on 
their previous wages. After the Conference approved of the scheme, Crossman worked 
very hard to convince the TUC of its merits. Because unions representing privileged 
workers resisted the scheme, he did so with only very limited success.  
To many in the Labour Party, superannuation must have seemed a true panacea for 
the shortcomings of both state and private provision. When Richard Crossman first read 
about it, the concept reportedly hit him with a “blinding flash.”
43
 As in Sweden, where 
the social democrats were also preparing the creation of an earnings-related supplemen-
tary pension (resulting in the Allmän Tilläggspension, or ATP, in 1959), the British 
Labour Party liked superannuation for its ability to spread earnings-related benefits 
among all workers. Unlike the Swedish case, however, superannuation came on the 
agenda in the United Kingdom as a means to finance an improvement in the basic state 
pension benefit. As a result, superannuation had a decidedly redistributive flavor; a 
large part of the earnings-related contributions would be used to finance a value-secured 
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minimum rate below which no pensioner was allowed to fall.
44
 Under such a scheme, 
the privileged members of existing occupational pension schemes would, of course, lose 
out. They now faced the potential replacement of their generous occupational plans with 
a public pension scheme that diverted a substantial part of their contributions to benefits 
for lower-paid workers. As a result, they vehemently opposed it.  
Resistance to this plan from unions representing higher-paid workers, among which 
civil servant unions like NALGO were especially vehement, initiated a long period of 
TUC ambivalence toward superannuation.
45
 On the one hand, members of the TUC 
Social Insurance and Industrial Welfare Committee were now well aware of the political 
impossibility of increasing the basic pension through taxation – at least without raising 
the prospect of a return to means testing.
46
 They also appreciated superannuation as an 
effective way to spread earnings-related pension schemes to all workers.
47
 Yet, the 
resistance of craft and occupationally organized white-collar unions against the 
redistributive features of the scheme forced the TUC to take a skeptical position on 
superannuation. In conversations with Labour backbenchers, TUC-representatives 
called superannuation merely “sufficiently attractive in principle to justify detailed 
examination.” At the same time, they made several demands that would reduce its 
redistributive features. First, Labour had to make sure that worker contributions were 
kept at a “reasonable” level. Second, and far more important, workers had to be given 
the option to opt out of the scheme.
48
  
This latter demand in particular presented Labour strategists with quite a dilemma. 
On the one hand, they realized that they had to allow some degree of contracting out 
into existing occupational schemes in order to get craft union, and thus TUC, support 
for their plans. On the other hand, they realized that if too many workers contracted out, 
it would become impossible to finance benefit increases for lower-paid workers.
49
 
Crossman therefore limited the opt-out possibility in two ways. First, he allowed 
contracting out only into existing schemes that could match the performance of the state 
scheme. As TUC representatives pointed out, this effectively resulted in the death 
sentence for existing pension schemes, since very few of them could guarantee an 
inflation-proof benefit or a complete transfer of existing pension rights after a change in 
employer.
50
 Second, only existing members of occupational schemes were given the 
possibility to contract out. According to TUC representatives, this meant that existing 
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schemes would “wither away,” since “many schemes […] depended on new entrants for 
their continued solvency.” TUC representatives also questioned why existing schemes 
could not accept new members. TUC representatives concluded from this that: “the 
Labour Party wishes the State to take over all private schemes but, for political reasons, 
prefers to do so in this indirect way.”
51
 
In the face of so much union resistance, Crossman had no alternative but to give in. 
In May of 1958, he informed the TUC Social Insurance and Industrial Welfare 
Committee that the opt-out was to be extended to new entrants as well. After the scheme 
had been in operation for some years, he would see whether this option was to continue 
permanently.
52
 Apparently, this was enough to give the scheme a cautious welcome at 
the TUC conference in Blackpool that year.
53
 Yet the divisions within the labor 
movement had become painfully clear. Employer interest groups like the LOA, 
Britain’s main representative of the insurance industry, capitalized on this by showing 
how bad a deal superannuation was for average- and higher-income workers.
54
 The 
Conservative government, meanwhile, referred to Labour’s plans as “backdoor 
nationalization.” This accusation proved potent in the upcoming election, simply 
because it was close to the truth. Although mainly financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, 
the superannuation scheme would have strong funded elements. To some in the Labour 
Party at least, the appeal of superannuation therefore lay in the prospect of redirecting 
investment funds from private insurance companies into the hands of the state.
55
 In fact, 
for some prominent left wing members, this was the only advantage Crossman’s scheme 
held over their preferred alternative, which was a complete replacement of contributory 
funding to financing by general taxation.
56
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The prospect of losing large parts of the private pension industry prompted some 
employers into willingness to compromise. In private discussions with Conservative 
ministers and Members of Parliament, representatives of the LOA went so far as to 
suggest the introduction of legislation to compel all employees to join occupational 
schemes. John Boyd-Carpenter, the Conservative Minister for Pensions and National 
Insurance, however, saw too many problems with this. He also did not see its necessity, 
as he deemed a modest increase in the basic state pension as sufficient to take the heat 
of his party.
57
 For the Conservatives, the main priority was to safeguard the financial 
solvency of the existing state pension scheme without touching the private pension 
industry. In response to superannuation, the government therefore proposed introducing 
a very limited measure of earnings-related contributions into the existing scheme, which, 
after sealing up the scheme’s deficits, left room for only miniscule earnings-related 
benefits.
58
 The plan brought little redistribution. It levied a contribution of four and a 
half percent only on earnings between nine and fifteen pounds per week, so that workers 
earning less than nine pounds per week stayed on flat rate benefits, while higher 
earnings remained untapped.
59
 By spurring workers to contract out, the government 
further prevented any pretence of a redistributive purpose. Lower national insurance 
contributions for the contracted out, more generous tax concessions to private schemes 
under the 1956 Finance Act, and the decision not to make the basic state pension 
inflation-proof all benefited private provision.  
The government’s solution to the shortcomings of the state pension received little 
sympathy from organized industry. The TUC General Council strongly criticized the 
increase in contributions, its use for sealing the scheme’s deficit, and the continued 
inadequacy of the flat rate benefit. Once more, the Council wanted to have it both ways 
by demanding an immediate substantial increase in the state benefit, to be financed by 
an increase in employer and Exchequer contributions.
60
 Employers, meanwhile, still 
preferred an increase in the retirement age and condemned the government scheme as 
too complicated to administer.
61
 Noting the opposition coming from the TUC as well, 
the BEC concluded that the government’s scheme did not have many friends outside of 
the Treasury.
62
 Yet the government was not seeking to increase its popularity with the 
proposed reform; it simply aimed to address the system’s insolvency without alienating 
too many voters.
63
 In this, it was quite successful. During the general elections of 1959, 
superannuation proved not to be the “wonderful vote-winner” Crossman had hoped it to 
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be, as a small majority of voters gave the Conservatives their third consecutive 
victory.
64
 
In retrospect, it is possible to argue that if the Labour Party had enacted superannua-
tion, the United Kingdom would have become one of the most advanced welfare states 
of the day.
65
 Yet the important point is that it could not do so. Even if Labour had won 
the elections, the concessions it had made to unions that objected to the scheme would 
still have prevented the scheme from being implemented in its original form. Labour’s 
social security experts were acutely aware of this, but, in contrast to the party’s left 
wing, saw little alternative. The ‘Scandinavian’ solution of financing the state pension 
by sources of income outside worker contributions certainly would have resulted in the 
return of the means test, as there was no strong agricultural interest in tax financing in 
the United Kingdom. Moreover, it would not have solved the problem of the lack of 
private pension coverage among manual workers. Superannuation therefore did not end 
up in the dustbin, but returned, in a somewhat modified form, when Labour regained 
power in 1964. Now popularly labeled “The Crossman Scheme,” employer, worker and 
state contributions would result in a sixty percent replacement rate on earnings up to 
half the national average, and an additional twenty-five percent up to a ceiling of one 
and a half times the national average. The pension benefit would again be inflation-
proof – or at least be subject to a biennial review. To prevent opponents from accusing 
Labour of having a secret agenda to nationalize the pension industry, Crossman had 
increased the fund’s reliance on pay-as-you-go financing, and there was no longer any 
talk of government control over economic investment.
66
 Finally, the option to contract 
out returned, as this was crucial for Labour’s bid to appease unions representing 
privileged workers.
67
  
With the opposition of the latter to superannuation still fresh in mind, the Party was 
reluctant at first to implement the new scheme.
68
 Initially, the narrowness of Labour’s 
parliamentary majority of four seats provided an excuse to delay implementation of the 
Crossman Scheme. After gaining a larger majority in 1966, the less-politically-sensitive 
introduction of earnings-related supplements to sickness and unemployment benefits 
gave the pretext for waiting two more years. Originally planned for implementation in 
autumn of 1966, the pension plan thus got underway only in 1968, after Crossman 
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personally took charge of the Department of Health and Social Security. Once more, the 
party worked frantically to obtain broad support for its proposals. Even more than in the 
late 1950s, the outcome was a useful lesson in the importance of union representation, 
as those unions whose members already had access to occupational provision had only 
grown more vocal in their objections to Labour’s redistributive goals. Once again, the 
TUC leadership struggled with the competing interests of different unions. Whereas 
those unions representing many workers who did not have access to occupational 
provision came out in clear support of the Crossman Scheme, others aligned themselves 
closely with the business community in opposing the scheme.  
The clash of interests between unions representing many lower-paid and those 
representing higher-paid workers came clearly to the fore in the discussions of the 
Social Insurance and Industrial Welfare Committee. To the representatives of the 
general unions, national superannuation was the only way to provide the bulk of union 
members with an earnings-related old age benefit, since voluntary efforts had not 
proven successful for them. They stressed that lower-paid workers were often outside 
occupational pension schemes not because they wanted to, but because employers had 
resisted the introduction of occupational schemes for them.
69
 General union representa-
tives also welcomed the government’s scheme for bringing “social justice” to lower-
paid workers, and took it for granted that a scheme based “on social principles” gave 
higher wage-earners a somewhat lower return on their contributions than the lower-
paid.
70
 Representatives of unions in which members already had access to occupational 
provision disagreed. They vehemently objected to the new scheme that gave lower-paid 
workers an advantage, and urged the Committee “to see that all interests were looked 
after without prejudice” as “these [meaning: their] interests had to be weighed against 
those without occupational schemes.”
71
 Again, these unions focused primarily on 
increasing the ability of workers to contract out from the state scheme into occupational 
schemes.  
In their opposition to the Crossman Scheme, these unions found a strong ally in the 
business community. During their first meeting with government officials, representa-
tives from the CBI – by then the only remaining employer federation in the country – 
made its opposition to the scheme perfectly clear. Still preoccupied mainly with the 
financial solvency of the National Insurance Fund, CBI representatives again proposed 
increasing the retirement age. An increase in the retirement age made sense, they argued, 
because the age at which health began to deteriorate was now much higher, and 
increased mechanization had lessened the rigors of work in heavy industry.
72
 At 
minimum, the representatives stated, the government’s plans must be deferred until the 
economic position of the United Kingdom had improved. At most, the CBI could 
support an increase in the Exchequer contribution, and then only to meet the growing 
costs of the National Insurance Fund. A higher Exchequer contribution made sense to 
the CBI because the Government itself was to blame for current problems: “As the 
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increasing numbers of old people could presumably be attributed to the benefits of the 
National Health Service, which was tax-financed, the increased numbers of pensions 
which had to be paid as a result should also be tax-financed.”
73
 The absence of Labour 
flirtation with government control over economic investment did not make the scheme 
more acceptable to the CBI. On the contrary, its representatives only lamented the move 
to increased pay-as-you-go financing as “inflationary” and a “mortgage on the future.” 
Provided the state’s role as an investor remained small, the CBI therefore favored an 
increase in funded components of the scheme.
74
 Like its counterparts in the Netherlands, 
the CBI’s main priority had always been to retain occupational pension schemes. If the 
government decided to go ahead with the scheme, employer representatives therefore 
warned, the CBI would only accept this when the maximum extent of contracting out 
was allowed.
75
 
 With both organized employers and unions representing privileged workers 
demanding a complete preservation of existing pension rights, the main quarrel was 
now over the so-called “abatement,” a partial contracting out of the state scheme. As 
Labour realized that most occupational schemes would not be able to match the 
performance of the state scheme – which previously had been the condition for 
contracting out – it now no longer allowed for complete contracting out of the state 
scheme.
76
 Instead, workers could give up a certain percentage of the state pension 
benefit in return for a reduced contribution to the state scheme. In other words, the 
abatement allowed occupational pensions to take over a share of the national pension. 
This again brought the following problem: if the abatement terms were made too lenient, 
the generosity of the state pension would be endangered; if the abatement terms were 
made too strict, many occupational schemes would not be able to survive. To Labour, 
an acceptable compromise was a one percent reduction in pension benefits in exchange 
for a one point three percent reduction in contributions. This time, the General Council 
of the TUC came out firmly on Labour’s side. It stated its opposition to any further 
increase in the level of the abatement, as this would be detrimental to the income of the 
state fund.
77
 To meet the demands of the more-privileged of its constituency, it 
simultaneously proposed making the state scheme somewhat less redistributive. While 
Labour had proposed giving a sixty percent replacement rate on earnings up to half the 
national average, resulting in a rather abrupt reduction in the marginal rate of the benefit 
at a relatively low level of earnings, the TUC now suggested a forty percent replace-
ment rate up to national earnings, and, like Labour, twenty-five percent over higher 
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earnings.
78
 This compromise, however, convinced neither the CBI nor the objecting 
unions. In an official press statement, the National Federation of Professional Workers 
(NFPW), for example, rejected Labour’s abatement as “complete nonsense.”
79
 
In 1969, in a powerful display of the importance of union leadership, NALGO –then 
the fifth-largest trade union in the United Kingdom – produced a pamphlet containing 
the “seven major disadvantages of national superannuation.” In it, NALGO’s leadership 
explained how it had been “forced to the conclusion that the effect of the Government’s 
proposals could be to seriously erode public service schemes, without substituting 
equivalent benefits.” In an excellent example of how close the interests of unions like 
NALGO were to those of employers, the pamphlet stated, “NALGO has no quarrel with 
the employers or their representatives in any of the public services, whose attitude 
throughout has been helpful and sympathetic to staff interests.”
80
 As Crossman himself 
noted in his diary, the pamphlet had quite an impact on the “rank and file.”
81
 When 
Crossman advanced a mass meeting of NALGO members in an attempt to smooth 
tensions, he encountered “an atmosphere of ferocious hostility.”
82
 Followed by loud 
applause from the floor, one worker fielded his frustration in a rather direct way by 
asking, “Is it your intention to lay your filthy hands on the lolly which is in the 
occupational schemes?” Crossman concluded from this that many unions were making 
“the wildest assertions about what was going to happen as a result of our scheme.”
83
 In 
fact, union agitation against his scheme became so malevolent that it even forced a 
response from the General Council. Just before the introduction of the superannuation 
Bill in Parliament, the TUC-report carried an article sub-headed: “Dick Crossman’s new 
pension plan is being misrepresented by some, maligned by others and misunderstood 
by many.” Although granting its own “criticisms” about certain parts of the scheme, it 
went on to stress that “working people can only benefit from the new state pension 
scheme.”
84
 
 Matters eventually came to a head at the TUC Congress of 1969, where three white-
collar unions supported a motion that criticized national superannuation for requiring 
members of occupational schemes to subsidize the state scheme. Perry Coldwick, the 
representative of the Transport Salaried Staffs’ Association (TSSA) who submitted the 
motion, attempted to convince Congress that “this motion is no manual versus non-
manual worker, no white-collar versus blue-collar motion.”
85
 This was true in the sense 
that the winners and losers in Labour’s attempt at redistribution could be found in each 
of these categories. Many skilled manual workers were by now members of occupa-
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tional pension schemes, while many unskilled white-collar workers remained outside 
the schemes. To be sure, semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers rarely had access to 
occupational provision. Thus, although it was not a “manual versus non-manual” or 
“white-collar versus blue-collar motion,” it certainly was an “affluent versus non-
affluent” motion. The initiators of the motion did little to conceal this, as they warned 
against attempts “to improve the position of the worse-off section of the community at 
the expense of those whose earnings were in the middle salary range and who were in 
occupational pension schemes.”
86
 The motion did not pass. Crossman nevertheless 
noted: “We really are in the soup.”
87
 
 The leadership of the CBI had endorsed the view of its Social Security Committee 
that it should attempt to cooperate with – not obstruct – Labour’s attempt to introduce 
earnings-related benefits, because it was uncertain whether even a change of govern-
ment could reverse existing plans.
88
 It need not have worried. The Labour government 
introduced superannuation into Parliament in the beginning of 1970, but, to Crossman’s 
great disappointment, lost the general elections of June 1970 before the scheme had 
passed the Committee stage. Its Conservative successor overturned the superannuation 
Bill and opted again for a small increase in earnings-related contributions to somewhat 
improve the basic pension, although not to the level of subsistence. The new govern-
ment also proposed making the basic pension inflation-proof.
89
 The Conservative 
government also proposed creating a so-called “state reserve scheme,” which was to 
give workers without occupational coverage an earnings-related pension inferior to all 
but the worst private pensions. Under this government, requirements for recognition and 
preservation of pension rights were so lenient that they would do almost nothing to 
improve existing private pensions.
90
  
 In the Labour Party, this second electoral defeat naturally provoked a reconsidera-
tion of the view of superannuation as a “vote-winner.” Powerful sections within the 
party called for a return to the Beveridge system, improving the state pension either by 
expanding on the Conservative solution of combining earnings-related contributions 
with uniform benefits, or by increasing the Exchequer contribution. Union resistance to 
the small increase in earnings-related contributions by the Conservative government 
made the first a non-starter, but the option of increased Exchequer contributions again 
proved quite popular with Labour’s left wing.
91
 Eventually, however, the moderate view 
prevailed, and efforts instead focused on finding ways to put superannuation more in 
line with the interests of higher-paid workers. To make superannuation acceptable to the 
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higher income strata, Labour’s social security experts now accepted, they had to modify 
superannuation so that the state scheme would not stand in the way of private pension 
provision. Labour’s agreeing to leave private pension schemes untouched was a sharp 
reversal of the party’s stance on pension reform, since it necessitated an abdication of 
the party’s original redistributive ambitions.  
 When Labour returned to power in 1974, it discarded the Conservative scheme and 
implemented its own renewed version of superannuation. Labour’s new State Earnings 
Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) differed from earlier superannuation proposals in one 
major way. Instead of demanding that private schemes match the performance of the 
state scheme, the state now undertook to guarantee the viability of private schemes. As 
SERPS guaranteed an inflation-proof benefit, this move “extended public liability in an 
unprecedented fashion.”
92
 It also made SERPS into little more than a voluntary scheme. 
Within one year after its introduction, more than ten out of the eleven-and-a-half million 
occupational pension scheme members had contracted out.
93
 By maximizing the ability 
to contract out, the government successfully appeased unions representing privileged 
workers and the CBI, but only at the expense of needy pensioners. With all those who 
lost out in redistribution contracting out, SERPS did little for the basic state pension 
other than making it inflation-proof, thus leaving poorer pensioners to rely on means-
tested social assistance.
94
 SERPS merely added twenty-five percent of a worker’s 
previous best twenty years’ earnings to the existing flat rate benefit. For those workers 
who earned a wage that was close to – or even below – subsistence, this resulted in a 
very meager supplement to the flat rate benefit, which, although now inflation-proof, 
now for married couples still came to only about thirty-five percent of the average 
earnings of a male manufacturing worker.
95
 
 Some twenty years after it was first proposed, the United Kingdom had finally 
introduced superannuation. In terms of solidarity, SERPS was a pale reflection of what 
Crossman and Titmuss had proposed in the 1950s. Yet this is exactly what made it 
successful. Targeted as it was at the mass of the population instead of the needy, it 
commanded broad societal support. After the Conservatives regained power in 1979, 
they therefore chose to leave it intact – at least for the moment. 
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UNIONS, EMPLOYERS AND THE MOVE TOWARDS FULL 
SUBSISTENCE PENSIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
The protracted and difficult struggle to introduce superannuation in the United Kingdom 
shows that the ability of nations to achieve adequate pension provision for all depends 
not on the organizational strength of labor unions but on their willingness and ability to 
support redistribution of income among workers. State pension provision remained 
inadequate in the United Kingdom not because of weak labor unionism but because 
craft and occupationally organized white-collar unions opposed any redistributive effort 
among workers. How different the situation was in the Netherlands, where union 
federations not only accepted that an adequate old-age benefit demanded a certain 
degree of redistribution between more and less affluent workers but also actively pushed 
for this redistribution. As a result, from its inception the Dutch public pension 
guaranteed a far more generous level of income maintenance for old age pensioners 
than the British state pension. Earnings-related contributions allowed for a much more 
generous benefit rate, while index-linking guaranteed a preservation of purchasing 
power for the elderly or, if employers willed it (and they would eventually), allowed 
pensioners to share in future increases in national prosperity.  
 This is of course not to say that the introduction of the General Old Age Act in 1955 
completely eradicated the problem of poverty in old age in the Netherlands. Some five 
years after its introduction, the percentage of the elderly living below the fiscal 
minimum had in fact only dropped from thirty-two to twenty-four percent.
96
 Although 
the General Old Age Act is now often treated in the literature as the concluding piece of 
the Dutch pension system, to contemporaries the Act only provided a healthy first step 
in the creation of an adequate safety net of old age provision. Like its British counter-
part, the Dutch state pension was not initially designed to be sufficient to live on. 
Instead, it was to provide an adequate pension only in combination with private pension 
supplements. In following years, union and employer federations continuously 
discussed how to improve the safety net of public and private provision in the 
Netherlands, with the unions putting more emphasis on public pension provision and 
organized employers emphasizing the importance of occupational provision. In doing so, 
both sides of industry confirmed the preferences they had shown in the years leading up 
to the introduction of the General Old Age Act. The three union federations strength-
ened their demands for an increase in the level of the public benefit by arguing for more 
worker solidarity in the form of higher worker premiums and an increase in the level of 
the ceiling over which no income had to be paid. The employer federations fought a 
long, but eventually unsuccessful, battle to prevent such an increase. It was only when 
they were faced with a plan that would have resulted in an almost complete replacement 
of the private pension industry that they fully agreed to the demands of the union 
federations.  
To understand the events that unfolded in the Netherlands after the introduction of 
the General Old Age Act, it is first necessary to point out that by the time the state 
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pension came into operation, most workers already had access to supplementary 
occupational provision. This meant that both sides of industry viewed occupational 
pension schemes as an integral part of the Dutch pension system. The only question, 
then, was how large the shares of public and private pensions were to be in the total 
provision of income maintenance for the elderly. All three union federations argued that 
the public share of total pension provision must be substantial because this was the only 
way to achieve adequate pension levels for all workers. The employer federations, by 
contrast, pushed to keep the public pension share as small as possible. They did accept 
that some degree of public, pay-as-you-go financing was necessary to provide a certain 
degree of protection against inflation.
97
 Yet they wanted the public share in old age 
pension provision to be as small as possible in order to leave sufficient room for funded, 
private capital-based provision.
98
 Initially, they therefore argued that the public pension 
should provide a subsistence benefit level only in combination with private supple-
ments. The three union federations obviously disagreed with the employer federations 
on this point.  
The reasons most workers already had access to supplementary occupational provi-
sion at the time of the introduction of the General Old Age Act can be found in the 
immediate pre- and postwar periods. As in most other European countries (but not in the 
United Kingdom), the prewar decision to introduce statutory legislation on an extension 
of collective bargaining outcomes had provided a first impulse to bringing many 
workers under the tutelage of occupational pensions. Yet the high coverage rates that we 
see today resulted from the guided wage policy of the early postwar period.
99
 
Occupational pension schemes expanded rapidly in both range and generosity during 
the late 1940s and 1950s because employers used the schemes to placate wage demands 
in the context of the guided wage policy. When tensions on the labor market mounted, 
employers were not allowed to increase net wage levels, but were allowed to increase 
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their pension pledges.
100
 A favorable tax treatment further motivated employers’ use of 
pension pledges as a means to satisfy worker demands. In 1950, the NVV estimated the 
coverage level of occupational pensions at one third of the workforce. Eight years later, 
the CNV estimated it at seventy percent.
101
 During the same period, existing schemes 
also increased enormously in generosity.  
In the immediate postwar period, the massive growth of occupational pension 
schemes was both facilitated by and resulted in several legislative measures. As early as 
1948, for instance, the Dutch government proposed a bill enabling the Minister of 
Social Affairs to compel employers and employees in specific industrial branches to, 
respectively, set up and join industrial pension funds. This resulted in the 1949 Industry 
Pension Fund Act (Wet Bedrijfspensioenfonds).
102
 Then, three years later, the 
government proposed a bill that aimed to set strict criteria for evaluating private pension 
scheme performance. This resulted in the 1954 Pensions and Savings Funds Act 
(Pensioen- en Spaarfondsenwet).
103
 Both acts passed in Parliament by overwhelming 
majorities and received broad support from both sides of industry. The union 
federations supported both acts because they presented a further step in the creation of 
adequate old age pension provision. The employer federations motivated their support 
by referring to the importance of private pensions for the economy.
104
 To understand the 
latter’s support for these acts, despite their natural aversion to regulation, it is important 
to realize that both acts were created when the future of the public pension scheme was 
still uncertain. The emergency old age provision had, and Joekes’s plan certainly would, 
deduct the individual’s resources from the public benefit, and other equally harmful 
outcomes to private pension industry were still foreseeable. For the employer 
federations, then, their acceptance of regulations to guarantee and extend existing 
occupational pension schemes served to deflect calls for an overly generous, or in other 
ways harmful, public pension. 
In later years, the employer federations continuously referred to improvements in the 
coverage and generosity of private pension funds to counter what they disliked most: an 
increase in the public share of old age provision. In the first years after the introduction 
                                                
100 Although adding to labor costs, increases in pension rights worked non-inflationary and improved the 
savings rate – which in turn strengthened the productive potential of the economy. On this, see IISG, 
NVV codelijsten 1945-1970, 1952, HM13, Notulen Commissie Ouderdomsvoorziening, 16 oktober 1952. 
101
 IISG, NVV codelijsten 1945-1970, 1951 HM4, Notulen Sociale Commissie, 21 maart 1951; IISG, 
CNV, Commissie Sociale Zekerheid, 63, Ouderdomsverzekering, F5, Het vraagstuk van het aanvullende 
ouderdomspensioen. Uit “De Vakbeweging”, 21 januari 1958. 
102
 The direct occasion for this Act was the intention of creating a pension scheme in the agricultural 
sector. This scheme would cover at least two hundred thousand workers, but the government wanted to 
expand it further by including small employers and the self-employed, who together numbered three 
hundred thousand. Parliament disagreed, however, and enabled the self-employed to opt out of 
participation in the 1949 Industry Pension Fund Act. For an encompassing history of the Act, see Peter 
van Griensven, “Het sociale beleid van minister Joekes.” In P.F. Maas, Parlementaire Geschiedenis van 
Nederland na 1945. Het kabinet Drees-Van Schaik (1948-1951). Liberalisatie en sociale ordening 
(Nijmegen: SSN, 1992). 
103
 The reason the 1949 Act did not set criteria was apparently that the government wanted it to get 
through parliament quickly so that it could apply to the agricultural sector, where plans were being made 
to set up an industrial fund. This is why the 1949 Act has also been called an “Emergency Act.” See Van 
Griensven, “Het sociale beleid,” 639. 
104
 VNO, F119(4) Cie Sociale Verzekering RCO 1947-1970: Notulen, 27 april 1948. 
  
84 
of the General Old Age Act, the union and employer federations argued mainly over the 
question of whether the state benefit was to be tied to yearly increases in the level of 
prices or wages. At the time of the introduction of the Act this had not been a strong 
issue. After all, the guided policy of the time only allowed wages to increase with price 
levels. When this wage policy broke down in the late 1950s, the employer federations 
first opposed an automatic adjustment of the public benefit to wage increases.
105
 When 
this proved untenable, they used the automatic adjustment of the public benefit to wage 
increases to argue against any incremental increases in the level of the public benefit. 
They claimed that wage-indexation meant that the benefit level would automatically 
approach – and eventually even come to exceed – the “social minimum” without further 
meddling.
106
 The resistance of employer federations to incremental increases in the level 
of the public benefit proved unsuccessful, however. Between 1961 and 1975, the unions 
were able to increase its level with more than twice the amount index-linking would 
have entailed.
107
 
 The first initiative for a major increase in the level of the public benefit was put forth 
in 1961. In that year, union, employer and state representatives in the Social and 
Insurance Council received a request from the government for advice on whether the 
public benefit should be increased to a level of subsistence. All employer representa-
tives to the Council argued against doing so; all state and union representatives argued 
in favor of the increase. The employer representatives explained their opposition with 
the claim that those pensioners who could not survive on an old age pension alone must 
simply resort to social assistance to subside.
108
 Internal discussions in the Council of 
Directors in Labor Affairs on the issue show that employers were, however, quite aware 
of the fact that this argument would convince neither the unions nor most political 
parties.
109
 All they could do, therefore, was attempt to delay legislation on the increase 
in the public benefit for as long as possible.
110
 They managed to do so until 1965. In that 
year, the government finally raised the level of the public benefit from fifty to seventy 
percent of the minimum wage for a married couple, and to seventy percent of a full 
benefit for a single person. Representatives from the Protestant employer federation 
VPCW complained afterward that the government apparently had little interest in the 
opinion of employers. In matters concerning the public pension benefit, they argued, the 
government always sided with the unions.
111
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 During internal discussions on the matter, the employer federations had deemed an 
increase in the level of the public benefit inevitable because private pension provision 
still was (and in the coming years would remain) insufficient to guarantee a decent 
supplement to the public benefit for all workers.
112
 Yet, as the British example has 
already demonstrated, this does not in all cases mean that an increase of the state benefit 
to a level of subsistence is inevitable. What the employer federations did not mention, 
since they regarded it as self-evident, was the importance of labor union unity on the 
question of worker solidarity. This, among other factors, enabled the unions to found 
their demands for an increase in the public pension benefit by emphasizing that such an 
increase would be almost completely financed by workers themselves. Once more, the 
three union federations tied this to increased redistribution of income among workers, 
proposing to finance a large part of the benefit increase by removing the ceiling over 
which no contributions had to be paid. The Protestant CNV’s motivation for this is most 
interesting here. Once a fierce defender of the strict insurance approach, it now 
increasingly explored ways to reconcile its emphasis on personal responsibility with the 
notion of worker solidarity. This led CNV representatives to conclude that the 
confessional virtue of social insurances’ normative effect on societal structure 
demanded solidarity – and this meant that there was no longer any place for a ceiling.
113
  
 The insistence of the three union federations that workers themselves would pay for 
most of the demanded increase in the public benefit did not itself convince the employer 
federations to agree. The fact was that employer opposition to the benefit increase was 
not only founded in cost considerations. At least equally important, to quote a 
representative of the CSWV, was that: “A further extension of the AOW [the public 
pension] means that a greater part of pension provision for employees is financed by 
public provision, which leaves less room for additional supplements provided by 
industry or company pension funds.”
114
 In other words, any increase in the level of the 
public benefit meant that the employer community was left with fewer opportunities to 
raise capital to invest. Yet if financing the increase through worker contributions did not 
convince the employer federations to agree to an increase in the public pension benefit, 
it certainly helped to convince most political parties to support such an increase. In 1963, 
the employer federations had already noted that the government was leaning toward 
granting union demands for an increase in the public benefit. It is important to bear in 
mind here that this government did not include members of the Labor Party.
115
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 In contrast to their stance at the introduction of the public benefit in the mid-1950s, 
the union federations did not demand wage compensation for the increase in worker 
contributions that made possible the 1965 increase in public benefit level. Workers 
nevertheless again received some degree of compensation in 1965. During discussions 
on how to finance the 1965 increase, both union and employer federations were 
preoccupied with the effect of increased worker contributions on the purchasing power 
of the lower and middle income brackets. They had quite different reasons for this 
preoccupation. While union representatives worried mostly about the effect of the 
coming increase on the purchasing power of lower income groups, their employer 
counterparts worried about the effect of the coming increase on the ability of middle 
income groups to improve private pension provision.
116
 To solve this problem, union 
representatives in the Social-Economic Council proposed to finance part of the public 
benefit increase by increasing the state contribution. Representatives of the liberal 
CSWV were willing to consider this proposal, but though agricultural employers 
supported it,
117
 their confessional counterparts adamantly opposed any expansion of 
government financing in the pension sphere.
118
 A compromise eventually came from the 
Catholic union federation KAB, representatives of which proposed to compensate for 
part of the increase in worker contributions by financing future expenses for child 
benefits through taxation – instead of through contributions, as was currently the case. 
The confessional employer representatives could eventually support this solution – so 
long as it did not open the door for further government financing of social insurances.
119
  
 Although the 1965 agreement led to a substantial increase in the level of the public 
pension benefit, unrest on the pension front did not subside. In subsequent years, the 
union federations kept pushing for an additional large increase in the level of the public 
benefit. They argued that the 1965 increase had simply not been enough to provide full 
subsistence to pensioners who did not have access to occupational provision. By the late 
1960s, some ten to twenty percent of all workers were not covered by private pension 
funds. For many other workers, private pension provision would result in rather meager 
supplementary benefits. Finally, among existing old age pensioners, a whopping forty to 
forty-five percent had no additional provision.
120
 Another problem was that few private 
pension funds were able to guarantee an inflation-proof – let alone a wage or 
‘prosperity’-proof – benefit. Under the circumstances of rapid economic growth and 
rising inflation, this last shortcoming received increased attention. To the horror of 
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employer federations, this attention soon brought about an increase in the public share 
of old age provision back on the agenda – and this time in a much more far-reaching 
form. Union federations, progressive or left wing parties, and even individual employers 
now increasingly came to argue for what the employer federations wanted to prevent 
more than anything else: the introduction of a Dutch version of superannuation. 
 Above, I already noted that during the first decades of the postwar period, the 
existence of a thriving private pension industry had been a sacrosanct feature of old age 
pension provision in the Netherlands. There were several reasons for this. The employer 
community appreciated private pension funds mainly for their financial and economic 
value. Others appreciated them mainly because they helped preserve workers’ sense of 
self-responsibility. The socialist NVV had realized this at an early stage. When it 
received criticism for its underlining of the importance of preserving the private pension 
industry by signing of the second Van Rhijn Report in 1948, the NVV response was: 
“[We] have often heard the reproof that the notion of industry pension funds conflict 
with our image of society. This might be true, but here also, reality is of more 
importance than doctrine. A people’s provision for the elderly will have to deal with 
industry pension funds.”
121
 Many within the NVV also appreciated the usefulness of 
funded provision for the productive potential of the economy.
122
 In the immediate 
postwar period, it therefore strove not to replace private pension industry, but to achieve 
worker representation on the boards of pension funds.
123
 
 Yet despite this overall acceptance of the existence of private pension industry by 
the union movement, there had always been strong undercurrents that favored a partial 
or complete replacement of private pension funds by an earnings-related public pension 
fund. In the years leading up to the introduction of the General Old Age Act, the NVV 
leadership for example noted that a group of union members were campaigning for such 
a solution.
124
 And in 1958, after the introduction of the ATP in Sweden, both the Labor 
Party and the NVV investigated the possibility of grouping all existing private pension 
funds under the umbrella of one public fund. Employer federations were not worried 
about this at the time. Other political parties did not favor such a move, and the 
confessional union federations were also quite reluctant to support their socialist 
counterpart.
125
 In subsequent years, however, confessional unions’ dissatisfaction with 
the lack of progress made by private pension funds – especially on the long-standing 
demand of making them inflation-proof – spurred them to alter their position. Once 
again, the formerly conservative CNV made the sharpest reversal. In 1969, at a time 
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when the other two union federations were still committed to leaving the private 
pension industry intact, the CNV came forward with a proposal to introduce a public 
supplement on top of the existing public benefit.
126
 This almost immediately resulted in 
a reversal of the stance of the other two union federations. Later in the year, the union 
representatives in the Social-Economic Council together presented a proposal to create a 
supplementary public benefit for all existing pensioners, collected on a pay-as-you-go 
basis, and financed completely through worker contributions.
127
  
 It would be an understatement to say that the union proposal disturbed the Council’s 
employer representatives. Its introduction would be disastrous for private savings and 
could bring about a complete replacement of private pension funds by a public pension 
fund – as the CNV had in fact already demanded.
128
 It seems that the employer 
federations were not quite sure what to make of the proposal at first. In the social 
insurance committee of the liberal VNO, which succeeded the CSWV and several other 
employer federations of a liberal signature in 1968, one member saw the CNV proposal 
as an off-season attempt to lure employers into voicing approval for a substantial 
increase in the existing public benefit.
129
 If this was indeed the case, the attempt was 
quite successful. Within a matter of weeks, the employer representatives to the Social-
Economic Council made the following counterproposal. They offered to increase the 
level of the existing public pension benefit by some fifteen percent to that of the 
minimum wage, introduce a holiday surcharge to the benefit, and oblige all workers to 
become a member of an occupational pension scheme. The combination of public and 
occupational benefits was to provide at least seventy percent of the last earned wage for 
all workers.
130
 
 The authors of the combined employer proposal had to overcome substantial internal 
opposition. To many members of the Protestant FCWV, the opposition centered mainly 
on compulsory membership in pension schemes – to which they objected in principle. 
The leadership of the FCWV regarded this stance as “unworkable,” however, and 
argued that: “Those who are of the opinion that membership in supplementary pension 
schemes has to remain completely voluntary have no stance that leads to a solution in 
the short term that is satisfactory to the union organizations as well. By rigidly sticking 
to this viewpoint, the unions will only feel it necessary to strive for a completely 
centralized system.”
131
 Within the VNO, there was also much skepticism toward the 
plan, but there, the objections focused mainly on the generosity of the proposed increase 
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in the level of the public benefit.
132
 Most VNO members had much less difficulty with 
compulsory membership in occupational pension schemes. In fact, only a few years 
after the introduction of the General Old Age Act, the VNO had already partially 
reversed its opposition to compulsory membership in occupational pension schemes. In 
1958, because of “automatic” progress on private pension coverage, the leadership of 
the VNO questioned whether “there is still reason…to take such a dismissive stance as 
taken at the time [of the creation of the AOW]. It has to be noted that we are already 
heading in the direction of a closing net of private provision.” It also noted at the time 
that “from the side of the [social insurance] committee, nobody opposed this notion.”
133
 
 Of eventual overriding importance to the leadership of all the employer federations 
was the fact that the government had already shown support for union demands for an 
increase in the public pension benefit.
134
 By taking the initiative, the employer 
federations could at least prevent the six hundred guilders plan from becoming a 
political issue.
135
 Also important was the fact that the union federations had backed up 
their demands for an increase in the level of the public benefit by offering that the 
increase be paid completely by workers themselves. The NKV, which had succeeded 
the KAB, and the NVV were unwilling to support this in a formal statement, but this did 
not matter as long as employers supported it in coming wage negotiations. The union 
federations promised to endorse this as a proper stance if their members challenged it.
136
 
Finally, the union federations also promised to consider austerity measures in exchange 
for the pension proposal of the employer federations. Austerity measures proposed by 
the employer federations included a freezing of child benefits, the introduction of 
waiting days in the Sickness Act, and the introduction of personal risks in the health 
insurance. The employer federations emphasized that austerity measures of some sort 
would be necessary; the costs of handing out an old age benefit at seventy percent of the 
last earned wage would accrue to twenty-five percent of wage costs.
137
 
 In following years, both sides of industry lived up to their promises.
138
 In late 1971, 
the union federations agreed to freeze child benefits for the first and second child if the 
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resulting savings were used to improve occupational pension provision.
139
 The 
employer federations, in turn, accepted a limited degree of pay-as-you-go financing in 
the private pension sphere to make inflation-proof benefits possible.
140
 This and a host 
of other measures greatly improved the generosity and reliability of old age pension 
provision in the Netherlands. Most important was, of course, the increase in the level of 
the public pension benefit. Within several years, the public pension benefit came to be 
tied firmly to the level of the minimum wage. This paved the way for an automatic 
improvement of the public benefit that even exceeded average wage increases. By the 
time SERPS was introduced in the United Kingdom, the Dutch public pension offered a 
benefit to married couples that approached eighty percent of the net average earnings of 
a male worker in manufacturing industry.
141
 By comparison, and as mentioned before, 
the corresponding number in the United Kingdom lay close to thirty-five percent. 
 
A FINAL NOTE ON EMPLOYERS 
The above histories of postwar pension reform in the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom have demonstrated the importance of union structure to the success of efforts 
to provide all members of society with an adequate income in old age. At the same time, 
these histories tell us much about the ways in which union structure impacts employer 
interest group stances on public pension initiatives. In the previous two chapters I noted 
the growing prominence of recent writings on organized employers in the debate on 
welfare state development. Because of this growing prominence, the last section of this 
chapter dwells on the stance of British and Dutch employer interest groups towards the 
organization of old age pension provision. 
 As a result of differences in their organizational blueprint, the stance of British and 
Dutch labor unions, and of different British labor unions for that matter, towards the 
organization of old age pension provision differed substantially. No such differences 
emerge when we compare the stance of British and Dutch employer interest groups. In 
both countries, all employer interest groups were concerned mainly with ensuring that 
the public pension was to interfere as little as possible with the development of the 
private pension industry. In the United Kingdom, employer interest groups supported 
the creation of a universal state pension because its effect on private industry was 
limited. In the Netherlands, the employer federations preferred the more generous NVV 
scheme to that of the government for exactly the same reason. In the periods following 
the creation of the British and Dutch state pensions, all activities of British and Dutch 
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employer organizations continued to revolve around their objective of keeping the 
private share of old age pension provision as large as possible, and the public share as 
small as possible. British employer groupings opposed superannuation because they 
regarded it as a threat to the private pension industry. Dutch employer federations 
opposed an increase in the level of the flat rate public benefit for the same reason.  
 In the years after the introduction of universal contributory benefits, employer 
interest groups in both countries were faced with quite different challenges to their 
private pension industries. As a result, they responded in different ways. In the United 
Kingdom, employer interest groups were faced with superannuation, a scheme that, if 
enacted in its original form, would have replaced most of the private pension industry. 
In their opposition to this, the BEC, LOA and later CBI were supported by unions 
representing privileged workers who also opposed superannuation. This makes it quite 
tempting to follow the recent employer-oriented scholarship in arguing that employer 
interest groups and unions representing privileged workers in the United Kingdom 
formed a “cross-class alliance” against superannuation. Yet this would be quite 
misleading. British employer interest groups and unions representing privileged workers 
both rejected superannuation, but they did so for very different reasons and, as a result, 
also had strongly conflicting goals.  
 Employer interest groups in the United Kingdom opposed superannuation because it 
posed a challenge to the private pension industry and because they feared that its 
introduction would prove quite costly to employers. This latter concern conflicted with 
the only concern of unions representing privileged workers, which was that superannua-
tion would result in a redistribution of income among different grades of workers. As 
these unions were strongly opposed to such redistribution, they would surely attempt to 
make up for their losses by demanding higher wage increases during subsequent wage 
negotiations. This would surely complicate wage negotiations, and quite likely meant 
that they would have to carry most of the costs of superannuation. In a published 
reaction to the Crossman Scheme, the CBI expressed its worries about this, stating that 
“in the long run these increases in employee’s contributions will be reflected in wage 
claims and so far as these are allowed, the whole of the increase will be met by 
employers.”
142
 This certainly reinforced the CBI’s opposition to Labour’s pension 
initiatives. It also explains why it demanded that any increase in the state pension 
benefit, if inevitable, be financed through general taxation. 
 In the Netherlands, the situation was quite different. There, the employer community 
initially only faced union demands for an increase in the flat rate public benefit. Such an 
increase, which was to be financed by increasing earnings-related contributions, would 
certainly leave somewhat less room for the development of occupational pensions. Yet 
it did not raise the prospect of a complete replacement of private provision by public 
provision. Compared to its British counterpart, the Dutch labor union movement also 
proved far more willing to accept that increased state provision for retired workers be 
financed by workers themselves. At the introduction of the General Old Age Act, the 
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unions had still demanded a partial wage compensation for this worker-based financing. 
At the time, the employer federations were willing to give this compensation because 
the unions had shown a consistent willingness to support wage restraint. When the 
guided wage policy that had produced this wage restraint broke down, the employer 
federations were no longer willing to give, but the union federations also no longer 
demanded such compensation. The 1965 increase in the state benefit was completely 
paid for by workers – who, however, received some compensation through the 
replacement of contributory financing of child benefits by financing through general 
taxation. Five years later, no compensation was granted. 
 The willingness of Dutch unions to accept that improvements to the public pension 
benefit had to be paid by workers themselves did not spur any greater willingness by the 
employer federations to agree to such improvements. The reason for this was that any 
improvement to the public pension benefit left less room for the development of the 
lucrative private pension industry. (In this respect, old age pension insurance is quite 
different from insurance against other labor market risks.) Yet if it did not prompt 
employer federation sympathy for an increase in the public pension benefit, the union 
stance certainly made it more difficult for employers to resist such an increase in public 
benefit provision. Again, the contrast with the United Kingdom is significant. There, the 
TUC was forced to argue for a limited – and, in any case, politically unfeasible – 
increase in Exchequer contribution to the scheme. In the Netherlands, by contrast, union 
demands for a benefit increase funded by worker contributions received a very 
favorable reception in political circles. It is no coincidence then that employer 
federations like the VPCW complained that the government – even though it was 
dominated by confessional and liberal parties – often chose to side with the position of 
the unions. 
4 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN 
THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Efforts to provide all workers with adequate protection against the risk of unemploy-
ment differ from efforts to create adequate universal old age pensions in one important 
way. While the latter center on direct income redistribution among different occupa-
tional categories, the former also lean heavily on indirect redistribution through risk 
reapportioning. This difference can be attributed to the specific nature of unemployment. 
The risk of unemployment is such that different categories of workers are exposed to it 
to quite different degrees. Some workers occupy relatively secure positions and thus can 
insure themselves against the risk of becoming unemployed on relatively favorable 
terms. Other workers are much more prone to the risk of becoming unemployed and 
thus cannot do the same. Risk pooling allows such workers to achieve insurance against 
unemployment on the same terms as less-risk-prone workers. After all, when all 
workers join in a common risk pool, ‘good’ risks effectively subsidize ‘bad’ risks.  
 The greater importance of risk reapportioning does not make the redistributive logic 
behind efforts to provide all workers with adequate protection against the risk of 
unemployment different from efforts to create adequate universal old age pensions 
though. Whether ‘directly’ or ‘indirectly’, such efforts require a redistributive effort 
between different categories of workers. Moreover, the winners and losers in risk 
reapportioning are largely the same as the winners and losers in direct income 
redistribution, since workers who are more exposed to the risk of unemployment are 
often lower-paid as well. Thus, worker solidarity matters to unemployment insurance 
development in the same way it matters to old age pension development: in order to 
provide all workers with adequate protection against the risk of unemployment, workers 
with stronger positions in the labor market have to support the welfare efforts of less-
fortunate workers.  
As worker solidarity is again of central importance here, the main narrative of this 
chapter will follow a similar pattern to that of the previous chapter. In the Netherlands, 
the three industrially organized union federations actively pressed for more risk 
reapportioning and the introduction of a redistributive contributory system. Faced with 
the opposition of its craft and occupationally organized white-collar membership against 
this, the TUC leadership could not do the same. As we will see in the following pages, 
British craft and occupationally organized white-collar unions were as opposed to risk 
reapportioning as they were to the introduction of a redistributive contributory system. 
As a result, the Netherlands proved far more successful than the United Kingdom in 
providing all workers with adequate insurance against labor market risks during the 
postwar period.  
In their attitudes toward improving the generosity of the public unemployment 
insurance by increasing its redistributive features, British unions differed to a great 
extent both from Dutch unions and between themselves. The employer communities on 
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both sides of the Channel were, conversely, in full agreement on the point: they full-
heartedly opposed any attempt to redistribute risks to enhance public unemployment 
benefits. It is not hard to see why this was the case. Employers have always regarded 
unemployment as the most problematic social risk. Much more than other welfare 
dependents, the unemployed tend to be labeled as unwilling, not unable, to work. This 
popular perception, as well as the notion that unemployment is “uninsurable,” meant 
that many nations only introduced public unemployment insurances several decades 
after the introduction of public insurances against all other labor market risks.
1
 The 
Netherlands is a good example of this. It only introduced a public unemployment 
insurance in 1949, almost half a decade after the introduction of the first social 
insurance.
2
 Both during and after its creation, Dutch employer federations insisted that it 
had to operate according to strict insurance principles, so that its costs and possible 
misuse would be limited as much as possible.  
In any event, the Dutch union federations were far less successful than their British 
counterparts in their opposition to an increase in risk reapportioning and the introduc-
tion of a redistributive contributory system. Dutch employer federations’ inability to 
prevent what they described as “excessive solidarity” in the operation of public 
unemployment insurance tells us much about the importance of the organizational 
blueprint of unions to the success of efforts to create adequate security for all. It 
suggests that when a union movement is united in its support for an extension of risk 
reapportioning and the introduction of a redistributive contributory system, employer 
interest groups eventually have to cede to this. If, on the other hand, as with the British 
case, many unions also oppose such measures, matters are quite different. In the United 
Kingdom, the employer community and privileged part of the union movement agreed 
that public unemployment insurance must operate according to strict insurance 
principles. As a result, the degree of risk reapportioning remained far more limited than 
in the Netherlands. Moreover, and contrary to in the Netherlands, the system of 
contributions and benefits did not come to work to the advantage of lower-paid workers.  
The British and Dutch postwar old age pension development histories that were 
analyzed in the previous chapter lent themselves well to an illustrative comparison 
because both countries initially opted for the same formula. The initial consideration of 
a flat rate contributory system in the two countries made it possible to begin the 
previous chapter with a direct comparison of early postwar efforts to create adequate old 
age security for all members of British and Dutch society. Such a direct comparison is 
not possible in this chapter. In fact, the British and Dutch approaches to unemployment 
insurance development differed from the start. The British extended the flat rate 
contributory system that we now all know as the “Beveridge-approach” to the public 
unemployment insurance, while the Dutch opted for a “Bismarckian” system, in which 
unemployed workers were entitled to earnings-related benefits in exchange for earnings-
                                                
1 See, for example, Jens Alber, Vom Armenhaus zum Wohlfahrtsstaat (Frankfurt: Campus, 1982) 49. 
2
 For an excellent overview of the introduction of the most important social insurances in the Netherlands, 
see Cox, The Development of the Dutch Welfare State. 
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related contributions. This makes it necessary to discuss the postwar histories of 
unemployment insurance development in the two countries one at a time.  
In the previous chapter, we saw that a flat rate contributory system has the obvious 
drawback of limiting the generosity of the scheme to what the poorest-paying 
contributor can afford. When all contributors are entitled to a benefit at an equally-low 
level, this creates a problem for the less-affluent, because they do not have the means to 
add private provision to this. This is why the Dutch NVV and the British Labour Party 
both proposed combining flat rate benefits with earnings-related contributions in, 
respectively, the late 1940s and early 1950s. When the British Labour Party proposal 
failed, Labour moved toward a complete break with “Beveridge” by proposing national 
superannuation. The previous chapter has shown how the inability of the Labour Party 
to push through a redistributive solution led to the introduction of a limited earnings-
related supplement to the existing flat rate pension benefit. The first part of this chapter 
shows that attempts to improve the British public unemployment insurance had quite 
similar results.  
Yet if “Beveridge” comes up short in caring for less-fortunate workers, then so does 
“Bismarck.” When workers receive an unemployment or old age benefit that is a 
percentage of their previous wages, the lowest-paid workers inevitably end up with 
benefits that are too low to live on. After all, for those who earn a wage that is already 
close to subsistence, any decrease in that income might be disastrous. The only way to 
fix this is by entitling the lowest-paid workers to a benefit that closely approaches their 
previous wages. Such a move certainly functions redistributively, as the lowest-paid 
workers will then be entitled to a higher percentage of previous earnings than will 
higher-paid workers. The previous chapter demonstrated that the British Labour Party’s 
first two superannuation proposals attempted to enact precisely this type of redistribu-
tion. The second part of this chapter shows, among other things, how the Dutch union 
federations successfully pressed for such a solution during the 1960s. 
 
TOWARD SUPERANNUATION FOR THE UNEMPLOYED 
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
When William Beveridge came to head the Committee on Social Insurance and Allied 
Services in June of 1941, his main task was to propose ways to create a unified system 
in which all programs and services were organized and financed in the same way. 
Beveridge set about this task by proposing the establishment of a single National 
Insurance Fund that would entitle all retired, sick, disabled, and unemployed to the same 
flat rate benefit.
3
 In the previous chapter, we saw that both sides of industry supported 
Beveridge’s choice of a flat rate contributory public pension. In addition, the TUC and 
its employer counterparts also agreed on the need to organize the public unemployment 
insurance along egalitarian lines. As with the public old age pension, both sides of 
industry had been accustomed to a flat rate contributory unemployment system since the 
beginning of the twentieth century. And as with the public old age pension, neither the 
                                                
3
 Beveridge proposed making an exception only for industrial injuries – and the following chapter will 
analyze his reasons for this. 
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privileged part of the labor union movement nor the employer community would have 
accepted an alternative scheme. As a result, it was not just the state old age pension 
benefit that turned out to be inadequate in coming years; the flat rate benefit proved just 
as inadequate for the sick, disabled and unemployed as it was for the elderly.  
Considering the very low level of the national insurance benefit, it is not surprising 
that after the introduction of the 1946 National Insurance Act discussions of the state 
unemployment insurance, like discussions of the state old age pension, focused mainly 
on the inadequacy of the benefit. Even the proposed solutions to the inadequacy of the 
benefit were quite similar. By the mid-1950s, all involved parties had developed their 
own notions on how to solve this problem. As with the state old age pension, the 
Conservatives played with the idea of introducing a means test.
4
 Contrary to with the 
state old age pension, they received support for this from the employer community. The 
BEC, for example, argued that “unemployment is not, properly speaking, an insurable 
risk in the sense in which old age and sickness are.” Any benefit therefore had to be 
“adjusted to need…thus making it subject to a means test.”
5
 The TUC vehemently 
opposed this and instead pushed in vain to raise benefit levels through a tax-financed 
increase to the National Insurance Fund.
6
 As for the Labour Party, its own solution was 
national superannuation. From the moment Labour adopted the superannuation platform 
in the mid-1950s, it aimed to extend the earnings-related principle to the public 
unemployment and sickness insurances as well. It pressed ahead with a reform of the 
public old age pension scheme first only because it felt that the problem of inadequate 
old age pension benefits was more pressing.
7
 Once reform there had been achieved, 
Labour anticipated the addition of earnings-related supplements to the unemployment 
and sickness benefits as well, because “it would [then] be quite impossible for any 
democratic government to resist the argument that the sick and the unemployed must be 
kept in an inferior status.”
8
 
As it turned out, the Labour Party did not provide the spark for the introduction of 
the earnings-related principle into state unemployment and sickness insurances. Instead, 
this initiative emerged from a complex series of negotiations among the BEC, the TUC, 
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 See Paul Bridgen, “The State, Redundancy Pay, and Economic Policy-making in the early 1960s,” 
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6
 As the National Insurance Fund offered equal benefits to the retired, the (non-industrially injured) sick 
and disabled, and the unemployed, an increase in the “National Insurance Benefit” would not only raise 
the income of the elderly, but that of the sick and the unemployed as well. The National Insurance Fund 
continued to hand out more or less equal flat rate benefits to the retired, the sick, and the unemployed 
until the mid-1970s. The subsequent period witnessed an increasing degree of differentiation, in which 
the unemployed were affected the most. For the development of the benefit rates of the most important 
social security programs between 1951 and 1981 see Parry, “United Kingdom,” 189. For an excellent 
overview of events during the 1980s, see Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, 
and the Politics of Retrenchment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
7
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Peter Townsend, The Poor and the Poorest (London: Bell, 1965). 
8
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and the Conservative government over the issue of redundancy during the early 1960s. 
After it defeated Labour during the general election of 1959, thereby shelving the 
superannuation issue momentarily, the Conservative government had presented a plan 
to introduce a national redundancy fund that would entitle all redundant workers to 
severance payments. As we will see, the Conservative government’s initiative was 
motivated more by economic than social considerations. The BEC countered the 
government’s proposal by suggesting instead a public earnings-related supplement to 
the flat rate public unemployment benefit. In this, the BEC was supported by the TUC. 
After winning the general election of 1964, a new Labour government eventually 
introduced both.  
One striking feature of the introduction of the earnings-related principle into the 
unemployment and sickness insurances is that the move was to a large extent rooted in 
economic considerations. Of course, social considerations did also play a role in its 
introduction; after all, it was a Labour government that eventually carried through the 
1965 Redundancy Payments Act and 1966 National Insurance Act, of which the latter 
introduced earnings-related benefits. Yet the public justification for its introduction was 
that it addressed Britain’s comparatively lackluster postwar economic performance. 
When the Conservative government had come forward with its plan to introduce a 
national redundancy fund in the early 1960s, it believed that the fund’s introduction 
would boost the performance of the British economy. At the time, the BEC – and later 
the TUC – argued that earnings-related unemployment benefits would be better for the 
British economy. No one claimed that earnings-related sickness benefits would also 
help the economy. Yet, with the exception of organized employers, all those involved 
felt that the unified nature of the British insurance system required equal treatment of 
the unemployed, sick and disabled (the British sickness insurance dealt with both non-
work-related disabilities and sicknesses). Thus, the economic considerations that 
brought about the introduction of earnings-related unemployment benefits also 
indirectly led to the introduction of earnings-related sickness benefits.  
 The next section of this chapter begins with a detailed account of the economic 
rationale behind the introduction of the earnings-related principle into the unemploy-
ment and sickness insurances. Through this account, I critique a notion that has become 
quite popular in the last few years: the idea that public welfare policies can serve a 
productive or economic function, which can in turn inspire organized employer support 
for welfare state development. This notion has become especially popular among 
scholars espousing the “varieties of capitalism” approach to the study of political 
economy.
9
 In Varieties of Capitalism, for example, Peter Hall and David Soskice argued 
that “many kinds of social policies actually improve the operation of markets and 
enhance the capacities of firms to pursue distinctive strategies, thereby inspiring active 
support in the business community.”
10
 Likewise, Bernhard Ebbinghaus and Philip 
Manow argued in Comparing Welfare Capitalism that “welfare states do not always 
                                                
9
 For an overview of this literature, see footnote 99 of chapter 2. 
10 It is important to note that Hall and Soskice explicitly referred to public policies, as they later argued 
that this “calls for a reinterpretation of the welfare state.” Hall and Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism, vi 
and 50. 
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institute ‘politics against markets’ as is commonly assumed: social policies can also 
serve a productive function.”
11
 In the varieties of capitalism literature, many examples 
of the supposed productive functions of social policies relate to the use of public 
benefits for redundancy purposes.
12
 For this reason, the British debate over the 
introduction of a national redundancy fund and the introduction of earnings-related 
benefits during the 1960s is ideally suited to explore this argument.  
 In chapter 2 of this work I expressed my main criticism of the idea that employer 
interest groups may support the development of public welfare policies when these 
serve a productive or economic function. That is, when employers appear to like the 
“productive” or “economic” function of public welfare policies, what they actually like 
are the policies’ redistributive effects. After all, if firms want to “persuade” workers to 
invest in skills or shed redundant workers without getting into conflict with unions, they 
can simply do so by providing occupational provision for this. Employers will only 
prefer public solutions if they result in redistribution between them and their competi-
tors. Yet this will, of course, give other employers very good reason to oppose such 
solutions. As we will see in the following section, the British employer community was 
acutely aware of this redistributive logic. As a result, it vehemently opposed the 
Conservative government’s plans. The BEC only introduced a plan for earnings-related 
unemployment benefits because it felt that this would be less costly than the introduc-
tion of a national redundancy fund. In the event, however, it had to accept the 
introduction of both.  
 
THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
The idea of improving financial provision for the unemployed as a means to reform the 
labor market arose in the United Kingdom during the early 1960s. It resulted from 
concerns over the relatively lackluster postwar performance of the British economy. 
Their relative decline in economic productivity worried Britons increasingly in the first 
decades of the postwar period, and by the early 1960s a strong consensus had emerged 
on the need to accept a greater degree of state intervention to deal with this.
13
 During 
this decade, consecutive Conservative and Labour governments implemented a series of 
measures designed to improve the functioning of the British economy. Many of these 
aimed to improve the operation of the labor market. The 1960s period among others saw 
the introduction of legislative and other measures aimed at increasing labor mobility, 
furthering a greater dispersion of economic activity, and creating a permanent incomes 
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policy.
14
 Most of these measures are of no concern to this chapter, as they only 
peripherally affected the development of the British welfare state. The one major 
exception to this is the arena of financial protection for the unemployed. Improved 
protection against the financial consequences of unemployment, consecutive Conserva-
tive and Labour governments argued in the 1960s, might increase labor mobility, 
thereby leading to a more efficient use of labor within firms, and might even increase 
the chances of creating a permanent incomes policy. To understand this, it is necessary 
to examine the immediate pretext for improving financial protection against unemploy-
ment: the need to take away workers’ fear of redundancy.  
As in other countries in which automation and competition with low-wage foreign 
competitors resulted in structural losses of jobs, the pressure to do something about 
redundancy had been mounting in the United Kingdom since the 1950s. At first, this 
stemmed mainly from social concerns, but with time the comparatively lackluster 
performance of the British economy brought in economic considerations as well. Policy 
makers increasingly saw workers’ fear of redundancy as contributing to the weak 
performance of the British economy. By causing “strikes, restrictions, or resistance to 
change,” this fear seemed to act – as the BEC, for one, argued – “as a break on 
industrial expansion.”
15
 As the performance of the British economy further deteriorated, 
the need to fix the problem was felt with increasing urgency. One possible solution was 
to ameliorate workers’ fear of redundancy by improving financial provision for the 
unemployed. The rationale for this was simple. By increasing workers’ protection 
against the financial consequences of redundancy, it was hoped that workers would 
become less resistant to industrial change. In other words, ‘buying off’ workers who 
stood to lose from automation and the closing of plants in declining sectors could lessen 
union resistance to these changes. This would not only improve labor mobility and 
workplace flexibility, but might also improve the relationships between both sides of 
industry and the state, thereby even introducing the prospect of future wage restraint.
16
 
According to Paul Bridgen, the idea of using improved compensation for unem-
ployment to facilitate industrial change first arose in the Treasury in 1961.
17
 From there, 
it spread to other Ministries and tripartite advisory councils like the National Joint 
Advisory Council (NJAC) and later the National Economic Development Council 
(NEDC).
18
 Within the Treasury, officials focused on the question of how to attain the 
transfer of labor from declining sectors of the economy to growing sectors without 
provoking massive union protests against the (temporary) job losses that would then 
certainly occur. Initially, Treasury officials only looked to “voluntarist” solutions. An 
obvious solution was to give so-called “severance payments” to redundant workers, 
which were lump sum or weekly payments as compensation for the termination of 
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employment after several years of good service. In some industries, severance payments 
were already an established practice. Officials hoped that instigating the spread of this 
practice represented a solution for the problem of redundancy that fitted well with the 
voluntarist framework of the British industrial relations system – and to which, thus, 
employer interest groups and unions would not object. 
Of course, this solution of furthering the use of severance payments through volun-
tary means had the obvious limitation of depending on the benevolence and financial 
health of individual employers. The latter was especially a problem, since employers 
who operated in industries where redundancy occurred most often were also least able 
to afford severance payments. Because of this, the need for a legislative initiative slowly 
gained acceptance in government circles. Several additional factors played a role in this 
growing realization of the need for state action. Most important among these was that 
the Conservative government began to link progress on redundancy to the achievement 
of an incomes policy. Following the 1961 sterling crisis, the Conservative government 
became convinced that a successful economic policy required the introduction of a 
permanent incomes policy. To attain such a policy, the government clearly needed 
union support. By promising to improve the “security and status” of workers, the 
government hoped to secure the cooperation of unions in the creation of a permanent 
incomes policy. In the summer of 1962, the government announced its intention to 
implement a “package” of measures aimed at improving the status and security of 
workers. Among the first items to be covered was redundancy.
19
 
Once the government was willing to move beyond voluntary measures, two alterna-
tives presented themselves. Initially, government officials only explored severance 
payments. The National Economic Development Office (NEDO), the secretariat of the 
NEDC, later contributed another alternative to the discussion: the introduction of 
earnings-related contributions and benefits into the unemployment insurance.
20
 Both 
options had their problems. An important problem with the former was that mere 
legislation obliging employers to make severance payments would not suffice, as 
employers who were most prone to end up making severance payments were also least 
likely able to afford them. A solution through the severance payments route therefore 
required the creation of an employer-financed national fund. Such a scheme would of 
course be deeply unpopular with employers who were less likely to deal with 
redundancy; after all, they would end up at the losing end. Officials were also well 
aware of another problem with the severance payments route. To make the scheme 
affordable, it would have to be limited to redundant workers. Yet any attempt to do so 
would certainly be arbitrary.
21
 
As problematic as the severance payments route was, however, the government 
considered it much more feasible than the alternative of reforming the unemployment 
insurance. One of the problems with unemployment insurance reform was that many 
inside the Conservative Party were now advocating a move toward “selective targeting” 
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(read: introducing a means test for the neediest).
22
 An expansion of the unemployment 
insurance with a contributory approach would run exactly contrary to this aim, and 
would therefore increase already-existing divisions within the Conservative Party over 
welfare issues. Even more important, unemployment insurance reform would be a 
lengthy affair, and the Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan desperately 
wanted to achieve some measure of progress before the coming general election. Thus, 
when in the beginning of 1963 Macmillan announced his intention to create a scheme to 
deal with redundancy, there was little doubt that he referred to the creation of an 
employer-financed national fund that would hand out severance payments. 
By opting for the creation of a “national redundancy fund” to earnings-related 
unemployment benefits, Macmillan might have closed the ranks within the Conserva-
tive Party, but he did so at the cost of incurring the wrath of the employer community. 
Its participation in the NJAC and the NEDC meant that the BEC had been closely 
involved in deliberations over the problem of redundancy. It certainly shared the 
government’s concerns over worker resistance to dismissal due to redundancy. It 
therefore had little difficulty with ministerial attempts to encourage the voluntary use of 
severance payments. The BEC supported the handing out of severance payments to 
reward years of good service, and liked the additional benefit of reducing union 
resistance against dismissal.
23
 This does not mean that the BEC also supported the 
introduction of compulsory severance payments though. On the contrary, it had very 
solid financial and economic reasons to oppose such legislation.  
The BEC did not believe that compulsory severance payments would contribute to a 
healthier economy for several reasons. If the goal was to increase labor mobility, BEC 
representatives warned government officials, the legislation would be counterproductive. 
First, the BEC questioned whether compulsory severance payments would make 
workers more willing to accept their dismissal. After all, workers primarily feared the 
financial consequences of long-term unemployment, and severance payments did little 
about this. Moreover, many redundant workers now left voluntarily, while they would 
no longer do so when large sums were at stake.
24
 Second, even if compulsory severance 
payments reduced union resistance to redundancy, they would do so with substantial 
financial costs. These costs might in turn deter employers from discharging surplus 
labor, thereby reducing – instead of increasing – labor mobility.
25
 It is unclear whether 
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the BEC believed this reasoning would also hold under the operation of a national 
redundancy fund. As the goal of such a fund was to redistribute the costs of severance 
payments between employers who were more and those who were less prone to having 
to deal with redundancy, all employers would likely have to contribute equally to the 
fund, regardless of risk incidence. Under such circumstances, employers would more 
likely be encouraged to release workers than deterred.
26
 Although the BEC must have 
realized this, it kept arguing that statutory severance payments would decrease labor 
mobility long after the government’s announcement to set up a national redundancy 
fund.
27
 
The BEC was equally skeptical about the government’s belief that compulsory 
severance payments – or, for that matter, any other initiative aimed at increasing the 
security of workers – might convince unions to support a permanent incomes policy. On 
the contrary, it feared that such legislation would only complicate future wage 
negotiations. The reason for this was explained at length in the previous two chapters. 
As shown in those two chapters, the industrially organized unions in the Netherlands 
had come to accept that public – like private – insurance against labor market risks had 
to be financed in principle by workers themselves. As a result, the costs of public 
welfare development could often be (partially) offset during wage negotiations. In the 
United Kingdom, it was unthinkable for unions to lower their wage demands in 
exchange for public welfare development. As a result, public welfare development only 
gave employers less room for maneuvering during wage negotiations. As the BEC put it, 
“legislation…would weaken the bargaining power of employers in their dealings with 
the unions.” This was because “these various proposals…were items which the 
employers could use in bargaining with the unions about wages, but if the Government 
imposed the schemes by legislation, employers would lose them as bargaining 
counters.”
28
 
Finally, the BEC questioned the government’s plan in two other respects. At the 
time, severance payments normally only applied to workers whose jobs had become 
redundant because of structural change. Legislation might make it more difficult to 
distinguish between dismissal because of redundancy and ‘normal’ cases of dismissal. 
Already, unions were trying to call every dismissed worker redundant, and they would 
certainly become more insistent on this when large sums were at stake.
29
 The result 
could be twofold. First, instead of improving the relationship between the two sides of 
industry, a statutory obligation to hand out severance payments in case of redundancy 
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might actually increase industrial conflict.
30
 Second, and far more important, the scheme 
would be extremely costly. Government officials could only admit that they shared the 
BEC’s concerns on the latter point, as many of them had already expressed doubts about 
the scheme for exactly this reason.
31
 
It was the latter concern that eventually spurred the BEC into action. In private, BEC 
representatives expressed strong doubts about the ability of a national redundancy fund 
to bring about any of the benefits for which the government hoped. In fact, they 
privately dismissed the whole notion that improved financial provision against 
redundancy, or unemployment in general for that matter, could improve the operation of 
the labor market. The only problem with labor mobility, they reasoned, was the lack of 
movement from declining to new industries. To stimulate this, investments in industrial 
training and housing facilities would be much more fruitful.
32
 Likewise, if high wages 
were a problem, it was best not to raise the costs of labor further.
33
 The BEC leadership 
was smart enough, however, to refrain from expressing the full depths of its skepticism 
in public. Realizing the inevitability of some kind of legislative initiative to improve 
financial provision for unemployed workers, it instead tried to convince the government 
that an earnings-related unemployment scheme was much preferable to a redundancy 
payments scheme. Although problematic in its own right, the former had one important 
advantage over the latter: its financial cost would be much lower.  
In the summer of 1962, the BEC General Purposes Committee considered for the 
first time deflecting pressure for the creation of a national redundancy fund by 
proposing to increase the generosity of the state unemployment insurance. It set up a 
special working committee to consider such an increase. The main conclusion of this 
committee was that the outcome of such a move would be quite uncertain. If the BEC 
proposed increasing the level of the unemployment benefit, the committee warned, it 
might end up with higher unemployment insurance and severance payments costs.
34
 As 
a result, the BEC leadership decided to limit its actions to warning the government 
about the probable adverse consequences of statutory legislation on severance payments. 
At the time, many BEC officials still felt that they would be able to dissuade the 
government from passing such legislation.
35
  
When it finally became clear that the government was indeed committed to the 
introduction of a national redundancy fund, the BEC changed course. In June of 1963, it 
came forward with a detailed plan to add earnings-related supplements to the flat rate 
unemployment benefit. In discussions with government officials, BEC representatives 
underscored the economic advantages of an earnings-related unemployment scheme by 
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arguing that such a plan would encourage flexibility in labor distribution and improve 
industrial relations by removing the fear of redundancy. As a result, they argued, “wage 
related supplements to unemployment benefit…would be a positive contribution to 
economic growth.”
36
 At the same time, they emphasized that a national redundancy 
fund might increase industrial trouble and deter employers from discharging labor 
surplus – thereby impeding the goal of improving labor mobility.
37
 
In reality, the BEC very much doubted whether its plan would either help to increase 
labor mobility or facilitate the relationship between employers and the unions. In private, 
members of the BEC Social Insurance and Employers’ Liability Standing Committee 
and the working party on redundancy policy admitted that “the Confederation was by no 
means convinced of their efficacy, but…they were thought to be a considerable 
improvement on the idea of statutory severance payments.”
38
 One of the most important 
improvements to the idea of statutory severance payments was probably that workers 
and the state would also be more likely to contribute to a national insurance solution, 
which would reduce the costs of employers.  
If the BEC had stood alone in its opposition to the government’s redundancy plan, it 
might have been forced to reconcile itself with the situation. This was not the case, 
however, since the confederation found a very influential ally in the TUC. By the time 
the government announced its intention to introduce legislation, the BEC and TUC had 
already achieved a striking degree of consensus over the problems at hand. While both 
acknowledged that fear of redundancy might lead workers to resist industrial change, 
neither felt that this justified abandoning the voluntary practice of trade union 
negotiation. Like the BEC, the TUC had great doubts about the ability of statutory 
legislation on severance payments to take away workers’ fears of redundancy. Moreover, 
it shared the BEC’s belief that legislation was too blunt an instrument. Not only would 
it be difficult to distinguish between normal dismissal and dismissal because of 
redundancy, different kinds of redundancy also required different degrees of compensa-
tion.
39
 Most importantly, statutory legislation on severance payments conflicted with the 
interests of some of the most powerful members of the TUC: the unions representing 
workers who already had already achieved rights to redundancy severance payments 
through voluntary collective bargaining.  
To the Conservative government, the TUC’s dismissal of its proposal may have 
come as a surprise. To Labour backbenchers, it did not. Some two years before the 
Conservatives announced their intention to create a national redundancy scheme, the 
Labour Party had already approached the TUC with an alternative of its own. At the 
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time, economic considerations had not yet entered political party agendas. Labour’s 
initiative therefore arose purely from social concerns. Under Labour’s proposal, 
employers would have been obliged to pay their workers at least one half of normal 
earnings for the first month of either redundancy or sickness. The TUC Social Insurance 
and Industrial Welfare Committee had reacted quite dismissively to this proposal. When 
Labour representatives to the Committee explained the need for it through the low 
coverage rates of redundancy schemes, they were told that the TUC “strictly opposed 
legislation, because this might hurt the position of unions during negotiations over 
collective agreements.”
40
 While “fully recognizing the need for extending redundancy 
and service payments,” the members of the Committee emphasized that “this should be 
done by encouraging trade union negotiation.”
41
 To replace trade union negotiation by 
legislation, they warned, would “give rise to many fundamental problems which did not 
appear to have been considered by the Labour Party.”
42
 According to the BEC, these 
problems were that “better results from the standpoint of trade unions would often be 
obtained on this subject by local negotiation.”
43
 Of course, those who could get better 
results were workers with a strong position on the labor market, and who consequently 
already had negotiated rights to severance payments in case of redundancy. For other 
workers, voluntary negotiation had already proven to be much less advantageous. 
During the early 1960s, less than one third of all workers had secured a right to 
receive severance payments when laid off.
44
 Among the remainder, many could hardly 
rely on trade union negotiation to provide coverage against the risk of becoming 
redundant. The combination of low wages and a high risk incidence of becoming 
redundant put occupational provision against redundancy out of reach for many workers. 
For such workers, their only hope for any improvement lay in the creation of a public 
scheme. In such a scheme, they would be able to share their risks with less-risk-prone 
workers. Of course, this gave less-risk-prone workers a good incentive to oppose the 
creation of a public scheme. After all, and as mentioned before, in a common risk pool 
privileged workers end up subsidizing the welfare efforts of less-privileged workers. 
From the perspective of the unions representing privileged workers, it made no 
difference that employers would bear the full costs of the scheme. In discussions of the 
TUC Sub-Committee on Sickness and Unemployment Benefits, representatives of these 
unions argued that employers would use the costs of the scheme as an argument to 
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oppose future wage increases. As risk reapportioning meant that the amount of foregone 
wage increase would be much higher under a state scheme than under occupational 
provision, the introduction of a national redundancy fund was therefore not in the 
interests of workers who currently had access to severance payments.
45
 Under pressure 
from unions in which members stood to lose from risk reapportioning, the TUC 
declared that it could not accept a public scheme.  
Whereas the unions representing workers who already had access to severance 
payments opposed the creation of a public scheme because they could achieve better 
results through voluntary wage negotiation, others also found reason for skepticism. In 
discussions with government officials, TUC representatives admitted that many workers 
certainly had a lot to gain from statutory severance payments. Yet, they stressed, such 
workers undoubtedly had even more to gain from proper financial provision for long-
term unemployment. This represented an important problem, because the TUC feared 
that legislation on severance pay would provide the government with an “alibi for doing 
nothing on insurance benefits.”
46
 The TUC had long argued for a government- or 
employer-financed increase to the national insurance benefit level, and it feared that an 
additional statutory levy on all employers would complicate this goal. In a meeting with 
the Minister of Pensions, TUC representatives pointed this out, and added that countries 
with statutory service payments often also had very inadequate social security 
provisions.
47
 Because of its opposition to statutory severance payments, the TUC came 
out in cautious support for the BEC’s alternative. While remaining firm on the need to 
raise the flat rate national insurance benefit first, it carefully hinted that it might also 
accept the introduction of earnings-related supplements.
48
  
Bolstered by the TUC’s support, the BEC put the government under extreme 
pressure. If the government did decide to move ahead with its scheme, BEC representa-
tives warned, it would receive “a strong reaction” from its members. “Not only would 
the die-hards be opposed to them,” the direct of the Confederation, George Pollock, 
argued, “but also the more progressive elements.”
49
 In personal conversations with 
government officials, Pollock urged the government to accept the BEC proposal.
50
 
Unhampered by ideological bonds with the present government, the TUC was able to 
voice its discontent more bluntly. According to TUC General Secretary George 
Woodstock, the government’s proposals “sprang from immediate political considera-
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tions and not from a genuine desire to provide greater security of income for workpeo-
ple.”
51
 
With both the BEC and TUC strongly opposed to the introduction of a national 
redundancy fund, government policy drifted. The sheer strength of organized industry 
certainly influenced the government, and many inside the bureaucracy openly preferred 
the BEC’s alternative.
52
 Yet, the introduction of the earnings-related principle into the 
unemployment insurance was equally controversial. Many inside the Conservative Party 
opposed this because they wanted to move toward selective targeting instead. Moreover, 
there were those who, like the BEC, were as skeptical about the economic benefits of an 
earnings-related scheme as they were about the economic benefits of statutory 
severance payments.
53
 As a result, the government was utterly divided. Some in 
Parliament wanted to go ahead with the statutory redundancy scheme. Others preferred 
an earnings-related scheme. Still others wanted to do both. Finally, there were those 
who began to question the idea of reform altogether.
54
 According to Paul Bridgen, the 
issue divided the Cabinet to the core.
55
 The government certainly found it impossible to 
come up with a concrete proposal before the general election of 1964 – this, despite 
having worked on the redundancy issue for three years. All it could do was promise to 
make a decision after it had renewed its mandate.  
Matters were taken out of the government’s hands when it lost its parliamentary 
majority to the Labour Party after the 1964 election. Having already shown a 
commitment to introduce statutory severance payments and the earnings-related 
principle, the new Labour government found it much easier to achieve progress than did 
its Conservative predecessor. To accommodate the TUC, it first raised the level of the 
National Insurance Benefit – although not to a level of subsistence. In less than a year 
after the election, it also introduced a Redundancy Payments Act.
56
 Organized employer 
and union objections to this were of no avail. In clear and ironic terms, the Minister of 
Labour informed them that “he appreciated the strength of the case in logic for dealing 
with earnings-related unemployment insurance benefits before dealing with severance 
payments. The review of the social insurance scheme would, however, take a good deal 
of time, and provision to encourage mobility of labor and acceptance of change were 
urgently needed. He could not hold out any prospect of severance pay legislation being 
deferred, but social insurance proposals would be prepared as quickly as possible.”
57
  
In the end, the National Insurance Act that introduced the earnings-related principle 
into the National Insurance Scheme passed Parliament in the beginning of 1966, some 
one-and-a-half years after Labour regained power. The new Labour government, led by 
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Harold Wilson, presented this feat as a part of its strategy to modernize the British 
economy.
58
 As Labour’s ambition to improve financial provision for the unemployed 
long predated any discussion of such provision’s utility for economic modernization, it 
is safe to assume, however, that social considerations were at least of equal importance 
to the new government. It is even possible that economic arguments primarily served as 
rhetoric, designed to put pressure on the BEC and TUC.
59
 If this was the case, though, 
one can hardly blame Labour. After all, even its ‘natural ally’ was almost as opposed to 
an earnings-related unemployment scheme as it had been to statutory severance 
payments.  
 
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EARNINGS-RELATED 
SUPPLEMENTARY SCHEME 
Despite its support for the BEC’s proposal, the TUC was not enthusiastic about an 
earnings-related unemployment scheme. In fact, the TUC – much like the BEC itself – 
had supported the BEC’s scheme mostly because its members agreed that the “proposal 
of a comprehensive wage related National Insurance Scheme is greatly preferable to the 
alternative suggestion of a National Redundancy Fund.”
60
 Once more, the TUC’s 
hesitancy stemmed primarily from the position of its craft and occupationally organized 
white-collar unions. These unions had no more interest in earnings-related unemploy-
ment benefits than in superannuation or the national redundancy scheme, and they 
feared the redistributive consequences of an extension of the unemployment insurance. 
As had been with case with superannuation and the national redundancy scheme, their 
resistance first came to the fore in discussions with Labour when the latter was still in 
the opposition.  
Intensive discussions between Labour and the TUC over the possible introduction of 
the earnings-related principle into the state unemployment insurance began in the early 
1960s.
61
 In their first meeting with Labour officials, the representative of unions 
representing privileged workers immediately made it clear that “no part of an insured 
person’s wage related contributions should be used to pay for flat rate benefits.”
62
 In 
fact, the representative made it clear that they disliked the idea of an earnings-related 
scheme even without direct redistribution between higher- and lower-paid workers. To 
understand this, it is necessary to revisit the difference between saving for retirement 
and insuring against the risk of unemployment. Unlike the risk of becoming dependent 
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in old age, the risk of unemployment is a much greater concern for some workers than 
for others. This gives the less risk-prone good reason to resist participating in public 
insurance against unemployment, since such participation would entail subsidizing the 
welfare efforts of more risk-prone insurance plan members. If the less risk-prone do 
want to insure themselves, they would do far better to pool their insurance with equally 
risk-prone workers in occupational schemes. In fact, some might not even need to insure 
themselves against the risk of becoming unemployed at all. 
Representatives of craft and occupationally organized white-collar unions used 
exactly this logic when they argued against Labour’s plans. Anne Godwin, the 
representative of the Clerical and Administrative Workers Unions (CAWU), simply 
stated that “sickness and unemployed benefit differed from retirement pension in that 
the contingencies against which they were intended to give protection, affected the 
higher paid less than the lower paid.” This made it “undesirable to put too heavy a 
burden directly on those with the smallest risk.”
63
 Another representative to the TUC 
Social Insurance and Industrial Welfare Committee warned that “many higher paid 
workers would resent a high level of contributions for benefits which might mean little 
to those in tolerably secure positions.”
64
 The problem was also that many workers could 
already claim occupational coverage. To them, “wage related National Insurance 
benefits would mean little…except increased contributions.”
65
  
There were of course representatives – namely those of general unions – who 
bemoaned the absence of occupational provision for most workers. There were also 
those who emphasized that Labour’s wage-related proposal was the only way to raise 
flat rate benefits.
66
 Yet the TUC did not yield on its preference for a flat rate system of 
national insurance over an earnings-related system. Labour representatives were told 
that the TUC’s main priority remained to obtain an increase in the National Insurance 
benefit, so that any additional provision could be left to trade union negotiation.
67
 In 
response, the Labour representatives pointed out how close the stance of the TUC was 
to that of the Conservative government. Douglas Houghton, who would later become a 
minister in the new Labour government, was right on the mark when he stated that “the 
trade unions might be in danger of accepting the [Conservative] Government’s view that 
state provision should be limited to the most basic social needs and that the establish-
ment of higher standards should be left to private individuals and groups.”
68
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When Labour and TUC representatives renewed their discussions over the earnings-
related principle some two to three years later, the TUC took a more positive stance. In 
these later talks, Labour representatives were told that the TUC “welcomes and supports 
the principles of the Labour Party’s proposals for a comprehensive scheme of wage-
related national insurance benefits and contributions.”
69
 To understand this, it is 
necessary to note that in the meantime, the TUC had already supported the BEC’s 
earnings-related unemployment scheme. When the new Labour government adopted the 
main principles of this scheme, the TUC simply continued to support it. Second, even 
when Labour and the TUC first discussed the earnings-related principle, many of the 
latter’s members already acknowledged that only an increased contribution from 
workers could raise the unemployment benefit.
70
 Third, and by far most important, the 
BEC’s scheme was acceptable to unions representing privileged workers, since it met 
their most pressing demand: there was to be no direct redistribution between higher and 
lower incomes.  
The proposal of the new Labour government was to add an earnings-related supple-
ment, amounting to one-third of weekly earnings between nine and thirty pounds, to the 
existing flat rate benefit. The supplement would be paid for six months.
71
 Entitlement to 
the earnings-related supplement depended strictly on the number of weekly contribu-
tions paid, with contributions set at two percent of weekly earnings. Unemployed 
workers could only claim the maximum benefit level after a contribution record of ten 
years. In such a system, there was to be little solidarity between more- and less-
privileged workers. First, earnings over one-and-a-half times average earnings (which 
meant an income higher than thirty pounds per week, since average earnings equaled 
roughly twenty pounds per week at the time) were excluded from the scheme. Second, 
the scheme was specifically designed to limit redistribution between more- and less-
privileged workers. It did so in two ways. First of all, unlike with superannuation, no 
part of earnings-related contributions would be used to finance an increase in the flat 
rate benefit. This ensured that there would be no direct redistributive effort between 
higher- and lower-paid workers. Second, and equally important, more risk-prone 
workers had a much lower chance of completing the contributory record that was 
needed to achieve the maximum earnings-related benefit than did less risk-prone 
workers. This also ensured that risk redistribution would be limited.  
All these measures did secure craft and occupationally organized white-collar 
acquiescence, but they also ensured that the earnings-related unemployment scheme did 
little to improve the situation for those who needed it most, namely the lower-paid and 
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more risk-prone workers. By excluding all earnings below nine pounds, the scheme was 
no improvement for workers who earned less than half the national average. They 
remained completely dependent on the dismally-low national insurance benefit. For 
some of the workers who earned just a little more than half the national average, the 
situation was arguably even worse. Not only did the scheme bring them little 
improvement; they could even lose out by participating in it. The reason for this was 
that the new scheme did not improve the benefit level of the lower-paid family man 
with several children, since his benefit would be subject to a wage stop. He would, 
however, have to contribute to the scheme. As a result, to a lower-paid family man with 
several children, the scheme simply presented an increase in taxation levels by two 
percent, for which he received nothing in return. To understand this, it is necessary to 
look at the problem of “excessive benefiting” that worried policy-makers so much. This 
problem arose from the combination of a flat rate scheme with an earnings-related 
supplementary scheme – and was worsened by the problem of low pay in the United 
Kingdom.  
In the previous chapter and the beginning of this one, I emphasized that all involved 
parties in the United Kingdom, including the TUC and BEC, supported the notion that 
the national insurance system had to operate along egalitarian lines, and thus was to 
levy equal contributions in exchange for equal benefits. They allowed for only one 
major exception to the egalitarian principle. Welfare recipients who had families to 
support were entitled to a higher benefit than welfare recipients without dependents. 
This exception arose out of necessity, as the low level of the flat rate national insurance 
benefit affected welfare recipients with a wife and children most seriously. Wife and 
child supplements could raise the total benefit dramatically. While a single welfare 
recipient received around four pounds in 1965, his married counterpart with three 
children could claim over nine pounds. Table 4.1 below illustrates the effect of wife and 
child supplements. Benefit levels are given as a percentage of previous earnings for 
workers who earned between ten pounds (or half of average earnings at the time) and 
thirty pounds (or one-and-a-half of average earnings) per week. A secondary purpose of 
this table is to show how inadequate the National Insurance benefit was for welfare 
recipients.  
 
Table 4.1: The unemployment benefit as a percentage of weekly earnings under the  
                  National Insurance Scheme in 1965 
Weekly 
earnings 
Single Married, no 
children 
Married, 1 
child 
Married, 2 
children 
Married, 3 
children 
10 40 65 78 85 93 
12 33 54 65 71 78 
14 28 46 56 61 67 
18 22 36 43 47 52 
20 20 32 39 43 47 
30 13 22 26 28 31 
Source: MRC, MSS292B/161.6: TUC, Level of wage related national insurance benefit, April 
16 1964, several appendices. Calculation of percentages by author. 
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 As benefits were flat rate, the degree of earnings replacement for benefit recipients 
depended on their previous weekly earnings. To a single unemployed worker who had 
previously earned ten pounds per week (and thus half the national average), the flat rate 
benefit amounted to forty percent of previous earnings. To a single unemployed worker 
who had previously earned thirty pounds per week (and thus one-and-a-half times the 
national average), the flat rate benefit amounted to only thirteen percent of previous 
earnings. The degree of earnings replacement for these income categories increased 
depending on whether the workers had a wife and children to support. To illustrate the 
inadequacy of the unemployment benefit in another way, we may express its value as a 
percentage of average earnings. For a single benefit recipient, the benefit amounted to 
only twenty percent of average earnings; for a family man with three children, it was 
only forty-seven percent. For both, this was hardly enough to live on.
72
  
Yet the main purpose of the above table is not to illustrate the inadequacy of the 
unemployment benefit. Instead, it is to show that for those unemployed workers who 
had earned just over half of national average earnings and who had several family 
members to support, the National Insurance benefit already closely approximated 
previous earnings. For instance, an unemployed worker who had a wife and three 
children to support was entitled to a benefit that amounted to ninety-three percent of his 
previous earnings. This meant that the introduction of an earnings-related scheme on top 
of the flat rate benefit would entitle some workers to a total benefit that even more 
closely approached their previous earnings. Table 4.2 illustrates this problem. Under the 
combination of the flat rate benefit with earnings-related supplements, our unemployed 
worker with a wife and three children who had previously earned ten pounds per week 
was entitled to a benefit that equaled ninety-seven percent of his previous wage. As the 
table shows, other unemployed workers with dependents (provided that their previous 
wages were sufficiently below the national average) were also entitled to benefits that 
closely approximated their previous earnings. 
 
Table 4.2: The unemployment benefit as a percentage of weekly earnings under the  
                  National Insurance Scheme and the earnings-related supplementary scheme 
Weekly 
earnings 
Single Married, no 
children 
Married, 1 
child 
Married, 2 
children 
Married, 3 
children 
10 43 68 (66
2/3
) 81 (66
2/3
) 89 (85) 97 (85) 
12 42 63 73 (66
2/3
) 79 (66
2/3
) 87 (85) 
14 41 58 68 (66
2/3
) 73 (66
2/3
) 78 (66
2/3
) 
18 39 53 60 64 68 (66
2/3)
 
20 38 51 57 61 65 
30 37 45 49 52 54 
Source: See table 4.1. 
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 In their The Poor and the Poorest, Abel-Smith and Titmuss defined the level of the poverty line by 
adding 40 percent to the national assistance benefit, which was roughly similar (and in some cases even 
higher) than the national insurance benefit. Based on this formula, they concluded that in 1960 7.5 million 
people were living below the poverty level. Of these, 7 percent belonged to the category of the 
unemployed. See Abel-Smith and Titmuss, The Poor and the Poorest, 18-21. 
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 It is needless to say that the prospect of some benefit recipients receiving “excessive 
benefiting” worried the BEC very much. The confederation had already anticipated this 
problem in its own scheme and had devised a solution for it: that is, the flat rate benefit 
and earnings-related supplement were not together to exceed two-thirds of previous 
earnings.
73
 Severely pressured by the BEC and apparently itself worried about excessive 
benefiting, Labour adopted this feature in its own scheme, although it raised the limit to 
eighty-five percent of previous earnings. Whereas the BEC regarded the eighty-five 
percent threshold as too high, the TUC resisted the introduction of a maximum benefit 
level altogether. Its protests, however, were of no avail. When the TUC complained that 
many low wage families would now receive no supplement, despite having paid, the 
government merely responded that it understood the problem, but that “it had not 
however been possible to find a solution in time…Further enquiries were undertaken by 
the Ministry.”
74
 
The BEC also used the issue of excessive benefiting as an argument against the 
extension of the earnings-related principle to the sickness insurance. In resisting this, 
however, the confederation stood alone.
75
 The BEC leadership felt that it had 
nevertheless been successful in keeping the scheme as lenient as possible. Income 
below nine and above thirty pounds was excluded altogether, benefits averaged only 
fifty percent for most recipients, with the exception of lower-paid workers with large 
families, and on the BEC’s insistence (despite fierce resistance from the TUC) the 
Labour government had introduced a waiting period of twelve days before the earnings-
related supplement could be paid. These features may not have made the application of 
the earnings-related principle to the sickness insurance palatable to the BEC, but it at 
least made it bearable. Most important to the BEC was the introduction of the waiting 
period, which, according its estimates, would cut annual sickness claims by at least four 
million.
76
 As a result, the BEC leadership was not discontented with the new scheme. 
Most important to the organization was that the scheme “did not involve large 
additional expenditure; the additional unemployment and sickness contributions by 
employers would come to about thirty million pounds, or one-fifth of one percent of the 
wages bill and could have been much more.”
77
 
                                                
73
 MRC, MSS.200/C/3/EMP/3/115: Social insurance and employers’ liability standing committee and 
working party on redundancy policy. Minutes of joint meeting held at 36 Smith Square, Westminster, 
S.W.1. on Wednesday, January 29th, 1964, at 2:30 p.m. 
74
 TUC, MSS.292B/161.8: Need for increased family allowances, July 13, 1966. 
75
 The BEC gave several reasons for its opposition to extending to the earnings-related principle. Among 
its arguments were the notions that: the sick normally had a job to which to return, which meant that this 
did not relate to the question of redundancy; that half the working population was already covered by 
occupational sick pay scheme; that earnings-related sickness benefits would have no effect on labor 
mobility; that an extension of the earnings-related principle would lead to inflation; and that it would lead 
to increased absenteeism. PRO, Lab 10/1932: Note of second meeting with BEC, 7 February 1964; MRC, 
MSS.200/C/3/EMP/5/1: CBI social insurance committee, minutes of meeting held at 21 Tothill Street, 
London, S.W.1. on Wednesday, October 6
th
, 1965 at 2:30 p.m; MRC, MSS 200/C/3/EMP/3/115: Social 
insurance and employers’ liability standing committee and working party on redundancy policy. Minutes 
of joint meeting held at 36, Smith Square, Westminster, S.W.1. on Wednesday, January 29
th
, 1964, at 
2:30 p.m. 
76
 MRC, MSS.200/C/3/EMP/5/1/: New national insurance legislation, 23
rd
 August 1965. 
77
 MRC, MSS.200/C/3/EMP/5/1/: Extract from minutes of November 1965 Council Meeting. 
  
114 
Although presented by the Labour government as an important step forward for all 
workers, the introduction 1966 National Insurance Act did little for those who needed it 
most: the low-paid workers who were most susceptible to the risk of becoming 
unemployed. Not only were the lowest-paid workers not entitled to earnings-related 
supplements, but the introduction of a long waiting period ensured that workers who 
were often unemployed also did not qualify for the supplements. Moreover, the 
supplements were paid out for a limited period only. This meant that they did nothing to 
improve matters for the long-term unemployed. Despite the limited nature of the 
scheme, the Conservatives criticized its costs and effect on the willingness of the 
unemployed to seek work. This line of reasoning led a Conservative government to 
abolish the supplements in 1982.
78
  
 
FROM BISMARCK TO THE SOCIAL INSURANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS 
In the Netherlands, early postwar thinking on public protection against the financial 
consequences of unemployment developed in a completely different direction from the 
United Kingdom. Instead of opting for a system that combined flat rate benefits with flat 
rate contributions, as the British had done, the Dutch created a system that offered 
earnings-related benefits in exchange for earnings-related contributions. To a large 
extent, the choice of a completely earnings-related system in the Netherlands can be 
explained in the same way as the choice of a totally flat rate system in the United 
Kingdom: this was simply what workers and employers had been accustomed to before 
the War. Until the introduction of the 1949 Unemployment Act, there had been 
technically no public unemployment insurance in the Netherlands. Yet the state had 
given large subsidies to union-operated unemployment funds. In addition, many 
employers had offered so-called reduced pay schemes (wachtgeldregelingen) to 
unemployed workers. Employers were not obliged to create reduced pay schemes, but 
since state subsidies almost completely financed them, many had started doing so in the 
1930s.
79
 
 The 1949 Unemployment Act (Werkloosheidswet or WW) created a public 
unemployment insurance that resembled prewar semi-public protection from the 
financial consequences of unemployment in two important ways. First, it offered the 
same percentage of previous earnings as had the prewar reduced pay schemes. Married 
men and breadwinners were entitled to eighty percent of their previous wages; unmarried 
men and women, as well as non-breadwinners of eighteen years and older were entitled 
to seventy percent of their previous wages; and the rest to sixty percent of previous 
wages. Second, the new insurance comprised two separate schemes. Depending on their 
contributory records, workers were first entitled to “reduced pay” for a minimum of 
eight weeks (it was up to the unions and employers of a specific industry to decide 
                                                
78
 See Frans Pennings, Benefits of Doubt: a Comparative Study of the Legal Aspects of Employment and 
Unemployment Schemes in Great Britain, France and the Netherlands (Deventer: Kluwer, 1990) 62. 
79
 See P. Schrage and E. Nijhoff, “Een lange sisser en een late knal? De ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse 
werkloosheidsvoorziening in West-Europees perspectief: een terreinverkenning.” In W.P. Blockmans and 
L.A. van der Valk, Van particuliere naar openbare zorg en terug? Sociale politiek in Nederland sinds 
1880 (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1992) 38-42. 
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whether benefits should continue for a longer period).
80
 After their entitlement to 
reduced pay had ended, unemployed workers were, again depending on contributory 
records, entitled to unemployment benefits for thirteen weeks (or twenty-one weeks if a 
worker was not entitled to reduced pay but was entitled to the unemployment benefit).
81
 
In terms of benefit levels, the two schemes were quite similar; the only difference in this 
respect was that under the reduced pay scheme, employers were allowed to supplement 
the percentages given above, while they were not in principle allowed to do so under the 
unemployment scheme.
82
 In terms of financing, eligibility criteria and, as shown above, 
duration, the two schemes differed quite substantially.
83
 
Unlike the 1955 General Old Age Act, the 1949 Unemployment Act did not posses 
specific features designed to aid lower-paid workers. In fact, the strict “Bismarkian” 
system that was initially chosen in the Netherlands limited redistribution as much as did 
the flat rate Beveridge system on which the British unemployment insurance was based. 
First, there was to be no direct redistribution between higher- and lower-paid workers in 
the form of a redistributive contributory system. Second, the insurance was specifically 
designed to limit risk redistribution in three ways. First, a wage limit excluded all 
workers who earned more than a hundred and twenty percent of the modal wage – and 
who consequently stood a much lower risk of becoming unemployed.
84
 Second, 
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 The responsibility for administration of unemployment insurance in the Netherlands lay with so-called 
industrial insurance boards (bedrijfsverenigingen), which comprised representatives of unions and 
employers in a particular industry. It was up to these boards to decide whether or not to grant reduced pay 
for more than 8 weeks. I will return to the importance of the industrial insurance boards in chapter 6. 
81
 In comparison, in 1946 the duration of the British unemployment benefit was set at a minimum of 180 
days. Based on the contribution record of a worker, the duration could be extended by 130 days. In 1953, 
the additional duration was increased to 312 days. In 1966, the minimum duration level was increased to 
12 months. The duration of the British unemployment insurance was thus much greater than that of its 
Dutch counterpart. This does not mean that the long-term unemployed were necessarily worse off in the 
Netherlands. Nearly all unemployed workers in the Netherlands were entitled to the relatively generous 
Social Provisions (Sociale voorzieningen) A and B, which served to complement the unemployment 
insurance. See the following paragraph on this. For a good, detailed comparison of the features of the 
British and Dutch unemployment insurances, see Pennings, Benefits of Doubt, 33-89 and 295-389. 
82
 If individual employers decided to grant private supplements to the state unemployment benefit, these 
in principle had to be subtracted from the state benefit. Yet the industrial insurance boards that were 
responsible for the operation of the unemployment scheme were allowed to make exceptions to this rule. 
As we will see in chapter 6, these exceptions were made quite frequently. ARA, CSWV, 2.19.103.06, 
146: Verslag van de vergadering van de Technische Commissie Sociale Verzekering, gehouden op 18 
december 1957, ten kantore van de Metaalbond. 
83 The government had chosen to differentiate between the reduced pay and unemployment schemes 
because it felt that the goals of the former differed from those of the latter. Those workers who received 
reduced pay were seen as a part of the industrial labor reserve, while those workers who received an 
unemployment insurance benefit were regarded as part of the general labor reserve. The employer 
federations disagreed with this line of reasoning and, for administrative reasons, preferred the creation of 
a single unemployment scheme. ARA, CSWV, 2.19.103.06, 130: Kort verslag van de vergadering van de 
Kring voor Sociaal Overleg, gehouden op woensdag 5 januari 1949, des namiddags te 2.15 uur, ten 
kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8, te ’s-Gravenhage. 
84 To avoid that price increases or increases in the level of prosperity would draw more workers out of the 
unemployment insurance pool, the level of the wage limit was linked to price and wage increases. In 
coming years, the union and employer federations would often struggle over whether the level of the 
wage limit should increase with prices, wages, or neither. ARA, CSWV, 2.19.103.06, 146: Verslag van de 
vergadering van de Technische Commissie Sociale Verzekering, gehouden op 27 september 1958; ARA, 
CSWV, 2.19.103.06, 139: Verslag van de vergadering van de Commissie Sociale Verzekering van het 
CSWV, gehouden op 22 oktober 1963, ten kantore van de Vereniging van Tricot- en Kousenfabrikanten 
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entitlement to a benefit strictly depended on a contribution record of one hundred and 
fifty-six days in the previous twelve months for the reduced pay scheme and seventy-
eight days in the previous twelve months for the unemployment scheme.
85
 Third, the 
contribution level of the reduced pay scheme differed per industrial insurance board. 
This meant that if the unemployment level in a certain industry was higher than in other 
industries, employers and workers in that industry also had to pay higher contribution 
levels. 
 To a certain extent, the limited redistributive nature of the 1949 Unemployment Act 
can be seen as the outcome of organized employer pressure for an adherence to strict 
insurance principles. Yet it should also be noted that the three union federations seem to 
have had little difficulty at the time in accepting this. This may have been because the 
three union federations worried as much about the costs of the new unemployment 
insurance as did the employer federations.
86
 This became evident in the ferocity of 
discussions over who would pay for its costs. In debates before the introduction of the 
Unemployment Act, the three union federations kept arguing that employers were 
responsible for involuntary unemployment, and therefore had to bear the brunt of the 
costs of the unemployment insurance. The employer federations naturally disagreed and 
wanted workers to share its costs equally.
87
 The discussions ended with a clear victory 
for the employer federations. The reduced pay scheme was to be financed by employers 
and workers on a fifty-fifty basis; the unemployment scheme was to be financed by 
employers and workers, who each financed twenty-five percent of the costs, and the 
state, which provided the rest. In coming years, the three union federations and their 
employer counterparts would continue to clash over who was to bear the (increased) 
costs of the scheme. In this, discussions over unemployment insurance development 
differed greatly from discussions over an increase in the generosity of the state old age 
pension – which, the unions acknowledged, had to be financed by workers themselves.  
 There was another reason why the union federations at the time were willing to 
accept the notion that the new unemployment insurance had to follow strict insurance 
rules. The fact was, some of their union members insisted on this. The public official 
                                                                                                                                          
te Utrecht; VNO, F119(4) Cie Sociale Verzekering RCO 1947-1970: Verslag van de vergadering van de 
Commissie Sociale Verzekering van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op 29 oktober 
1963, ten kantore van het Nederlands Katholiek Werkgevers-Verbond, Raamweg 32 te ’s Gravenhage. 
85 This was roughly similar to the case in the United Kingdom. See Anthony Ian Ogus and Eric M. 
Barendt, The Law of Social Security (London: Butterworth, 1982) 67. 
86
 ARA, CSWV, 2.19.103.06, 130: Kort verslag van de vergadering van de Kring voor Sociaal Overleg, 
gehouden op woensdag 5 januari 1949, des namiddags te 2.15 uur, ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal 
Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8, te ’s-Gravenhage. 
87
 The unions did demand wage compensation for the worker contribution. The employer federations at 
first rejected this, resulting in a stalemate that was solved in a rather strange way: a majority in the Social-
Economic Council (which seems to have excluded at least some employer representatives) spoke out in 
favor of wage compensation on the condition that employers were then allowed to pass on its costs 
through wage increases. See C.M.J. Ruijters, “Sociale Zaken.” In M.D. Bogaarts, Parlementaire 
geschiedenis van Nederland na 1945. De periode van het kabinet-Beel (1946-1948) (Den Haag: Sdu, 
1989) 663. It is important to note the distinction between state unemployment insurance development and 
the development of state insurance against old age, sickness and disability in this regard. While the unions 
were willing to accept that workers themselves pay state insurance against all the other major labor 
market risks, they were not willing to do the same for state insurance against unemployment. 
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unions, for example, took serious issue with their inclusion in the unemployment 
insurance. As their members enjoyed relatively secure positions, they objected to their 
having to contribute to the insurance at all – let alone on an equal basis.
88
 This, among 
other things, led them to support those unions favoring premium differentiation between 
industries. Especially within the NVV, many argued against a uniform contribution 
level for all industries.
89
 As a result, the union federations were willing to go along with 
the employer federations on this. Parliament eventually stood in the way, however. A 
parliamentary majority could accept premium differentiation between industries for the 
reduced pay scheme, but wanted the unemployment scheme’s contribution levels to be 
uniform across industries.
90
 
 The initial willingness of the union federations to adhere to ‘sound’ insurance rules 
soon made way for an interpretation that stressed the importance of worker solidarity. 
The industrial consensus on premium differentiation melted away first. As early as 1951, 
the members of the NVV Committee on Social Insurances already agreed that “there is 
no reason why a worker who, through no fault of his own, works in a branch of industry 
with unfavorable risk, should pay a much higher premium than a worker who happens 
to work in a branch with more favorable risk.”
91
 The other union federations now also 
took this position, and opposed renewed attempts by employers to extend premium 
differentiation between industries to the unemployment scheme.
92
 
 Worker solidarity-based considerations also partly guided union efforts to abolish 
the wage limit. In the run-up to the introduction of the Unemployment Act, the union 
and employer federations argued intensely over the question of whether or not higher-
paid workers should be excluded from the scheme. At the time, the union federations 
had been willing to give in partially. While accepting that the much lower risk of 
unemployment for higher-paid workers required the introduction of a wage limit, they 
insisted that the limit be set at a much higher level than the one demanded by the 
employer federations. The amount on which the two sides of industry eventually agreed 
was clearly a compromise.
93
 Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the union 
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 ARA, CSWV, 2.19.103.06, 130: Kort verslag van de vergadering van de Kring voor Sociaal Overleg, 
gehouden op 14 oktober 1947 ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8, 
te ’s-Gravenhage. 
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 Some of them continued to do so after the NVV leadership itself had already changed its stance. IISG, 
Codelijsten van het NVV-Commissiearchief 1945-1967, 322 Socialecie 1956-1961, Kort verslag van de 
42ee vergadering van de Sociale Commissie van het NVV, gehouden op woensdag 24 juni 1954 om 19.00 
uur ten kantore van het NVV. 
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 ARA, CSWV, 2.19.103.06, 3: Algemeen Bestuur, circulaires 1948/49: Standpunt van het CSWV met 
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NVV (Kleine Commissie): Kort verslag van de twaalfde vergadering van de Sociale Commissie van het 
NVV, gehouden op donderdag 24 mei 1951 om 19.30 te kantore van het NVV. 
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Vereniging van Tricot- en Kousenfabrikanten te Utrecht. 
93
 The compromise was 6000 guilders (which equaled to 120 percent of the modal wage), while the 
employer federations had argued for setting the wage limit at 4000 or 4500 guilders. The employer 
federations later complained that the agreed-upon limit was much too high. ARA, CSWV, 2.19.103.06, 
130: Kort verslag van de vergadering van de Kring voor Sociaal Overleg, gehouden op 14 oktober 1947 
ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8, te ’s-Gravenhage. 
  
118 
federations worked actively to first raise and then completely abolish the wage limit.
 94
 
Their efforts met with complete success in 1964. From that year on, all workers were 
included in the unemployment insurance, regardless of their income.
95
  
The willingness of the Dutch union federations to push forward with redistributive 
solutions was not only expressed in their pursuit of an increase in risk sharing. After 
succeeding in getting rid of the wage limit in 1964, the three union federations also 
pressed for direct income redistribution among workers with the introduction of a 
redistributive contributory system. The three did so because they felt that the earnings-
related system was much less able to accommodate lower-paid workers than higher-paid 
workers. For many lower-paid workers, they argued, even a benefit of eighty percent of 
their previous wages was too low to live on. After all, for those who earned a wage that 
was already close to subsistence, any loss of income was detrimental.
96
 To solve this 
problem, the union federations proposed granting the lowest-paid workers a benefit 
equal to their previous wages – or, in other words, to give a minimum benefit level 
equal to the net minimum wage. To do so would result in direct income redistribution 
between the lowest- and higher-paid workers, as it would entitle the former to a higher 
percentage of previous earnings (a full hundred percent) than the latter, while both 
would continue to pay the same percentage of earnings-related contributions. According 
to the Social-Economic Council, this move would increase the financial security of 
approximately twelve percent of all workers aged twenty-three and over.
97
 
 The idea of introducing a minimum benefit level first arose in discussions over 
reform of the state disability and sickness insurances in the early 1960s. Like the state 
unemployment insurance, these insurance plans combined earnings-related contribu-
tions with earnings-related benefits. This meant that the same reasoning with regards to 
the lower-paid applied to them as well. The main difference between these two 
insurances and the state unemployment insurance was that the former dealt with 
recipients who were rarely accused of an unwillingness to work. Whereas a worker’s 
unemployment was often seen as resulting from idleness, an unwillingness to work or 
from moral shortcomings, disability and sickness were seldom attributed to personal 
flaws.
98
 This made the introduction of minimum benefits into the state disability and 
sickness insurance much less controversial than their introduction into the state 
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 For the Protestant CNV, this was again more difficult to reconcile with its emphasis on strict insurance 
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unemployment insurance. It should also be noted here that lower-paid workers were far 
more frequently accused of being unwilling to work than higher-paid workers. From the 
perspective of employers, at least, this made it crucial to retain as great a margin as 
possible between benefits and wages for the lowest income categories. 
The employer federations initially opposed the introduction of a minimum benefit 
level into all three insurances. They did so by taking the principled stance that an 
insurance did not have to cover living costs completely; that was what social assistance 
was for.
99
 In practice, the employer federations were somewhat less hostile to the 
introduction of a minimum benefit level into the disability insurance than in the other 
two insurance. This was partly because the disability insurance catered mostly for 
people expected to remain outside of employment for long periods. This was clearly not 
the case with the sickness and unemployment insurances.
100
 Thus, in discussions on the 
introduction of the reform of the state disability insurance, the employer federations did 
not resist the introduction of a minimum benefit level for very long. When the 1966 Act 
on Disability Insurance (Wet op Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering or WAO) passed 
Parliament, it already included a minimum benefit provision. The 1966 Sickness Act 
(Ziektewet), which, as we will see in the next chapter, created an insurance for short-
term sicknesses and disabilities, did not include such a provision. Yet it did give the 
unions and employers responsible for its operation the right to supplement the state 
benefit. As we will see in chapter 6, they came to utilize this en masse. 
The employer federations resisted the introduction of a minimum benefit level into 
the unemployment insurance most fiercely, for the reasons noted above. Even as they 
argued against a minimum benefit level, however, they realized that they would 
probably not be able to prevent its introduction. Not only did the unions support it; so 
did the government. In fact, by the time that the unions came forward with their 
proposal to introduce a minimum benefit into the earnings-related social insurance, the 
government was already considering raising the rate of social assistance to the level of 
the minimum wage. This meant that those without work who had previously earned a 
wage equal to or a little higher than the national minimum wage would receive a higher 
benefit when on social assistance than when drawing the unemployment benefit – as, it 
should be noted, was then the case in the United Kingdom.
101
 Realizing this, the 
employer federations acknowledged that their case was quite weak.
102
 After being 
outmaneuvered in the Social-Economic Council on the need for a minimum benefit, the 
employer federations eventually succeeded in getting worker representatives to agree 
that it would apply only to breadwinners.
103
 The employer federations could celebrate 
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their partial victory only temporarily, however, because Parliament later decided that 
the minimum benefit should apply to all categories of workers.  
In spite of the opposition of the employer federations, in the late 1960s the govern-
ment introduced a minimum benefit level into the unemployment insurance, sickness 
insurance, and the newly-created unemployment provision. This meant that all 
unemployed, sick and disabled workers who were entitled to an unemployment benefit 
could look forward to a benefit that was at least as high as the net minimum wage. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the net minimum wage, in turn, would approach 
eighty percent of average earnings in the coming years.
104
 In comparison, in the United 
Kingdom, the flat rate public unemployment benefit continued to float somewhere 
between twenty to forty percent of average earnings, depending on child and family 
supplements.
105
 To this, those unemployed British workers who had previously earned 
wages that were below average earnings could often add neither private nor public 
supplements. 
 The introduction of a minimum benefit level completed a series of measures for 
which the unions had pushed since almost immediately after the Unemployment Act 
came into effect. Though it had initially been based on strict insurance principles, the 
Dutch public unemployment insurance eventually came to display several features 
specifically designed to improve matters for lower-paid workers. The abolition of the 
wage limit made sure that all workers were subject to the redistributive effects of risk 
pooling, while the introduction of the minimum benefit level produced direct income 
redistribution among workers. Both measures, it should be noted, took a long time to be 
fully implemented. So was the Netherlands among the last countries with an earnings-
related unemployment insurance to abolish the wage limit.
106
 And the introduction of a 
redistributive element into the unemployment insurance’s contributory system came 
over a decade after the emergence of a consensus on the need to combine flat rate old 
age pension benefits with earnings-related contributions. Many reasons can be given for 
the late introduction of specific measures aimed at improving matters for lower-paid 
workers into the unemployment insurance. Among the most important reasons is surely 
that the unions had focused first on two other important objectives.  
For a long time after the introduction of the 1949 Unemployment Act, the union 
federations focused almost exclusively on two objectives. The first was to increase the 
level of the unemployment insurance benefit for all recipients. The second was to 
increase the duration of the unemployment insurance benefit for all recipients. While 
agreeing that these two objectives had priority, the three union federations disagreed on 
which of the two was more pressing. While the NVV wanted to first increase the 
duration of the benefit, the CNV preferred raising the level of the benefit first.
107
 For 
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nearly a decade and a half after the introduction of the Unemployment Act, the 
employer federations managed to prevent both. It was not until 1964 that the unions saw 
improvements, and then these came simultaneously on both fronts. In that year, the 
duration of the unemployment benefit was increased by five weeks and the benefit was 
raised to a uniform level of eighty percent. This outcome resulted after several years of 
fierce negotiations between employer and union representatives in the Social-Economic 
Council, and again an intervention from Parliament on behalf of the union federations.  
The issue of the benefit rate of the unemployment insurance is of particular interest 
to us here, because it shows that the employer federations were quite willing to deviate 
from a strict interpretation of insurance rules when this was in their interests. When the 
representatives of union and employer federations negotiated the creation of the 
Unemployment Act in the late 1940s, they had, as we have seen above, agreed to grant 
different benefit percentages depending on marital status, sex and age. Both parties must 
have been aware of the incompatibility of this solution with sound insurance rules. They 
nevertheless pushed forward with this plan, as it represented the only solution 
acceptable to them. The employer federations had deemed a benefit rate of eighty 
percent of the previous wage as far too costly. The union federations, in turn, could not 
accept a lower uniform rate, as married men and breadwinners had already been entitled 
to a benefit level of eighty percent of their previous wages before the War.
108
 When the 
union and employer federations agreed on percentages of eighty, seventy and sixty 
percent for different categories, Parliament agreed. The Minister of Social Affairs 
successfully resisted a CPN motion to set the benefit at a uniform level of eighty percent 
by arguing that organized industry had already decided otherwise.
109
 
In following years, the union federations continued to strive for a uniform benefit 
rate of eighty percent of the previous wage. The two confessional union federations, in 
particular, found it easy to do so by arguing that the insurance nature of the unemploy-
ment insurance demanded a uniform percentage for all categories of workers.
110
 Not 
surprisingly, the confessional employer federations were more susceptible to this 
argument than were their liberal counterparts. While admitting privately that it was 
“incorrect” to combine a uniform premium with benefit differentiation, the liberal 
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CSWV in 1957 went as far as to state that it believed “for reasons of principle, that in a 
social insurance, a uniform premium does not have to result in a uniform benefit.”
111
 
This stance did of course not compute with its emphasis on a strict adherence to 
insurance rules on other issues related to the unemployment insurance. Nor did it 
compute with its initial reaction, made some five years earlier, to the NVV’s proposal to 
combine earnings-related contributions with flat rate benefits in discussions over the 
introduction of the state old age pension. The CSWV’s reaction then had been that the 
insurance character of the pension demanded adherence to the principle that “when the 
benefit is uniform, the contribution must be uniform as well.”
112
 Of course, the CSWV 
did eventually support the NVV’s old age pension plan for the simple reason that it was 
greatly preferable to the government’s means-tested alternative. Liberal employer 
representatives were definitively more opportunistic in their adherence to insurance 
rules than were confessional employers. The previous chapter has already mentioned 
this, and chapter 6 will illustrate this more dramatically.  
The employer federations eventually agreed to discuss the possibility of an increase 
in the level of the unemployment benefit as part of a complete review of the operation 
of the state unemployment insurance, which also addressed an issue that was of 
importance to them.
113
 They never agreed, however, to set the benefit level at eighty 
percent of previous earnings for all recipients. After several years of negotiations, both 
sides of industry eventually agreed to a compromise that had been devised by the NVV. 
In this compromise, all workers who were entitled to an unemployment benefit, with the 
exception of those under twenty-one years and those who were not married, would be 
able to claim a benefit of eighty percent of their previous wages, and would be able to 
do this for twenty-six instead of twenty-one weeks (the union federations had initially 
demanded an extension of up to thirty-four weeks). Against the wishes of the employer 
federations, Parliament later decided to do away with the exception for the unmarried 
and for those under twenty-one years of age.
114
 
In the same year when negotiations between the union and employer federations 
resulted in increases in the duration and benefit level of the unemployment insurance, a 
government initiative created a new earnings-related state provision for the unemployed. 
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In later years, when the problem of long-term unemployment became more severe, this 
provision turned out to be very important for the financial security of unemployed 
workers. After 1976, as a result of new legislation, the provision was also used by 
employers to shed redundant workers in large numbers. A short investigation into the 
creation of the provision is merited in this chapter. Its use to shed redundant workers 
will be investigated in chapter 6, which deals with the utilization of several social 
security schemes to shed redundant workers in the Netherlands.  
 
FROM GRANT TO RIGHT: THE INTRODUCTION 
OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT PROVISION 
For the sake of simplicity, this chapter has thus far treated the unemployment insurance 
as the only form of financial compensation against unemployment besides social 
assistance. This depiction is somewhat misleading, however, as a third alternative did 
exist: the so-called Social Provisions A and B (Sociale Voorzieningen A en B). These 
provisions constituted a mixture between a Bismarckian insurance and social assistance. 
Created in 1952, the Social Provisions A and B enabled the unemployed to preserve 
income maintenance for several months after they could no longer claim the unem-
ployment insurance benefit. Like the unemployment insurance, the Social Provision A 
offered a benefit of eighty, seventy, or sixty percent of previous wages for twenty-one 
weeks. After that period, the Social Provision B entitled unemployed workers to 
benefits of seventy-five, sixty, or forty-five percent of previous wages for an indefinite 
period. The Social Provision A also resembled an insurance in that unemployed workers 
could only claim a benefit if they met certain qualification criteria. Workers needed to 
have a working history of at least thirteen weeks in the previous twelve months to 
qualify for a Social Provision A benefit. Workers did not have to meet certain 
qualification criteria to be able to claim the Social Provision B benefit. The insurance 
characteristics of the Social Provisions A and B were combined with two social 
assistance characteristics. First, benefits were means-tested.
115
 Second, they were 
completely state-financed. Technically, both provisions were therefore part of the social 
assistance system.  
The Social Provisions A and B are often left out of the literature on Dutch welfare 
state development because they were of little significance in the Dutch system of 
compensation for the financial consequences of unemployment. From 1958 to 1962, the 
financial costs of operating the Social Provisions A and B constituted only about eight-
and-a-half percent of the costs of operating the state unemployment insurance.
116
 The 
main reason for this lay in the almost complete absence of long-term unemployment 
among workers at the time. The Social Provisions A and B are only mentioned in this 
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chapter because they developed into a much more generous addition to the unemploy-
ment insurance in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1964, the government passed the Unem-
ployment Provision Act (Wet Werkloosheidsvoorziening or WWV), which transformed 
both provisions into a more generous provision that operated separately from the social 
assistance scheme. Then, in 1976, the duration of the benefit was extended by five years 
for elderly workers. Of these two steps, the second is of far more interest to us here, and 
therefore deserves a separate treatment in chapter 6..  
The introduction of the Unemployment Provision Act resulted from dissatisfaction 
with the inclusion of an earnings-related benefit into the social assistance system. Both 
Parliament and the union federations informed the government of their objections to the 
inclusion when the latter contemplated a major reform of the social assistance system in 
the late 1950s.
117
 This represented a dilemma for the government. On the one hand, it 
believed that a supplement to the unemployment insurance could not be omitted. On the 
other hand, it felt that long-term unemployment was different, and therefore needed to 
be treated differently, from short-term unemployment. The government’s solution was 
to introduce a new provision that would operate separately from both the unemployment 
insurance and social assistance. It also briefly considered increasing the duration of the 
unemployment insurance, but shied away from this after employer and worker 
federations reached a compromise on an extension of the unemployment insurance by 
five weeks. To contradict that, the government feared, would unduly complicate matters. 
Moreover, since neither the union nor employer federations would be willing to pay for 
an improved version of the Social Provisions A and B, the government felt that a 
separate scheme – in provision form – was most suitable.
118
 
The union federations applauded the introduction of the Unemployment Provision 
Act mainly for two reasons. First, the new scheme lacked a means test, and even 
allowed for the granting of private supplements, as long as the total benefit did not 
exceed a recipient’s previous wage level.
119
 Second, workers could claim a benefit on 
fairly lenient terms. Not only was a working history of only six consecutive weeks or 
sixty-five days in the previous year sufficient to claim a benefit; as a matter of principle, 
the voluntarily unemployed were also entitled to a benefit. This leniency stemmed from 
the government’s intention of charting a “middle course” between the two predecessors 
of the new unemployment provision. Under the Social Provision A, a worker could 
claim a benefit only if he or she had a working history of thirteen weeks and was 
involuntarily unemployed. The Social Provision B, on the other hand, granted benefits 
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to all workers – including the voluntarily unemployed and those with no working 
history. The employer federations naturally argued that a non-means-tested provision 
demanded stricter qualification rules than a means-tested provision. Others who shared 
this opinion included the government-appointed members of the Social-Economic 
Council and the government officials of the Association of Director-Generals of 
Government Bodies for Social Work (Vereniging van Directeuren van Overheidsor-
ganen voor Sociale Arbeid). The government officials of the latter body argued for 
stricter qualification rules because even the probation period was often longer than six 
weeks.
120
 The arguments of employers and skeptical government officials, however, 
were of no avail. The government insisted that fairness demanded a middle course 
between the two predecessors of the new unemployment provision.
121
  
Whereas the union federations saw the lenient nature of new unemployment provi-
sion in a positive light, the employer federations regarded it as the Act’s main 
shortcoming. The employer federations had little difficulty with the level and duration 
of the provision’s benefit, though these were quite generous: the benefit was set at 
seventy-five percent of the previous wage, and the duration was set at two years.
122
 To 
them, the main problem with the Act lay in the ease with which workers could claim an 
unemployment benefit. In the years leading up to the introduction of the Act, the 
employer federations had therefore urged the government to either make the benefit 
means-tested (and thus part of the social assistance system) or dependent on a long 
working history (as was a real insurance). In the end, however, it turned out to be 
neither of the two.
123
 Even more regrettable to the employer federations was that the 
voluntarily unemployed were also entitled to a benefit. In the years after the unemploy-
ment provision came into operation, the employer federations put much work into 
rectifying this latter feature. It soon became clear that they had good reason to do so. 
Responsibility for the operation of the unemployment provision was given to the 
local authorities, in contrast to the centralized administration of the unemployment 
insurance. To prevent misuse of the new scheme, these authorities were allowed to hand 
out lower benefits or debar “undeserving” workers altogether. In practice, however, this 
almost never happened. In 1966, only two years after the Act’s introduction, an 
unemployment survey conducted in the city of Geldrop showed that as many as thirty-
five percent of all recipients of an unemployment provision benefit were voluntarily 
unemployed. More importantly, almost half of all recipients were under thirty and the 
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vast majority of them had little motivation to return to work.
124
 Faced with these 
numbers, and after fierce pressure from the employer federations, the government 
decided to limit entitlement to the unemployment provision on this point. From 1972 on, 
entitlement extended only to the involuntarily unemployed – as was the case with the 
state unemployment insurance. The union federations opposed the 1972 amendment to 
the Unemployment Provision Act. Although acutely aware of the Act’s misuse, they 
simply did not deem this as important enough to warrant a reversal of improvements 
made to the social security system.
125
 
Compared to the long and complicated history of union attempts to improve the 
level and duration of the unemployment insurance benefit, the generosity and ease of 
establishment of the unemployment provision seem remarkable. This shows us two 
things. First, it shows us how effective the employer federations were for a long time in 
resisting an increase in the generosity of the unemployment insurance. Part of the reason 
why the unemployment provision could be created so easily was surely that it was a 
provision and not an insurance, which enabled the government to bypass organized 
industry – and thus the employer federations. Illustrative of this is that the government 
initially did not even want to consult the main corporatist body in the Netherlands, the 
Social-Economic Council, on its plans to reform the Social Provisions A and B. It only 
did so after another counseling body which did not contain representatives from 
organized industry, the Council of Estate (Raad van State), emphasized that “such a 
move will not be understood politically.”
126
 Second, it illustrates the importance of 
timing. Both the first major reform of the Act on Disability Insurance and the 
Unemployment Provision Act came about in the mid-1960s, and thus at the pinnacle of 
a long period of high economic growth, low unemployment, and an all-but-complete 
absence of long-term unemployment. Under these circumstances, the government did 
not have to worry about the affordability of the unemployment provision, which might 
explain partly why the provision turned out to be so generous.  
This golden era of high growth and low unemployment would soon come to an end, 
however. The first signs of this were already present in the mid-1960s. The closing of 
state mines and the first restructuring measures in the shipbuilding and textile industries 
during the period gave the government a first taste of what was to come in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Under these circumstances, the unemployment provision, which initially 
applied to only a small group of workers, grew steadily in importance. In fact, and as we 
will see in chapter 6, it eventually came to fulfill a function that far exceeded its original 
purpose. 
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5 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISABILITY INSURANCE IN THE 
NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
This chapter looks at the last common source of economic misfortune against which the 
welfare state provides protection: disability. Unlike old age and unemployment, 
disability is never treated as a single risk. All countries distinguish in some way 
between different disabilities, and some go quite far in this. First, there are often 
separate policies for disabilities resulting from sickness, accident, and old age. Second, 
most countries distinguish between work-related and non-work-related accidents and 
sicknesses Third, there may be different policies for the short-term and long-term 
disabled. Fourth, many countries have different disability policies for workers and for 
the self-employed. This chapter is concerned with all policies that compensate for 
disability during a person’s working life, which means that several policies are to be 
covered here. In the United Kingdom, the two main distinctions in the postwar period 
were between short-term and long-term disabilities, and between work-related and non-
work-related disabilities. In the postwar Netherlands, only the distinction between 
workers and the self-employed remained important. 
In most countries, work-related disability programs represent the oldest form of 
social security.
1
 The Netherlands and the United Kingdom are not exceptions. The 
Dutch Industrial Injuries Act (Ongevallenwet, 1901) and the British Workmen’s 
Compensation Act (1897) had passed their respective parliaments more than a decade 
before the next social security initiatives were put forward in the two countries. The 
early passing of these work-related disability programs is not a coincidence. Work-
related disabilities differ from non-work-related disabilities, old age and unemployment 
in that responsibility for provision against them lies fairly incontestably with employers. 
Employers are generally accepted to bear full responsibility for the working conditions 
of their workers, and thus for any work-related accidents and sicknesses. Because of this 
reasoning, the establishment of work-related disability programs related more to the 
struggle for worker emancipation than did the introduction of any other social security 
program. For labor unions, the absence of financial compensation for work-related 
disabilities was a grave injustice that urgently needed to be rectified. Unions’ ability to 
do so reflected the growing strength of worker organizations in late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth-century Europe. By the end of the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, all industrialized European countries had introduced work-related disability 
programs, which without exception were funded by employers, and were often far more 
generous than other social insurance programs.  
 Yet work-related disability programs, however generous, can at most play a minor 
part in catering for the disabled. After all, the vast majority of accidents and sicknesses 
are not related to paid work. Employers cannot be held responsible for dealing with 
their employees’ non-work-related sicknesses and accidents. This means that the issue 
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of worker solidarity, and thus of union organization, is again of central importance in 
this chapter. Since not all workers have an income or risk profile that grants them 
adequate insurance against all types of disability on their own, efforts to provide all 
workers with adequate insurance against disability during their working lives demand a 
redistributive effort among different grades of workers. As we will see, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom, as a result of differences in the stance of their labor union 
movements, again differed to a great extent in the degree to which such a redistributive 
effort came about.  
 As worker solidarity is again of central importance here, it should not come as a 
surprise that Dutch efforts to provide adequate financial provision for all disabled were 
far more successful than were British efforts to do so. By the mid-1960s, the Nether-
lands had created a system that offered very generous treatment to all disabled, 
regardless of cause, duration or contributory record. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, 
only those disabled who incurred their injury at work could count on generous treatment. 
Indeed, the inability of the British welfare state to provide adequate care for the much 
larger group of non-work-related disabilities is one of its major failings. Compared to 
their equivalents in most continental European countries, and certainly in the 
Netherlands, British state benefits designed to provide for non-work-related disabilities 
were much less generous in terms of benefit levels and entitlement rules. This 
manifested itself in a much higher level of poverty among the British disabled than their 
Continental counterparts.
2
 
 The continued inadequacy of state provision for the financial consequences of non-
work-related disabilities has been one of the most marked features of the postwar 
British welfare state. This makes it quite remarkable that welfare state scholars have 
paid so little attention to the causes of this inadequacy. While most treatments of 
postwar British welfare state development give ample reasons for Beveridge’s decision 
to grant preferential treatment to work-related disabilities, few even raise the question of 
why state provision against non-work-related disabilities remained so poor. Between 
roughly the late 1950s and late 1960s, the Labour Party – first from opposition, and later 
when in government – proposed several initiatives to improve state provision for non-
work-related disabilities. Unfortunately, these initiatives have attracted little academic 
interest. The first part of this chapter, which deals with the United Kingdom, will look at 
these initiatives in great detail.  
A similar charge of omission can be made with regards to scholarship on the Nether-
lands. While scholars have paid much attention to the operation of the Dutch disability 
insurance system after its 1960s reform, there has to date been no systematic investiga-
tion of how this reform came about. As a result, we know much about the consequences 
of the system’s generosity, but little about its causes. The most common explanation for 
the system’s generosity is that it was reformed quite late, which means that its most 
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generous features were introduced at a time of continuously high economic growth.
3
 
There are at least two reasons why this explanation is insufficient. First, if reform had 
taken place at an earlier stage, union pressure would probably have resulted in new 
reform measures in later years – after all, this had been the case with the state old age 
pension and unemployment insurance. The outcome might then have been equally 
generous. Second, and more important, the explanation based on timing can be turned 
upside down. As will be shown in the second part of this chapter, which deals with the 
Netherlands, the late moment of reform was itself at least partly the result of the 
commitment of all involved parties to increasing the disability system’s generous 
features.  
This lack of systematic investigation of the introduction of the 1966 Sickness Act 
and Act on Disability Insurance in the Netherlands has also had another consequence. In 
their (often very brief) treatments of the introduction of these Acts, both academic and 
popular writings have attributed a very important role to Gerard Veldkamp, who, as 
Minister of Social Affairs at the time, presided over their creation. Some scholars have 
even described both Acts as his “brainchild.”
4
 This chapter emphasizes that Veldkamp’s 
role in the 1966 disability insurance reform was much more minor than often suggested. 
It is certainly true that Veldkamp had been a longstanding supporter of this reform (he 
had already argued for reform of the kind that eventually came about in 1966 in his 
1949 dissertation).
5
 And as Minister of Social Affairs, he certainly did share responsibil-
ity for its specific features. Yet it is crucial to realize that the 1966 reform measures 
were principally the outcome of a long process of discussions between representatives 
of labor union federations, employer federations, and the state that had begun in the 
immediate postwar period. The decision to grant all disabled equally-generous treatment 
regardless of risk, cause, and contribution record resulted from an agreement between 
both sides of industry on the need to do so. Once the “social partners” reached 
agreement on the main features of the 1960s reform, Parliament closely followed their 
recommendations.  
The second part of this chapter investigates the events leading up to the 1966 reform 
that created such a generous disability insurance system in the Netherlands. The chapter 
ends with a brief look at the last major formal extension of this system: the introduction 
of the 1976 General Disability Act (Algemene Arbeidsongeschiktheidswet or AAW), 
which extended the disability scheme with a flat rate insurance for the self-employed. 
Chapter 6 looks at one important consequence of the 1966 reform: the massive use of 
the disability insurance system to get rid of redundant workers. The first part of the 
present chapter examines the United Kingdom. This part begins by comparing the 
British welfare state’s treatment of work-related and non-work-related disabilities. It 
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then looks at the stance of British unions on Labour’s attempts to improve state 
provision for non-work-related disabilities. We set the stage for the United Kingdom 
discussion by returning to the Beveridge reforms of the late 1940s.  
 
THE TUC AND THE INDUSTRIAL PREFERENCE 
When Beveridge undertook his review of the social security system, the risk of 
disability posed a particular problem for him. As mentioned before, Beveridge’s task 
was to put forward ways to create a unified system in which all programs and services 
were organized and financed in the same way. To achieve this, he proposed the creation 
of a single National Insurance Fund that would entitle all social security recipients to the 
same flat rate benefit. Beveridge took it for granted that those unable to work because of 
old age, unemployment, or non-work-related disabilities (as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the British sickness insurance covered all non-work-related injuries and 
sicknesses) should receive the same treatment. His only dilemma was how to approach 
work-related disabilities. As in other countries, workers who incurred disabilities at 
work were accustomed to preferential treatment. This manifested itself in two ways. 
First, the disabled who incurred their disability at work could claim a much higher 
benefit than other social security recipients. Second, and also in contrast to other social 
security benefits, entitlement to compensation for work-related disabilities did not 
depend on a worker’s contributory record. A worker could claim a benefit even if his or 
her disability occurred on the first day of work. In fact, workers did not have to 
contribute to work-related disability insurance at all, since employers were considered 
solely responsible for the cost of work-related disability benefits.  
For Beveridge, the main dilemma was whether social security recipients who 
incurred their disability at work should subsequently continue to receive higher benefits 
than other social security recipients. On the one hand, he felt that social justice 
demanded equal compensation for all interruptions of earnings. To quote Beveridge 
himself: “If a workman loses his leg in an accident, his needs are the same whether the 
accident occurred in a factory or in the street.”
6
 On the other hand, Beveridge felt that 
there were several compelling reasons to hand out higher benefits to the industrially-
disabled than to the elderly, unemployed or otherwise disabled. In his Report, he gave 
three such reasons. Two of these were economic arguments, while the third was of a 
social or moral nature. First, Beveridge believed that only very generous compensation 
against work-related disabilities would encourage people to work under dangerous 
conditions. This made high work-related disability benefits a matter of national interest, 
since many industries that were vital to the community were also especially dangerous. 
Second, Beveridge hoped that generous compensation for work-related disabilities 
would reduce instances of employers being sued in tort and found liable even when they 
were not morally at fault.
7
 Third, and despite his opinion that the consequences of both 
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types of disability were quite similar, Beveridge believed that there was a fundamental 
moral difference between disabilities occurring while working under orders and non-
work-related disabilities.
8
 
 Beveridge solved his dilemma by proposing to retain the “industrial preference,” as 
the more generous treatment of work-related disabilities is often called in the United 
Kingdom, only for long-term victims of work-related disabilities. In his proposal, 
workers suffering from work-related disabilities would have to rely only on the national 
insurance sickness benefit during the first thirteen weeks of their disability. If they were 
still disabled after this period, they would receive a generous work-related disability 
supplement to the sickness benefit. The sickness benefit would be set at the same level 
as the unemployment and old age pension benefits. Unlike the unemployment benefit, 
but like the old age pension benefit, there was to be no limit to how long recipients were 
entitled to a sickness benefit. As with the unemployment and old age pension benefits, 
entitlement to a sickness benefit would depend on strict contribution criteria. Those 
disabled who incurred their injury at work would not have to meet certain contribution 
criteria. 
 Beveridge considered his solution to be both morally just and cheap – since only ten 
percent of work-related disabilities lasted longer than thirteen weeks.
9
 The new Labour 
government agreed with Beveridge on the latter count, but nevertheless opted for a total 
preservation of the industrial preference. Among the most important reasons for this 
was undoubtedly that the TUC strongly opposed Beveridge’s recommendation to retain 
the industrial preference only for the long-term disabled.
10
 To the TUC, it was 
imperative to “distinguish between industrial accident and disease and other causes of 
interruption of earnings both in respect of the basis of fixing compensation [meaning: 
the level of the benefit] and in the method of meeting the costs.”
11
 It therefore argued 
for the complete preservation of the industrial preference using a range of arguments 
which will be explained at length below. 
  Under Labour’s 1946 National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, workers with 
work-related disabilities never had to depend on just the sickness benefit. Instead, they 
could first claim a flat rate – but generous – industrial injury benefit for a maximum 
period of six months. If the disability lasted longer than this period, they were entitled to 
an industrial disablement pension. The disablement pension fully followed insurance 
standards: the level of the benefit depended solely on the extent of the disability.
12
 In 
contrast to the workmen’s compensation benefit, which it replaced, the disablement 
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pension was set at a flat rate level. If a worker remained fully disabled, he or she could 
claim the full disablement pension in combination with the sickness benefit. If a worker 
remained partially disabled, he or she could claim a percentage of the flat rate benefit 
level and combine this with income from work or from other sources. A special 
hardship allowance was available for those who were not fully disabled, but still could 
not return to work at their previous or an equivalent job. This allowance could be quite 
generous. At maximum, it could increase the level of the industrial disablement pension 
by forty percent.
13
 The industrial disablement pension was paid in either the form of a 
weekly pension (when the disability exceeded twenty percent) or a gratuity (when the 
disability fell between one and twenty percent).
14
 In principle, the benefit was payable 
for life, and thus did not have to end when the recipient reached retirement age.  
 Compared to the National Insurance Scheme (but not compared to its continental 
equivalents), the Industrial Injuries Scheme was extremely generous. When involved in 
an accident at work, a worker would first receive an industrial injury benefit that was 
seventy percent higher than the national insurance benefit. After six months, the 
disablement pension added about one-third of average earnings to the sickness benefit, 
which amounted to only one-fifth of average earnings. Those who had become disabled 
for the long term because of non-work-related accidents or sicknesses could only claim 
the sickness benefit. Often, they could not even claim this. While all cases of work-
related disability were eligible for a benefit, regardless of contributions paid, entitlement 
to the non-work-related sickness benefit depended on a strict contribution record.
15
 If 
claimants failed to meet the contribution criteria, and they often did, their only option 
was to draw on the means-tested national assistance.
16
 Finally, unlike the Industrial 
Injuries Scheme, the National Insurance Scheme only granted benefits to the fully 
disabled. Table 5.1 illustrates the relative generosity of the Industrial Injuries Scheme in 
terms of benefit levels. The table shows that a fully disabled male worker received a 
significantly higher benefit when his disability resulted from work-related activities – 
especially after six months. Child and family supplements could decrease the difference 
between the sickness and industrial injuries benefits paid for the first six months. After 
this, however, even a single disabled male worker who incurred his injury at work 
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received almost twice in benefits (namely one hundred eighty-five shillings) as a 
married worker with two children who incurred his or her injury outside of work (he or 
she received one hundred two shillings).  
 
Table 5.1: Weekly benefit level of a fully disabled male worker in shillings, 1959 
Type of benefit Single Married Married, 1 
child 
Married, 2 
children 
Sickness benefit 50 80 95 102 
Industrial injury benefit 85 85 100 107 
Industrial disablement pension 135 135 135 135 
Source: Pentti Korvenmaa, Social Welfare Administration in the United Kingdom and in the 
Netherlands (The Hague: Ministry for Social Work, 1959) 4-8. 
 
 A particularly useful way to illustrate the comparative generosity of the Industrial 
Injuries Scheme is by comparing the consequences of work-related and non-work-
related disability on the income of a lower-paid worker. Lower-paid workers provide a 
clear illustration because they seldom had the opportunity to add occupational provision 
to the benefit they received from the state – a problem to which I will return at length 
below. If a poorer worker suffered from a work-related accident or sickness, he or she 
could always look forward to a benefit that closely approached or even exceeded his or 
her previous wage. If he or she remained disabled for longer than six months, the 
combination of an industrial disablement pension and sickness benefit could even result 
in a benefit that far exceeded the previous wage. To Beveridge and the TUC, but not to 
employer interest groups, such an outcome was acceptable in the light of the national 
importance of providing adequate protection from disabilities that resulted from work 
done under orders or in dangerous industries.
17
 If the disability occurred outside of work, 
however, the outcome was at most a below-subsistence national insurance sickness 
benefit. Supplementary benefits for the disabled who incurred their disabilities outside 
of work were as good as nonexistent until the 1970s. When supplementary benefits did 
become available, their level was quite insufficient, and they were often either obscure 
or hard to obtain.
18
 The consequence of this was an exceedingly high poverty rate 
among the victims of non-work-related disabilities.
19
 
 The relatively generous treatment of work-related disabilities naturally led to a 
considerable amount of resentment by those disabled who themselves could claim only 
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a meager sickness benefit or, even worse, had to rely on means-tested national 
assistance. Over the years, individual (Labour) politicians, lawyers and social security 
experts also came to criticize the industrial preference.
20
 By the 1960s, they were joined 
by several organizations that actively lobbied for equal generosity for all disabled, 
regardless of cause. Most important among these lobbyists was the Disablement Income 
Group, which gained a formal charter as the Disability Alliance in 1973. In the 1970s, 
the chairman of this Alliance, the renowned poverty scholar Peter Townsend, repeatedly 
called for the creation of a “Dutch system,” which gave generous provision for all 
disabilities, whether or not they were work-related.
21
 
Among the many groups that called for equal treatment of all disabilities regardless 
of cause, one organization remained conspicuously absent. This organization was the 
TUC. Over the years, several commentators have noted that the TUC “depressingly 
failed to refer to this question,” and even “jealously defended the industrial prefer-
ence.”
22
 Yet none of them ever looked into the reasons for the absence of the TUC 
among the groups calling for equal treatment of all disabled regardless of cause. Nor did 
they ever investigate the involvement of the labor union movement in the development 
of state provision for disability in general. This is remarkable, because the TUC’s 
position was of crucial importance to the failure of British efforts to establish adequate 
provision for all disabled.
 23
 
The TUC first gave serious consideration to the issue of the possible equal treatment 
of all disabled regardless of cause during the early 1940s, when Beveridge consulted the 
confederation on its ideas for a reform of the existing social security system. At the time, 
as mentioned above, the TUC strongly opposed the idea. Like Beveridge, the TUC 
emphasized that only generous compensation for work-related disabilities would 
encourage people to work under dangerous conditions. To the TUC, it was also 
noteworthy that work-related disabilities occurred while working under orders. This 
made employers fully responsible for the costs of work-related disabilities, which in 
turn enabled workers to demand near-to-full compensation for loss of earnings. The old 
Workmen’s Compensation Act had entitled disabled workers who incurred their injury 
or sickness at work to half of their previous earnings. In the years leading up to the 
introduction of the 1946 Industrial Injuries Act, the TUC demanded that this be raised to 
at least two-thirds of previous earnings.
24
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To the TUC’s disappointment, first Beveridge, and later the Labour government that 
implemented Beveridge’s proposals, did not share the TUC’s views on the need to 
increase the benefit level for work-related disabilities to two-thirds of previous earnings. 
In fact, they did not opt for a benefit that replaced earnings at all. Instead, the 1946 
National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act entitled workers who became disabled at 
work to a flat rate benefit given as a compensation for loss of faculty. The TUC could 
eventually accept this outcome because the flat rate benefit was set at a very generous 
level and because compensation for loss of faculty meant that workers could still 
receive a benefit if they continued to work.
25
 Another one of Beveridge’s recommenda-
tions that eventually became legislation (as we have seen, his recommendation to 
maintain the industrial preference for only the long-term disabled did not) was far more 
difficult for the TUC to swallow. To the TUC’s utter dismay, Beveridge recommended 
making workers and the state responsible for the financing of the Industrial Injuries 
Scheme – and the Labour government agreed.  
This final feature of the new Industrial Injuries Scheme conflicted both with work-
ers’ sense of justice and with established practice – in the United Kingdom, as well as 
overseas. For the TUC, this regrettable feature was only tolerable for three reasons. First, 
employers continued to pay the largest share of the costs. Second, the low risk of work-
related disability made the costs to workers sufferable.
26
 Third, and most important, “in 
return for his contribution, the employee will receive a greatly improved system of 
compensation, with higher benefits, administered impartially and on a non-profit 
making basis.”
27
 The TUC nevertheless continued to press for a completely employer-
financed Industrial Injuries Scheme in ensuing decades.
28
 It is quite possible that this 
may have been part of the reason for its continued support for the industrial preference, 
since the creation of a single scheme for all disabled would certainly make it more 
difficult to restore individual employer liability for work-related disabilities.
29
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At the same time, there was a growing awareness within the ranks of the TUC that 
the enormous difference in benefit levels for work-related and non-work-related 
disabilities was hard to defend from both legal and social angles. Privately, TUC 
members eventually even came to admit that “a separate IIS [Industrial Injuries Scheme] 
could be seen as increasingly anachronistic and that the objective should be to move 
towards provision of the same benefits for all disabled people, regardless of the cause of 
disability, and this would not be helped by further emphasizing the separation of the 
IIS.”
30
 The acceptance of this view in principle did not mean, however, that the TUC 
ever actually came close to seeking abolition of the industrial preference. It might have 
done so if it did not have another, much more forcible reason to refrain from this: its 
awareness of the financial consequences of the abolition of industrial preference.  
Although realizing that treating different disabled groups differently based on cause 
of disability was problematic, the TUC also realized that any attempt to treat non-work-
related disabilities as generously as work-related disabilities would require substantial 
additional contributions. After all, non-work-related accidents and sicknesses far 
exceeded in frequency and number those that occurred in or because of work. In 1970, 
for example, on average almost one-and-a-half million disabled claimed a sickness 
benefit or social assistance, while only three hundred thousand disabled received a 
benefit from the Industrial Injuries Scheme.
31
 It would be extremely costly to entitle all 
the additional one-and-a-half million disabled to a benefit like that enjoyed by the three 
hundred thousand Industrial Injuries Scheme claimants. This was the main reason that 
the TUC continued to defend industrial preference. It simply understood that the costs 
of extending the generous work-related disability benefit would not be met. 
Without an accompanying increase in contributions, equal treatment of all disabili-
ties would only result in a redistribution of income between non-work-related and work-
related disability claimants. Moreover, as the former far exceeded the latter in number, 
the outcome in terms of benefit levels would be much closer to the level of the sickness 
insurance than to that of the Industrial Injuries Scheme. This meant that matters would 
improve only slightly for victims of non-work-related accidents and sicknesses. Victims 
of work-related accidents and sicknesses would, on the other hand, experience a vast 
decline in income. The same TUC members who had previously admitted that industrial 
preference was now anachronistic realized this very well. They therefore advised 
against abolition of industrial preference, as “abandonment of the IIS would not 
increase the total resources available for compensating injury and disablement, and 
would mean a level down of existing benefits for workpeople injured at work.”
32
 
The important point here is that only a substantial increase in contributory efforts 
could bring about a significant improvement in the plight of victims of non-work-related 
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disabilities. Without such an increase, the abolition of the industrial preference would 
bring them little improvement. Yet such an increase was hard to achieve in the United 
Kingdom because of the resistance of unions representing privileged workers to any 
attempt to redistribute income among different categories of workers. Redistribution 
would be crucial to attain adequate insurance against the risk of non-work-related 
disability. After all, not all workers (or self-employed, since the sickness benefit was not 
limited to workers) had high enough income to afford the substantial increase in 
contributions that was necessary to grant those disabled who had incurred their 
disability outside of work an evenly generous benefit on evenly generous terms as 
currently enjoyed by those disabled who had incurred their disability at work. The next 
section of this chapter illustrates this.  
 
THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC PROTECTION FROM 
NON-WORK-RELATED DISABILITIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
A popular view among welfare state scholars is that Beveridge only attended to those 
disabled in war and work, not to others.
33
 Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that 
with the exception of war- and work-related disabilities, Beveridge paid more attention 
to the needs of the affluent than to those of the less affluent. It is important to point out 
here that the Industrial Injuries Scheme could be so generous because it was based on 
solidarity through risk redistribution. All workers and employers paid the same 
contributions even though they differed greatly in their exposure to the risk of work-
related disability. Manual workers were much more prone to incurring work-related 
disabilities than were white-collar workers, and manual workers operating in dangerous 
industries were much more likely to experience work-related disabilities than their 
counterparts who worked in less-dangerous industries. A similar distinction can of 
course be applied to employers operating in more- and less-dangerous industries.
34
  
In the light of the national importance of providing adequate protection from dis-
abilities incurred while working under orders or in dangerous industries, Beveridge 
apparently did not worry about the uneven distribution of risk through the Industrial 
Injuries Scheme.
35
 It was surely also important that work-related disabilities posed only 
a small risk. Throughout the period under investigation here, the Industrial Injuries 
Scheme accounted for at most three-and-a-half percent of the total cost of social 
security expenditure. The sickness scheme, by comparison, even though it was much 
less generous, generally accounted for some ten percent of the total social security cost 
during the same period.
36
 Of course, this percentage would increase sharply if the 
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sickness scheme were to hand out benefits equally generous and on equally generous 
terms as in the Industrial Injuries Scheme. More important, such a move would also 
sharply increase redistribution between different categories of workers.  
By now, it should come as no surprise that the inadequacy of state security against 
the risk of non-work-related disability mainly posed a problem for the less affluent. As 
had been the case with unemployment and old age, Beveridge’s solution of providing 
only a public minimum of protection against non-work-related disabilities, which could 
then be supplemented by more generous private provision, worked very well for the 
more affluent part of working Britain. The problem primarily lay with the more risk-
prone and lower paid workers – and those self-employed – who did not have the means 
to add private provision to the state sickness benefit. Some fifteen years after the 
creation of the 1946 National Insurance Act, this group still accounted for about half of 
all workers. The other half could count on occupational sick pay, although at quite 
various levels of generosity. Thus, the “two nations” that Titmuss spoke about in the 
mid-1950s, not only applied to income in old age, but in disability as well.
37
  
Just as the spread of occupational pensions and severance payments had complicated 
efforts to improve matters for those elderly and unemployed who relied solely on the 
national insurance benefit, the existence of occupational sick pay stood in the way of 
attempts to improve state provision against non-work-related disabilities. Workers with 
adequate occupational provision had little to gain from improved state provision and 
therefore refused to pay for it. As a result, the TUC could once more do nothing beyond 
call for an Exchequer-financed increase of the national insurance benefit. It could 
certainly not support Labour’s ideas for improving matters for the disabled who 
incurred their injuries outside of work and did not have the means to add private 
provision to the national insurance sickness benefit. Two of Labour’s ideas were 
mentioned in the previous chapter as being linked to improved state security for the 
financial consequences of unemployment. 
As mentioned several times before, since the mid-1950s Labour’s conviction that a 
contributory solution was the only acceptable way forward had generated several ideas 
that centered on earnings relation. In approaching the risk of non-work-related disability, 
Labour’s initial priority was to grant earnings-related benefits to short-term cases. The 
previous chapter examined extensively the TUC’s reaction to Labour’s plan, launched 
in the late 1950s, to impose a statutory obligation on employers to pay workers at least 
one-half of normal earnings during the first month of redundancy or sickness. It gave an 
even more extensive treatment of another initiative taken by Labour at roughly the same 
time, which was its plan to add earnings-related supplements to the flat rate unemploy-
ment and sickness benefits for a maximum of six months. The General Council of the 
TUC initially expressed its “strong objection” to both proposals.
38
 It is tempting to refer 
back to the reasons given for this. Yet, as this has already been done at length in the 
previous chapter, it is enough here to state that those unions which represented 
privileged workers opposed the redistributive consequences of exchanging voluntary 
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provision for statutory provision. The previous chapter also showed why the TUC 
eventually did support the introduction of the earnings-related principle into the 
sickness and unemployment schemes in the mid-1960s. Solidarity with less-privileged 
workers certainly had little to do with this. On the contrary, the absence of direct 
redistribution between higher and lower incomes and the inclusion of all earnings below 
nine pounds ensured that the earnings-related scheme was of little use to the poorer 
national insurance contributors.  
 Some three years after Labour introduced the earnings-related supplementary 
scheme, it came up with a much more complete plan to combat hardship in disability. In 
1969, it published a whitepaper in which it promised a “new deal” for the disabled.
39
 
The goal of this new deal was twofold. First, it aimed to further improve public 
protection for short-term cases of disability. Second, it aimed to improve matters for an 
up-to-then-forgotten group, the long-term disabled. To achieve these two different goals, 
the new deal consisted of two different proposals. The first entailed a statutory 
obligation on all employers to pay a minimum level of sick pay to their workers during 
the first four weeks of disability. The second proposal entailed the introduction of fully 
earnings-related benefits for the long-term disabled into Crossman’s pension scheme. 
This “invalidity pension” would be paid after six months, or twenty-six weeks, as was 
the case with the industrial disablement pension. The government was somewhat 
unclear about what would happen for recipients during the twenty-two weeks between 
employer-paid sick pay and the granting of the invalidity pension. Most likely, the 
outcome in terms of generosity would be more or less similar to the situation as it was 
then in the first six months of disability. Minor adjustments, however, were likely. Most 
important of these was that the existing flat rate sickness benefit and earnings-related 
supplement might be replaced by a single benefit, which could turn out to be somewhat 
more generous for the lower income brackets. 
As expected, the employer community, now represented mainly by the CBI, fiercely 
opposed Labour’s plans. The CBI especially disliked the proposed statutory obligation 
to pay workers a minimum level of sick pay during the first four weeks of disability. It 
deemed this to be costly and unfair to employers, and feared that it would increase 
absence rates – especially among lower paid workers.
40
 Moreover, as a matter of 
principle, the CBI condemned the proposal as a further departure from the concept of 
relating statutory provision to need, and a further move toward a completely earnings-
related scheme.
41
 Fortunately for the CBI, it did not stand alone in its criticism of 
Labour’s plans. As with many of Labour’s attempts to improve state provision for the 
risks of unemployment and old age dependency, the Labour government might have 
been able to implement its new deal for the disabled if the employer community had 
indeed stood alone in its criticism of it. Yet, this was once more not the case. Again, the 
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TUC also made known its own disapproval of Labour’s plans. Like the CBI, it was 
particularly unhappy with Labour’s statutory sick pay proposal. 
It is important to remember here that Labour had already approached the TUC once 
with a similar proposal in the late 1950s. At the time, the TUC had rejected Labour’s 
proposal for a statutory obligation on employers to pay their workers at least half of 
normal earnings during the first month of redundancy or disability. When Labour later 
refurbished that plan, several years of thinking had resulted in some minor alterations. 
First, the introduction of the 1965 Redundancy Payments Act obviously made it 
unnecessary to go beyond a statutory obligation to hand out sick pay. Second, the 
obligation was no longer to hand out half of normal earnings. Instead, employers would 
now have to pay a full hundred percent on earnings up to nine pounds and fifty percent 
on further earnings up to twenty-one pounds. Third, the employer-paid sick pay would 
no longer only replace the national insurance sickness benefit; it would also replace the 
industrial injury benefit. None of these alterations enticed the TUC to support the plan 
this time, however. In fact, the last alteration only increased the TUC’s opposition to the 
proposal.  
The main goal of Labour’s proposal was clearly to improve matters for workers who 
incurred injuries outside of work and did not have the means to add occupational 
provision to the sickness benefit. It did so mainly at the expense of workers who could 
claim occupational sick pay. This can be illustrated as follows. Table 2 compares the 
generosity of Labour’s sick pay scheme with that of the national insurance sickness 
scheme in terms of earnings replacement for workers who earned half of national 
average wages, two thirds of the national average, the national average wage, and one 
third more than the national average.  
 
Table 5.2: Benefit as percentage of previous earnings under Labour’s sick pay  
                  proposal and the existing National Insurance Scheme during the first 4  
                  weeks of sickness or disability 
Weekly 
earnings 
Labour 
Plan 
NI when  
single 
NI when 
married, 
no 
children 
NI when 
married, 
1 child 
NI when 
married, 
2 children 
NI when 
married, 
3 children 
11 91 47 72 85* 85* 85* 
15 80 43 62 72 76 80 
22 68 40 53 60 63 67 
30 50 37 45 49 52 54 
* Wage limit applied 
Sources: Calculated from DHSS, Explanatory Memorandum on the National Superannua-
tion and Social Insurance Bill 1969 (London: HMSO, 1969) 44-52; DHSS, Social 
Insurance Proposals for Earnings-related Short-term and Invalidity Benefits (London: 
HMSO, 1969) 15-23. 
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As we can see, the generosity of Labour’s sick pay scheme exceeded that of the 
combined flat rate sickness benefit and earnings-related supplement for nearly all 
income brackets. The improvement was greatest for the lowest-earning claimants – 
especially if they had few or no dependents. Only those workers who earned more than 
a third more than the national average and had two or more children would lose out – 
and then only slightly (instead of a fifty-two or fifty-four percent earnings replacement 
rate, they would receive a replacement rate of fifty percent).  
 Yet this did not mean that Labour’s statutory sick pay actually brought a net 
improvement to all workers. The reason for this is that the above table excludes a major 
source of security against loss of income due to disability, namely occupational sick pay. 
By the late 1960s, over half of all workers could claim at least some degree of 
occupational provision for sick pay. For many of them, the combination of the flat rate 
sickness benefit, the earnings-related supplement, and occupational provision resulted in 
a full one hundred percent earnings replacement.
42
 Those workers had great cause to 
oppose Labour’s sick pay proposal. Not only would Labour’s plan bring no improve-
ment for them; it would also make it far more difficult for them to achieve future wage 
increases or improvements in occupational provision. After all, and as explained at 
length in the previous chapter, the introduction of a statutory obligation for employers to 
provide sick pay to all their workers would result in a substantial increase in wage costs 
for employers. Faced with a substantial increase in total wage costs, employers would 
be more resistant to any further increases in total wage costs. The final result would be 
that even those workers who did not profit from Labour’s scheme would find it more 
difficult to achieve generous outcomes during wage negotiations.
43
 
To a large extent, the TUC’s opposition to Labour’s 1969 statutory sick pay pro-
posal can thus be explained in the same way as its rejection of Labour’s statutory sick 
and redundancy pay proposal in the late 1950s, and the TUC’s attempts to stop the 1965 
Redundancy Payments Act. All these initiatives ran contrary to the interests of unions 
representing privileged workers, since these could achieve better results through 
voluntary negotiation. These unions came out in strong opposition of Labour’s sick pay 
proposal.
44
 This in itself was probably enough of a reason for the TUC leadership to 
oppose Labour’s proposal. At the same time, the TUC also had its doubts about the 
effect of Labour’s sick pay proposal on another category of workers, namely those who 
had incurred their injury or sickness at work.  
Whereas unions representing privileged workers agitated against Labour’s statutory 
sick pay proposal mainly because of its effect on voluntary negotiation, others had 
difficulties with the outcome of the proposal for some of the workers who had incurred 
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their injuries at work.
45
 Labour wanted statutory sick pay to replace both the national 
insurance sickness benefit and the industrial injury benefit during the first four weeks of 
disability. Although this would result in an improvement for some workers with work-
related disabilities, many such workers with large families would lose out. Table 5.3 
compares the generosity of Labour’s sick pay benefit with that of the industrial injury 
benefit in terms of earnings replacement for several different income brackets. In the 
existing situation, an industrial injury actually resulted in a benefit that exceeded the 
previous wage for a low-paid worker with three or more children. This would end under 
Labour’s statutory sick pay scheme. Many workers with two or more children would 
receive a lower benefit under Labour’s scheme. As table 5.3 shows, this was the case 
both for workers with very low earnings and for those with relatively high earnings. 
 
Table 5.3:  Benefit as a percentage of previous earnings under Labour’s sick pay  
                   proposal and the industrial injury benefit during the first 4 weeks of  
                   sickness or disability 
Weekly 
earnings 
Labour 
Plan 
II when 
single or 
married 
II when 
2 children 
II when 3 
children 
II when 4 
children 
11 91 72 92 101 109 
15 80 62 77 83 87 
22 68 53 63 67 71 
30 50 48 55 58 61 
Sources: See table 5.2. 
 
The TUC feared that at least some of the workers with work-related disabilities 
would lose out under other parts of Labour’s new deal for the disabled as well. One 
such worry related to the consequences of the introduction of the invalidity benefit for 
the loss of faculty concept. In the existing situation, workers who incurred their injury at 
work received a disablement pension if their disability lasted longer than six months. 
They were able to combine this disablement pension with the flat rate sickness benefit. 
If this flat rate sickness benefit were replaced by a fully earnings-related invalidity 
benefit after six months, the TUC feared that the government might very well decide to 
make the disablement pension less generous.
46
 Government attempts to reassure the 
TUC General Council on matters like these were far from successful. When the 
government, was overly vague or made contradictory remarks, that even augmented 
TUC concerns. This was clearly the case with the question of what would happen in the 
twenty-two weeks between statutory sick pay and the granting of the invalidity benefits. 
The government was quite unclear on this. While emphasizing that “the exist-
ing…injury benefit preference over sickness benefit will be retained,” it at also noted 
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that “the effect will be to draw the two benefits more into line.”
47
 Needless to say, such 
contradictory remarks did not convince the skeptics within the TUC.  
Although worries about keeping the disablement pension high and the question of 
the twenty-two week gap continued to resurface in the TUC’s discussions with the 
government, it was quite clear that the TUC’s main gripe with the new deal for the 
disabled related to the statutory sick pay proposal.
48
 Thus, this proposal was the first to 
go. In July of 1969, the General Council informed its members that “the Government 
recognise that there are substantial objections to the statutory sick pay scheme…and 
have decided not to proceed with it.”
49
 By withdrawing the statutory sick pay proposal, 
Labour sacrificed most other parts of the new deal as well. Only the invalidity benefit 
eventually made it – although only circuitously, as part of SERPS. Perhaps this benefit 
came through because it represented the least ambitious part of the new deal. As in for 
example Germany and Austria, Labour’s earnings-related invalidity pension was part of 
the pension scheme. Yet, contrary to these countries, eligibility conditions were not 
eased in a major way. The full earnings-related addition given to the flat rate benefit by 
SERPS required a build-up period of twenty years.
50
 If a worker became disabled before 
then, SERPS would do little for him or her. This left many national insurance 
contributors out in the cold, as the risk of disability is such that it often occurs before the 
disabled has had time to build up adequate contributions.  
The demise of the new deal clearly illustrates the limits of what governments can do 
to improve public protection when both sides of industry oppose interference with 
voluntary bargaining. After 1969, large-scale attempts to tackle the problem of 
disability in a unified way were a thing of the past in the United Kingdom. Faced with 
the unwillingness of unions to accept its redistributive consequences, Labour no longer 
attempted reform of state disability insurance, whereas the Conservatives never had this 
ambition to begin with. In the 1970s, both parties turned instead to more modest 
improvements. In 1971, a Conservative government introduced a small attendance 
allowance for those long-term disabled whose disability required constant attendance. In 
the same year, it introduced a flat rate invalidity pension, which was to replace the 
sickness benefit after a disability of six months. The invalidity pension was somewhat 
more generous than the sickness benefit, especially for those with children and those 
whose disability occurred early in working life. At some thirty-five percent of average 
earnings, this benefit still hardly compared to what those disabled outside of work could 
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rely on in most continental European welfare states, however – let alone in the 
Netherlands. Moreover, the Conservative government did not ease eligibility conditions, 
which left many long-term disabled dependent on the means-tested supplementary 
benefit. When Labour returned to power in 1975, it introduced a non-contributory 
invalidity pension for this group. The only merit of this pension was that it ended the 
reliance of many long-term disabled on the means test. Because it was tax-financed, the 
benefit was exceedingly meager: it gave out only about twenty percent of average 
earnings.  
The introduction of SERPS, the contributory and non-contributory invalidity pen-
sions, and the attendance allowance in no way diminished public pressure for more 
generous provision for non-work-related disabilities. The Disablement Income Group, 
for example, kept arguing for a Dutch-style system in which the benefit level depended 
on neither cause of disability nor contribution record.
51
 Yet, organized industry’s stance 
on the issue made these calls quite unrealistic. Characteristic of the apathy of organized 
industry was the reaction of the CBI and TUC to the introduction of the non-
contributory invalidity pension. Whereas the CBI was content that it could play a dead 
bat on this issue, the TUC accompanied its welcome of this initiative with the warning 
that there should be improvements for the industrially-disabled as well.
52
 
 
TOWARD A SINGLE DISABILITY INSURANCE FOR 
ALL DISABLED IN THE NETHERLANDS 
It is not a coincidence that the Disablement Income Group always looked to the 
Netherlands among all possible countries with state pension schemes as the country that 
had got it right on the disability issue. At the time when Peter Townsend started his 
campaign for a comprehensive solution to the problem of poverty in disability, the 
Dutch had just enacted legislation that did exactly this. In 1965, the second chamber of 
the Dutch parliament unanimously passed a Sickness Act and Act on Disability 
Insurance that had several unique features. Most important among these was that 
entitlement to a benefit no longer depended on the cause of disability, its duration, or on 
the contributory record. From July 1, 1967 on, every sick and fully-disabled worker 
could count on a benefit of at least eighty percent of his or her previous wages for as 
long as the sickness or disability prevented him or her from working. If eighty percent 
of the previous wage turned out to be lower than the minimum wage, then the worker 
was entitled to a benefit at minimum wage level. The disability scheme offered a benefit 
to the partially disabled as well – even to those who were only fifteen percent disabled. 
Finally, if partial disability prevented a worker from finding a new job, then he or she 
was entitled to a higher – which often meant a full – benefit. For Townsend, the Dutch 
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example must have seemed like a true panacea, especially after the Dutch enhanced the 
disability scheme in 1976 with a flat rate insurance for the self-employed.  
Of course, this panacea came at a price. After all, the Dutch sickness and disability 
schemes could only provide such generous protection against all sorts of disabilities 
because they operated in a highly redistributive manner. This explains why the creation 
of a comprehensive solution to the problem of poverty in disability was possible in the 
Netherlands and not in the United Kingdom. Again, the main difference lay in the 
stance of the British and Dutch labor union movements on redistribution of income and 
risk among different categories of workers. Without the willingness and ability of the 
Dutch union federations to press for redistribution of income and risk between more- 
and less-privileged workers, the Dutch solution to providing for the disabled would not 
have been so successful. At the same time, it must be noted that the Dutch employer 
federations were remarkably cooperative towards the demands of the union federations 
for a more generous treatment of all types of disabilities. In the previous chapter, I 
showed that both British and Dutch employer interest groups were quite averse to the 
creation of a generous public unemployment insurance. Although both accepted the 
need for a basic level of public protection for the unemployed, they also agreed that this 
protection remain as minimal as possible. In contrast to their British counterparts, the 
Dutch employer federations were willing to accept a much more generous level of 
public protection for the disabled. The reasons for this willingness will be discussed 
below. For now, it is sufficient to say that the Dutch employer federations were already 
willing to do so in the immediate postwar period.  
Had Townsend embarked on his campaign in the immediate postwar period, some 
twenty years before he actually did so, then he would hardly have given the Netherlands 
a second glance. At that time, there was nothing particularly generous about the Dutch 
system of public insurance for disabilities. Moreover, it was even more fragmented than 
the one he was used to. Table 5.4 shows the extent of this fragmentation by comparing 
some important features of the three compulsory insurances that comprised this system 
in the early postwar period. As in the United Kingdom until 1946, all workers whose 
disability occurred on the job were entitled to a separate benefit until reaching 
retirement age. This benefit was provided through the industrial injuries insurance. The 
Dutch industrial injuries insurance offered a benefit that was even more generous than 
that of its British counterpart, equaling eighty percent of previous wages in the first six 
weeks of disability and seventy percent after this. As in the United Kingdom, 
entitlement to a work-related disability benefit did not depend on the contributory 
record. As in the United Kingdom until 1946, the benefit was completely financed by 
employer contributions.  
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Table 5.4: Disability insurance in the Netherlands in the early postwar period 
 Industrial Injuries Act 
(Ongevallenwet). 
Sickness Act 
(Ziektewet). 
Invalidity Act 
(Invaliditeitswet). 
Year 1901 1929 1919 
Purpose Insurance against 
work-related 
sicknesses and 
injuries. 
Insurance against 
non-work-related 
sicknesses. 
Insurance against 
non-work-related 
(and permanent) 
invalidity. 
Scope All workers. With 
separate Acts for the 
shipbuilding and 
agricultural sectors. 
Workers in 
“enterprises” (as 
defined by Act).  
All workers. 
Benefit 80 percent of the 
former wage for 6 
weeks; then 70 
percent. Partial 
benefits were 
possible. Duration 
indefinite.  
80 percent for a 
maximum period of 
6 months. 
3 percent of the 
previous wage for 
each of 50 weekly 
contributions. 
Duration indefinite. 
Entitlement No contributory 
requirements. 
No contributory 
requirements. 
When at least 150 
weekly contributions 
had been paid. 
Contributor Employer. Employer and 
worker.  
Employer and 
worker. 
Financing Funded. Pay-as-you-go. Funded. 
 
In contrast to in the United Kingdom, there were also separate policies for workers 
unable to work because of a non-work-related sickness and those unable to work 
because of a permanent non-work-related disability. This latter distinction made matters 
quite complex in the Netherlands. If a worker suffered from a non-work-related sickness, 
then he or she could claim a benefit under the Sickness Act. This Act was generous in 
the sense that it entitled sick workers to a benefit that equaled eighty percent of their 
previous wages – a level even higher than the industrial injuries benefit after six weeks 
– regardless of their contributory records. Yet the sickness benefit lasted for only six 
months, and large groups of disabled workers were not entitled to it. First, only those 
disabled who worked in an “enterprise” could claim a sickness benefit. This meant that 
housing staff and those who were employed in the so-called “free professions” could 
not. Second, and perhaps more importantly, only workers who suffered from a 
“sickness” were entitled to it. The Sickness Act did not define what a “sickness” was, 
and case law defined it merely as a development that was subject to change. This meant 
that a worker was not entitled to a sickness benefit when it immediately became clear 
that his or her disability would be permanent. Of course, this led to a lot of bickering 
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over the question of whether or not a disability could be regarded as permanent, and 
case law on this was quite inconsistent.
53
  
 If a worker was sick for longer than six months (after which the sickness was 
automatically regarded as permanent), was unable to work because of a permanent non-
work-related disability instead of a sickness, or was simply not covered by the sickness 
benefit, then he or she could only hope to receive a benefit under the Invalidity Act. In 
contrast to the other two insurances, entitlement to an invalidity benefit depended solely 
on the contributory record. Workers were only entitled to a benefit if they had 
contributed to it for at least three years, and the level of the benefit depended on the 
number of contributions paid. This meant that only those workers whose disability 
occurred when they were close to retirement age could count on an above-subsistence 
pension. Others either did not receive a benefit at all or received a benefit that was quite 
inadequate. Unlike the industrial injuries pension, the invalidity scheme did not hand 
out benefits to the partially-disabled. Like the sickness insurance, it was financed by 
employers and workers on a fifty-fifty basis. 
When the second Van Rhijn Committee, comprising representatives of the state, the 
labor union federations, and employer federations, re-examined this system in the 
immediate postwar period, they naturally confronted the question of whether it would 
not be preferable to replace it with a unified system that treated all disabilities in the 
same way.
54
 As had happened only a few years before in the United Kingdom, all 
involved parties quickly dismissed this idea at the time. The reasons given for this were 
quite similar to those seen in the United Kingdom. First, and most importantly, all 
parties agreed that such a system was unaffordable. Second, and following from this, 
they agreed that the risk of work-related disability deserved special, more generous 
treatment. On both points, the union federations were in full agreement with their 
employer counterparts. As late as 1954, the NVV’s Social Insurance Committee still 
spoke out against a single disability insurance that did not distinguish between different 
causes because, among other reasons, it deemed such a system to be too costly, and 
because it believed that the industrial preference was still very popular among its 
members.
55
 Why then did the NVV, together with its confessional counterparts and the 
main employer federations, eventually commit itself to the creation of exactly such a 
system? The reason for this lay in its commitment to improving matters for, in particular, 
those disabled who incurred disabilities outside of work. With these improvements 
underway, the division of work-related and non-work-related disabilities into different 
policies simply became unnecessary. 
The first of these improvements was made as early as 1947, when the government 
increased the maximum duration of the sickness benefit from six months to one year. 
One year later, the second Van Rhijn Committee recommended increasing the 
                                                
53
 J. van Bruggen and B.C. Slotemaker, Commentaar op de Ziektewet. Handboek voor de practijk 
(Deventer: Kluwer, 1935) 80-83. 
54
 See A. van Rhijn, Rapport inzake de herziening van de sociale verzekering (Den Haag: Staatsdrukkerij, 
1948) 18-19. 
55
 ARA, CSWV, 2.19.103.06, 145: Verslag Vergadering Kleine Technische Commissie Sociale 
Verzekering, 11 october 1954. 
  
148 
maximum duration of the sickness benefit by another year, to two years. It also 
recommended granting the sickness benefit to all disabled, regardless of cause. The 
main purpose of these two recommendations was to improve matters for those disabled 
who currently had to rely on the contributory invalidity pension. Under the Van Rhijn 
proposal, they would be able to count on near-to-complete earnings replacement under 
the non-contributory sickness benefit for the first two years. The recommendations also 
served to improve matters for those disabled who were entitled to an industrial injury 
benefit. They had previously received eighty percent of their previous wages during the 
first six weeks of disability and seventy percent after this. The proposal of the second 
Van Rhijn Committee effectively meant that this initial six-week period would increase 
to two years. 
The Committee also proposed increasing the generosity of the invalidity scheme, 
thus improving matters for long-term victims of non-work-related disabilities. It 
proposed doing so in three ways. First, it proposed allowing the invalidity insurance to 
continue when a worker received a sickness benefit. Since it also proposed increasing 
the maximum duration of the sickness benefit to two years, this would effectively 
reduce the qualifying period for entitlement to the invalidity benefit from three working 
years to one working year. Second, it proposed setting the level of the benefit at seventy, 
sixty, and fifty percent of the previous wage during, respectively, the first, second, and 
all ensuing years. This would particularly improve matters for those workers who 
incurred a permanent non-work-related disability at an early age. Under the existing 
scheme, the level of the benefit depended completely on the number of years a worker 
had contributed to the scheme, which disadvantaged younger workers. Finally, the 
committee proposed granting an invalidity benefit to the partially disabled as well.
56
 
It is important to remember how generous these proposals were. By proposing the 
extension of the maximum duration of the sickness benefit to two years while retaining 
its non-contributory nature and extending it to all disabled regardless of cause, the 
second Van Rhijn Committee offered the majority of disabled the prospect of near-to-
complete earnings replacement. Although its members were not yet willing to do the 
same for those disabled whose disability lasted for longer than two years, the 
Committee’s proposed improvements for this group also went quite far. This shows us 
that as early as 1948, the Dutch union and employer federations were already committed 
to a series of measures that was more far-reaching than those later rejected by their 
British counterparts in the 1960s.  
 Despite this early consensus on the need to make far-reaching improvements to 
public insurance for disabilities, serious discussions on disability insurance reform only 
got underway in the mid-1950s. Up to that time, all efforts simply focused on the more-
pressing matter of old age pension reform. If both issues were to be addressed at the 
same time, both union and employer federations feared, then the creation of a new old 
age insurance might be delayed, especially since the two issues were closely linked.
57
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Thus, only after the issue of the organization of the old age pension was solved, did the 
union and employer federations turn their attention to disability insurance reform. But 
when they finally did, they proceeded in a remarkably swift manner.  
 As the inadequacy of the invalidity insurance posed the most pressing problem, the 
union and employer federations first focused on reforming this insurance. In June of 
1952, the then-minister of Social Affairs Dolf Joekes formally asked the recently-
created Social-Economic Council for advice on the possibilities for reform of the 
invalidity insurance. This was followed by another request by Joekes’s successor, Ko 
Suurhoff, in December of 1955. The Social-Economic Council turned its attention to a 
reform of the invalidity insurance immediately after the February 1954 publication of its 
advice on the creation of the General Old Age Act. By then, the second Van Rhijn 
Committee’s recommendations for improving the benefit levels of the invalidity 
insurance were considered insufficient. Union representatives demanded, and employer 
representatives were willing to go along with, a permanent maximum benefit level of 
seventy percent of the previous wage. With its proposed creation of four disability 
classes with intervals of twenty-five percent, the Council presented quite a generous 
solution for the problem of partial disablement. Furthermore, the Council recommended 
making the invalidity benefit wage-proof, which entailed a conversion to pay-as-you-go 
financing. Finally, entitlement to the new invalidity scheme would not depend on a 
minimum contributory record. To avoid misuse, however, administrators were given the 
right to refuse benefits to a claimant if his or her disablement occurred within one year 
after beginning to work and could be traced back to his or her state of health before this 
period. The Council published its advice on January 11
th
, 1957.  
It is important to point out here that all members of the Council lent their full 
support to the above recommendations. From the side of the union federations, this is 
not so surprising. The previous two chapters showed the remarkable commitment of the 
Dutch labor union movement to improving matters for all old age pensioners and 
unemployed workers. It only makes sense that this commitment extended to improving 
matters for all disabled as well. The ease with which the employer federations were 
willing to go along with the demands of the labor union movement is more surprising, 
however. The previous two chapters showed how reluctant the Dutch employer 
federations were to accept generous outcomes and deviation from strict insurance 
principles in the areas of public old age and, particularly, unemployment insurance 
development. On the issue of public disability insurance reform, they were much more 
willing to accept this. How can we explain this? The reason may have been that an 
                                                                                                                                          
exception. A look at the Invalidity Act can illustrate this. The Dutch invalidity insurance was in every 
sense an insurance for old age and invalidity. Beyond the fact that it only provided sufficient benefits for 
those disabled who incurred their injuries quite late in their working lives, it also contained a separate old 
age insurance. The question of what to do with this old age insurance after the introduction of the General 
Old Age Act was indeed one of the most difficult issues faced by representatives of the labor unions, 
employer federations and the state in the early 1950s. On the origins of the Invalidity Act, see Marcel 
Hoogenboom, Standenstrijd en zekerheid. Een geschiedenis van oude orde en sociale zorg in Nederland 
(Amsterdam: Boom, 2004). On union and employer federations’ fears that the simultaneous handling of 
disability insurance and old age insurance reform might delay progress on the latter, see SER, Advies 
inzake de herziening van de invaliditeitsverzekering (Den Haag: SER, 1957) 1. 
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increase in the generosity of the public disability insurance was simply less threatening 
to them.  
First, unlike old age pension provision, insurance for disabilities did not generate 
large private savings. The opposition of the Dutch employer federations to attempts to 
improve the general old age pension after its creation mainly resulted from their 
realization that any such improvement would leave less room for the development of the 
lucrative private pension sector. The employer federations had no such reason to oppose 
an extension of the disability insurance system. This might explain why they so easily 
accepted the conversion from a funded system to a pay-as-you-go system for both the 
industrial injuries insurance and the invalidity insurance.
58
 Second, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the disabled – unlike the unemployed – did not struggle with the 
stigma of being unwilling to work. Disabled workers simply were not able to work. The 
employer federations’ opposition to a further extension of the public unemployment 
insurance in the 1950s was not only motivated by concerns over costs; they also feared 
its implications for the willingness of the unemployed to find a new job. Such fears 
were absent with regards to public insurance against disabilities. On the contrary, one of 
the reasons why the employer federations supported giving benefits to the partially-
disabled as well was that such a move might keep more people at work.
59
 
Internal discussions among employer representatives in the social insurance commit-
tees of the CSWV illustrate the difference in attitudes toward public insurance for 
unemployment and for disabilities. When one employer representative suggested 
lowering the level of the invalidity benefit when the disability persisted for a longer 
period – as the second Van Rhijn Committee had suggested in 1948 – several other 
employer representatives voiced their opposition to this. In particular, they refuted his 
argument that such a progressive lowering of the invalidity benefit made sense because 
the relationship of the disabled worker with his or her previous position grew steadily 
weaker over the years. The consensus was that such an alteration in benefit levels could 
only be defended if there were a change in the level of disablement. Of course, things 
were different regarding unemployment. With unemployment insurance, a progressive 
lowering of the benefit level was considered quite reasonable.
60
 
If the advice of the Social-Economic Council had led to an immediate follow-up, 
then a reformed invalidity insurance scheme could have been operating before the end 
of the decade. Yet, as with the proposals of the second Van Rhijn Committee almost a 
decade before, there was no such immediate action. This time, the reason for the delay 
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was that the generosity of the Social-Economic Council’s plan created doubts over the 
need to retain separate invalidity and industrial injuries schemes. If the invalidity 
scheme offered benefit levels equal to those of the industrial injuries scheme, an 
increasing group of employer, union and state representatives wondered, then why not 
merge them into a single disability insurance? 
 In preparing their advice, the members of the Social-Economic Council had already 
given serious thought to the option of merging the invalidity and industrial injuries 
schemes into a single disability insurance. They decided in the end that they, the 
Council, would offer no official opinion on such a merger. Two of the reasons for this 
have already been mentioned above. First, there was still some fear in both union and 
employer circles over the costs of such a merger. Second, and related to this, both sides 
of industry agreed that the creation of a single disability insurance for all long-term 
disabled conflicted with the still-very-popular notion of the industrial preference.
61
 Of 
course, the Social-Economic Council’s generous plan for the invalidity scheme was also 
expensive; moreover, it surely conflicted with the notion of the industrial preference. 
This makes it quite unlikely that these two considerations were decisive. Much more 
important was probably the desire to achieve rapid progress for existing invalidity 
insurance claimants. The union federations, in particular, emphasized that the 
introduction of a single insurance plan for all the long-term disabled raised many issues, 
and arranging it would therefore be a lengthy affair.
62
  
Not all union and employer representatives to the Council agreed with its decision to 
focus only on reform of the existing invalidity insurance scheme, disregarding the 
possibility of a merger between the industrial injuries and invalidity insurance plans. 
From the moment that the union and employer federations turned their attention to the 
issue of disability insurance reform in 1954, there were those who argued that the 
Council should advise merging the invalidity and industrial injuries schemes into a 
single disability insurance. Some of them stressed that such an outcome was desirable; 
others stressed that it simply made sense. A good example of the former was Jan Mulder, 
the secretary of the largest employer federation at the time, the CSWV. In a meeting of 
the CSWV’s social insurance committee in October 1954, Mulder said that he had 
“serious objections to […] combining an industrial injuries scheme with high benefits 
and an invalidity insurance with lower benefits.” When other members of the CSWV 
interpreted this as a plea for the creation of a single insurance for all disabled regardless 
of cause, he did not deny this.
63
 A good example of the view that a merger between the 
two schemes just made sense came three months later, when another member of the 
CSWV’s social insurance committee stated that he saw no reason to oppose a merger of 
the invalidity and industrial injuries schemes if they would eventually offer the same 
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benefit levels anyway.
64
 In subsequent months, other employer representatives 
repeatedly voiced their approval for a merger of the invalidity and industrial injuries 
schemes into a single disability insurance.
65
  
It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when the union and employer federations commit-
ted themselves to the creation of a single disability insurance for all the long-term 
disabled. The records of union and employer federations’ social insurance committees 
from both the run-up to and the aftermath of the Social-Economic Council’s statement 
give the impression that the employer federations displayed a willingness to do so 
somewhat before their union counterparts did. The reason for this may have been that 
union leaders were more fearful that the creation of a single disability insurance would 
be a complicated, and therefore lengthy, affair. Since the goal of rapid progress on 
existing invalidity insurance claims was less important to employers, this consideration 
simply did not receive much attention in employer circles. For employers, all that 
mattered was that the invalidity and industrial injuries schemes had come to resemble 
each other closely, which lent appeal to the administratively cheaper solution of 
merging both schemes into a single disability insurance.
66
  
 The latter argument of expediency eventually proved decisive for both the union and 
employer federations. In March of 1958, the Social Insurance Council (which dealt with 
technical issues regarding social security) released an advice in which it argued for a 
merger of the invalidity, industrial injuries and sickness insurances into a single 
disability insurance.
67
 Although the task of this Council had been to advise the Minister 
of Social Affairs on a technical issue related to the operation of the industrial injuries 
scheme, its union, employer and state members had felt that they could not abstain from 
tackling the more important issue of the future relationship between the industrial 
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injuries scheme and the invalidity and sickness schemes.
68
 In its advice, the Social 
Insurance Council acknowledged that some remaining differences between the future 
invalidity scheme and the industrial injuries scheme would complicate efforts to merge 
them, but it stressed that none of these differences was insurmountable.
69
 Two years 
later, the Social-Economic Council also voiced its support for the creation of a single 
disability insurance. The Social-Economic Council’s statement only differed from the 
earlier Social Insurance Council’s statement in that the former wanted the disability 
insurance to cater only for the long-term disabled. All short-term disabled would first 
receive a benefit from a separate (but greatly improved) sickness insurance.
70
  
To ensure that the introduction of a single disability insurance did not impede their 
goal of rapid progress on existing invalidity benefit claims, the union federations 
pressed for the introduction of a temporary supplement to the invalidity benefit. The 
Temporary Act for Invalidity Beneficiaries (Interimwet Invaliditeitsrentetrekkers) that 
granted this supplement came into operation in 1962 and operated for five years. Like 
the later Act on Disability Insurance, it created a benefit equal to eighty percent of the 
previous wage for a fully-disabled worker with an average wage, and an even higher 
level for fully-disabled workers in the lowest income brackets. In contrast to the Act on 
Disability Insurance, however, it only entitled a worker to benefits if he or she had 
contributed to the invalidity insurance for at least a year and the disability impaired at 
least two-thirds of the worker’s work capacity.
71
 
With their prediction that the merger of the invalidity and industrial injuries insur-
ances into a single disability insurance would be a lengthy affair, the union federations 
had been quite right. It would take until 1967 before the new disability insurance, 
accompanied by a reformed sickness insurance, came into operation. Hesitation over the 
creation of a single disability insurance as opposed to reforming existing schemes, 
outstanding differences between the invalidity and industrial injuries schemes, and other 
issues, including questions over the exact role of the future Common Medical Service 
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(Gemeenschappelijke Medische Dienst or GMD), together delayed decision-making for 
several years.
72
 This delay, however, did not work to the detriment of the future 
scheme’s generosity. While in 1957 the Social-Economic Council had thought seventy 
percent of the previous wage to suffice for the full benefit level, this was later raised to 
eighty percent. The coming years also saw the addition of a minimum benefit level for 
those fully disabled workers whose benefit was lower than the recently-introduced 
minimum wage. Furthermore, the new disability insurance was to have no wage limit 
(all existing insurance plans against disability did), as many as eight disability levels, 
and entitlement to a disability benefit was to commence with the beginning of 
employment. 
It is important to emphasize here that, as with the recommendations of the second 
Van Rhijn Committee and the Social-Economic Council’s advice of 1957, these 
generous features cannot be understood as the outcome of a victory of ‘labor’ over 
‘capital’. They rather testify that the Dutch employer federations were very willing to 
accept generous outcomes for public insurance for the financial consequences of 
disability. When the chairman of the CSWV’s social insurance committee asked for 
committee members’ opinions on the union demand to set the maximum benefit level at 
eighty percent of the previous wage, he found that they did not object to this. All 
members agreed that a benefit level of seventy percent of the previous wage was simply 
insufficient for a fully-disabled worker.
73
 The employer federations could also accept 
the abolition of entitlement conditions and the wage limit. In fact, they had already 
considered supporting the abolition of the wage limit in discussions over the 1957 
statement pushing reform of the invalidity insurance. The argument against the wage 
limit had then been that higher-paid workers also needed protection against non-work-
related disability, which made voluntary insurance insufficient for them.
74
  
The employer federations were a bit more hesitant to lend their support to the 
decision to create eight different disability levels. In previous discussions over reform of 
the invalidity insurance, they had already expressed concerns over a system with four 
disability levels. At the time, medical specialists had judged that a gradation into four 
disability levels was the maximal level of refinement that could be achieved for insuring 
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non-work-related disabilities.
75
 Now, the union federations wanted to expand four 
disability levels to eight. Despite their hesitation, however, the employer federations 
were eventually willing to consent to this. Of much importance in this was that the 
industrial injuries insurance scheme contained as many as twenty disability levels. 
Moreover, employers seem to have held a sincere (but as we will see in the next chapter, 
quite naïve) belief that further refinement of invalidity levels would help keep more 
disabled workers at work.
76
  
The employer federations were even more hesitant to accept the introduction of a 
minimum benefit level into the disability insurance. Not only did they dislike the 
redistributive consequences of this; they also regarded it as unnecessary and costly.
77
 
Because it only applied to persons who were expected to remain outside of employment 
for a long period, employers could eventually agree to the introduction of a minimum 
benefit level into the disability insurance.
78
 But the employer federations vehemently 
opposed its introduction into the sickness insurance. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
they managed to stall its introduction there for roughly five more years – also because 
the union federations were at least for the moment quite content with a clause in the 
1966 Sickness Act that entitled those unions and employer who were responsible for its 
operation to grant a supplement the state benefit. In practice, this meant that the sickness 
benefit level of eighty percent of the previous wage was only a minimum norm.  
The employer federations were most unwilling to give to union demands on one 
final issue. In the years leading up to the 1966 disability insurance reform, employer and 
union federations were completely at odds over the issue of whether or not contribution 
levels should differ among industries. This issue had already led to much discussion 
during the preparation of the Social-Economic Council’s 1957 advisory statement on 
the reform of the invalidity insurance. Whereas the employer federations had argued 
that the insurance character and industry-based implementation of the invalidity 
insurance demanded premium differentiation between industries, the union federations 
argued for solidarity among industries.
79
 At the time, the employer federations had been 
willing to yield because of the non-work-related character of the invalidity insurance; 
thus, the Social-Economic Council’s 1957 statement expressed unanimous support for 
uniform contribution levels across industries. The employer federations were much less 
willing to give in, however, on the new disability insurance. As the new disability 
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insurance was to cover work-related disabilities as well, they were far more adamant 
that contribution levels reflect actual business risks. Only when contribution levels were 
allowed to differ among them, the employer federations argued, would industries be 
motivated to keep contribution levels as low as possible.
80
 The union federations, on the 
other hand, supported uniform contribution levels because they felt that it would be 
unfair if a worker paid higher contribution levels only because he or she worked in a 
more dangerous industry.
81
  
The union and employer representatives to the Social-Economic Council eventually 
reached a compromise agreement, in which the costs of a disability benefit would be 
shared equally among industries only after the benefit had been handed out for at least 
two years. Both sides agreed that the contribution levels of the reformed sickness 
insurance differ among industries. As they also agreed to reduce the duration of the 
sickness benefit from one year to six months, the result was that industries would 
themselves be responsible for bearing the costs of the first two-and-a-half years of a 
worker’s disability, while the costs of longer-term disabilities would be shared among 
them.
 82
 The employer federations were quite content with this outcome, as this initial 
period covered “ninety-eight to ninety-nine percent” of all disability costs.
83
 Unfortu-
nately for them, Parliament, on the insistence of Minister of Social Affairs Gerard 
Veldkamp, did not adopt this compromise. The new disability insurance would have 
uniform contribution levels across industries from the start. To pacify employer 
federations, Parliament decided to set the duration of the sickness benefit at one year.  
Parliament did adopt all other recommendations of the Social-Economic Council. It 
had merely decided against the contributions compromise because it deemed it too 
administratively complex. Nevertheless, the employer federations were furious. In the 
years after the creation of the new disability insurance, their insistence on the 
introduction of premium differentiation into the plan only increased. As we will see in 
the next chapter, they had good reasons for this insistence.  
  
THE GENERAL DISABILITY ACT AND THE 
INCLUSION OF THE SELF-EMPLOYED 
With the introduction of the 1966 Sickness Act and Act on Disability Insurance, the 
problem of poverty in disability all but completely disappeared from the Netherlands. 
Those groups for whom state provision had previously been quite inadequate, including 
workers who incurred injuries off the job, the partially-disabled, and workers in lower 
income brackets, now all received more-than-adequate treatment. There was only one 
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group left for whom disability still posed the prospect of financial ruin: the self-
employed. However generous the 1966 Sickness Act and Act on Disability Insurance 
were in other respects, they only covered employed workers. It would take another full 
decade before a separate state disability insurance for the self-employed came into 
operation. Until then, the only benefit that the self-employed could fall back on if their 
disabilities resulted in loss of income was means-tested social assistance.  
Several factors accounted for the long delay in establishing disability insurance 
coverage for the self-employed. The first involved the classical argument that the 
element of force that accompanied a compulsory insurance would be felt more sharply 
by the self-employed than by other workers. This argument carried great weight in all 
social insurance arenas – after all, there had only been a consensus on inclusion of the 
self-employed in the public old age pension scheme because the problem of poverty in 
old age was so pressing for this group. Yet this argument against inclusion was deemed 
extra important concerning the risk of disability, because disability did not always result 
in a loss of income for the self-employed. An additional problem here was that the self-
employed formed a very diverse group, comprising agricultural laborers, entrepreneurs 
of small- and mid-scale businesses, and practitioners of the so-called free occupations. 
For agricultural laborers, disability nearly always resulted in a loss of income. For 
entrepreneurs and practitioners of the free occupations, however, this was not always 
the case. Thus, whereas the former were quite eager to see the introduction of 
compulsory insurance (and preferably one in which they could share their risk with 
employed workers or other self-employed categories less prone to the risk of disability), 
the latter two categories were not so eager to see its introduction. As late as 1963, 
official hearings with representatives of small- and middle scale businesses generated 
only haphazard support for the introduction of a disability insurance for this group. The 
representatives of the free occupations even stated their own complete disinterest in it.
84
  
 Another important reason for the delay was that the establishment of disability 
insurance for the self-employed raised many difficult questions about such a scheme’s 
financing, implementation, and relationship to the disability insurance for workers. The 
last issue, in particular, delayed progress for many years. After the Social-Economic 
Council turned its attention in the mid-1950s to disability insurance reform, several 
successive governments voiced preference for an insurance scheme that included both 
workers and the self-employed. The union and employer federations, as well as 
representatives of the self-employed, however, strongly opposed this. This was because 
workers and the self-employed had different disability insurance preferences. Whereas 
the former desired, for instance, earnings-related benefits, the latter preferred the less-
expensive alternative of flat rate benefits.
85
 Those self-employed who were eager to be 
covered by a state disability insurance, meanwhile, were forced to wait in the wings 
when the government (temporarily) shelved its plans for the creation of universal 
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insurance. For the government, the union federations and the employer federations, 
disability insurance for employed workers simply came first.  
 After the introduction of the 1966 Sickness Act and Act on Disability Insurance, it 
still took more than a full decade before the self-employed were also covered by a 
disability insurance. The complete indifference of the union and employer federations 
on extending coverage to the self-employed certainly contributed to this long delay. In 
the early 1970s, for example, the union federations proposed delaying the introduction 
of the General Disability Act, which had been scheduled for 1972, by several years 
because they considered other social security initiatives to be more important. Just 
before the Act’s eventual introduction, the employer federations thought about doing the 
same.
86
 It is quite likely that the latter did so at least partly from their dissatisfaction 
with one redistributive feature of the Act: like the General Old Age Act, the General 
Disability Act entitled the self-employed to a flat rate benefit in exchange for earnings-
related premiums that were bound to a certain maximum level. In the years leading up 
to the Act’s introduction, the employer federations had voiced strong disapproval of this 
feature.
87
 
The General Disability Act came into operation in 1976. The Act entitled the self-
employed to a flat rate benefit if the disability lasted for more than fifty-two weeks (the 
Act covered only long-term disability) and the disablement exceeded more than twenty-
five percent of his or her earnings capacity.
88
 The level of the benefit was set at the 
same level as the minimum benefit level of the disability insurance for workers. The 
introduction of the General Disability Act ended a long period of discussions over 
improving the state disability insurance system, and with that, the social security system 
as a whole. 
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6 
UNION SOLIDARITY AND THE USE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
FOR EARLY RETIREMENT PURPOSES IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
The previous three chapters of this work examined the development of state insurance 
for dependency stemming from old age, unemployment, and disability in roughly the 
first three decades of the postwar period. By the end of this period, as seen in the 
previous chapters, most ambitious reforms of the British and Dutch social security 
systems had been carried through, albeit with quite varying degrees of success. From 
the 1970s on, the focus of policy-makers in both countries slowly shifted from 
improving the social protection net to stabilizing its costs. Efforts to improve state 
protection from economic misfortune in the labor market now focused on one group in 
particular: elderly workers who had not yet reached the retirement age. With the return 
of mass unemployment in the 1970s and 1980s, elderly workers became a particularly 
vulnerable group, and both countries responded to this with measures that – either 
intentionally or unintentionally – encouraged the withdrawal of older workers from the 
labor market. They did so in quite different ways, and consequently to quite different 
degrees though. In the Netherlands, elderly workers withdrew from the labor market to 
such a great extent that by the mid-1990s, less than fifteen percent of men worked until 
the official retirement age of sixty-five years.
1
 In the United Kingdom, elderly workers 
left the labor market to a more limited degree. There, in the mid-1990s, about thirty 
percent of men were still at work by the age of sixty-four.
2
 
 The mass withdrawal of elderly workers from the labor market in the Netherlands 
was facilitated by three very generous institutional arrangements that are known in the 
literature as early exit pathways. These exit pathways both allowed workers to retire 
early on generous terms and made it easier for employers to release them. In this chapter, 
I look at the development of these three early exit pathways. In the fourth and final part 
of this chapter, I analyze the introduction of industry-wide early retirement schemes 
(called Vervroegde Uittreding, or VUT) in the early 1980s. In the second and third part 
of this chapter, I analyze how the state disability and unemployment insurances 
developed into mass early exit pathways in, respectively, the early and late 1970s. In the 
case of the disability insurance, this development was to a large extent an outcome of 
the decision to incorporate labor market considerations into the disability assessment. In 
the case of the unemployment insurance, it was to a large extent an outcome of the 
decision to release unemployed workers over a certain age from the obligation to look 
for work and the decision to extend the duration of the benefit for this group. 
These decisions, which transformed the disability and unemployment insurances 
into mass early exit pathways, are of extra importance to us here, because they had two 
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very different consequences. On the one hand, they increased the security of workers 
from the financial consequences of redundancy. On the other hand, they made it easier 
for employers to declare workers to be redundant. Over the years, this latter conse-
quence has received much attention from scholars, especially from those who have 
assigned employers a more proactive role in the development of welfare states. Some 
scholars have even gone so far as to suggest that this labor-shedding consequence was 
not just an unintended side effect of an expansion of social rights, but an actual goal of 
these measures.
3
 In this chapter, I argue strongly against this view. The employer 
practice of labor-shedding through the state disability and unemployment insurances 
was nothing more than an unintended side effect of measures aimed at improving the 
security of workers from the financial consequences of redundancy. While the Dutch 
union federations had demanded the introduction of these measures for social reasons, 
their employer counterparts had been quite hesitant to accept them, especially because 
they feared that firms would use these measures to restructure at the expense of other 
companies and of the society at large. Similarly, the introduction of the industry-wide 
early retirement schemes in the early 1980s was greeted with much enthusiasm by the 
labor union movement – and with great reluctance by the employer community.  
In the United Kingdom, lower benefit levels and stricter entitlement rules prevented 
social security schemes from developing into early exit schemes on a large scale. The 
United Kingdom also did not experience the introduction of state or industry-wide early 
retirement schemes that could have provided workers of all income ranges the ability to 
retire early in a voluntary manner. As a result, older British workers left the labor 
market to a much smaller extent than did their Dutch counterparts. In the following 
section, I describe how this fits into the arguments set forth in previous chapters.  
 
EXPLAINING THE EXTRAORDINARY EXIT OF ELDERLY 
WORKERS FROM THE DUTCH LABOR MARKET 
When the golden years of high economic growth and low unemployment ended in the 
1970s, all industrial economies experienced a sharp drop in the participation rate of the 
elderly in the labor market. In some economies, however, older workers withdrew from 
the labor market to a much greater extent than in others. Figure 6.1 shows the extent to 
which the labor force participation rate of men over fifty-five declined in four European 
countries and the United States between 1965 and 2000. The figure shows that the 
decline started in the late 1960s and accelerated rapidly from the mid-1970s on. More 
important to us here, the figure shows that the withdrawal of the elderly from the labor 
market was most pronounced in the Netherlands, while the United Kingdom experi-
enced a much more modest decline. The labor force participation rate of male older 
workers remained relatively high in the United Kingdom until the late 1970s, after 
which it dropped rapidly, to just under the level of the United States, but far above that 
of Germany and the Netherlands. 
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Sources: OECD, Labour Force Statistics (Paris: OECD, Various years). Calculations by author. 
 
The low labor market participation of older men in the Netherlands becomes even more 
pronounced when we note the high rate of part-time work for this group. Table 6.1 
breaks the labor force participation rates of men in the five countries down into the age 
groups of sixty to sixty-four and fifty-five to fifty-nine in a given year, and adds to this 
the part-time work rate for these groups. The figure shows that the Netherlands in 1989 
not only had the lowest participation rate for both age ranges, but also one of the highest 
part-time work rates. Of the roughly twenty-five percent of men who were still in the 
workforce between the ages of sixty and sixty-four, a further twenty-six percent only 
worked part-time. Of the roughly sixty-five percent of men who belonged to the 
workforce between the ages of fifty-five and fifty-nine, some fifteen percent worked 
part-time. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, part-time work remained a rare 
phenomenon among older male workers. There, only about eight percent of men who 
were still in the workforce between the ages of sixty and sixty-four worked part-time. 
Of those men who were still in the work force between the ages of fifty-five and fifty-
nine, only about three percent worked part-time. 
 
Figure 6.1: Labor force participation rate of men aged 55-64 
in various countries  (in %)
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Table 6.1: Composition of the labor force of older men in various countries, 1989 
 Age Labor force 
participation rate 
(%) 
Part-time work 
rate (%) 
Sweden  60-64 
55-59 
62.7 
87.1 
30.7 
6.5 
USA 60-64 
55-59 
54.2 
78.8 
18.8 
10.7 
UK 60-64 
55-59 
53.5 
77.4 
8.1 
2.9 
Germany 60-64 
55-59 
34.2 
78.6 
3.9 
1.4 
The Netherlands 60-64 
55-59 
24.5 
65.3 
25.9 
15.2 
Source: Klaus Jacobs and Martin Rein, “Early Retirement: Stability, Reversal, or 
Redefinition.” In Frieder Naschold and Bert de Vroom, Regulating Employment and 
Welfare. Company and National Policies of Labour Force Participation at the End of 
Worklife in Industrial Countries (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994) 29. 
 
To be sure, the high part-time work rate among older workers in Sweden partly 
accounts for the high employment rate of older workers there. More than in other 
countries, older workers in Sweden did not leave the workforce entirely, but continued 
to work part-time until they reached the official pension age. Whereas a Dutch or 
German worker, for example, often drew a five-year partial pension, under which he 
received five years of part-time pay but actually worked full-time during the first two-
and-a-half years, then retired completely from the company, Swedish workers continued 
to work throughout the entire five years. Another important reason for the exceptionally 
high labor force participation rate of older workers in Sweden lay in the presence of 
labor market reintegration programs, including sheltered jobs and subsidized employ-
ment, for this group.
4
 
Why did elderly male workers withdraw from the labor market to a vastly greater 
extent in the Netherlands than in other countries? Why did their counterparts in the 
United Kingdom do so to a much more modest degree? Apart from the near-
nonexistence of Swedish-style labor market reintegration programs in the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, these questions can be answered by looking at the degree 
to which social security and other arrangements in the countries facilitated the early exit 
of workers.
5
 To understand this, it is necessary to distinguish between “pull” factors, 
                                                
4
 See Gunnar Olofsson and Jan Petersson, “Sweden: Policy Dilemmas of the Changing Age Structure in a 
‘Work Society’.” In Frieder Naschold and Bert de Vroom, Regulating Employment and Welfare: 
Company and National Policies of Labour Force Participation at the End of Worklife in Industrial 
Countries (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994); Anne-Marie Guillemard and Martin Stein, “Comparative 
patterns of retirement: recent trends in developed societies,” Annual Review of Sociology 19 (1993) 481 
5  Up to the early 1980s, many older unemployed workers did benefit from specific re-employment 
measures realized in the 1970s. A good example of such a measure was the “30 percent wage subsidy 
regulation,” which subsidized the labor costs of those unemployed who had a poor employment outlook 
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which refer to the effects generous arrangements have on the ability and willingness of 
workers to withdraw from the labor market, and “push” factors, which refer to the effect 
generous arrangements have on employer practices regarding layoffs. Let us explore 
these factors.  
Imagine a situation in which an older male manual worker is about to lose his job 
due to redundancy in, say, the early 1980s. If this worker lived in the Netherlands, then 
he was entitled to an unemployment benefit of at least seventy-five percent of his 
previous wage for a period of at least two-and-a-half years. If he was older than fifty-
seven-and-a-half, legislation passed in 1976 allowed him to draw this benefit until he 
reached the official retirement age without having to look for a new job. If he was 
somewhat younger, but suffered from a minor disability, the incorporation of a labor 
market consideration article in the Act on Disability Insurance meant that he could draw 
a full disability benefit (which equaled at least eighty percent of the previous wage) 
until he reached the official retirement age. In other words, if our older worker became 
unemployed in the Netherlands, he stood a very good chance of being able to retire 
early on quite generous terms. Things were quite different, however, if he lived in the 
United Kingdom. There, our older worker could most likely look forward to a state 
unemployment benefit that equaled some thirty percent of the average wage, and to 
several weeks of severance pay. Together, these benefits were seldom enough to end his 
reliance on the labor market. And even if he were content with this combined income 
(which could be the case if he either had previously earned very low wages or was able 
to supplement the state benefit with generous private supplements) he still could not 
retire early on an unemployment benefit, since the duration of this benefit was much 
shorter than in the Netherlands and he did have the obligation to continue to look for a 
new job.  
Of course, there were some alternatives to drawing an unemployment benefit. If our 
worker belonged to a private occupational pension fund, then he could decide to draw 
his private pension early – especially if his employer were prepared to make him a good 
offer. Yet not many British manual workers had access to private pension savings, and 
even fewer could afford to draw these early. From 1977 on, it would also have been 
possible for our worker to receive a flat rate early retirement pension from the so-called 
“Job Release Scheme” if he were close to reaching the official retirement age, and 
provided his employer were willing to recruit a replacement from the employment 
register. However, even if his employer were willing to do so, the chances of our 
manual worker actually drawing such a benefit were slim: at between one-fourth and 
one-third of the previous wage, the level of the benefit was so low that it could replace 
earnings only for the lowest-income workers.
6
 Finally, our manual worker could also 
                                                                                                                                          
due to age. This subsidy was abolished in 1981. See Willem Trommel and Bert De Vroom, “The 
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end up on social assistance. Between 1981 and 1983, a Conservative government freed 
all income support recipients over the age of sixty from the obligation to register as 
unemployed, with the exception of those who received a partial income support benefit 
as a supplement to an unemployment benefit. It also granted them automatic access to 
the “long-term rate” of income support, which was twenty-five percent higher than the 
normal rate.
7
  
In sum, if our older male manual worker became redundant in the United Kingdom, 
then there was a large chance that he could simply not afford to retire early. In a poll 
taken in the late 1980s, Westergaard, Noble and Walker showed that among British 
male workers who became redundant over the age of sixty, almost forty percent were 
actively in search of work immediately after losing their job, while only about thirty-
five percent withdrew from the labor market completely. Among the rest, some twelve 
percent were unemployed and not actively seeking work, seven percent were on a 
sickness or injury benefit,
8
 and another six percent had found new part-time or full-time 
work.
9
 No such surveys were taken in the Netherlands, because all redundant workers of 
this age group could retire there on a benefit of at least seventy-five percent of their 
previous wages.  
There is little doubt that the more generous nature of social security arrangements in 
the Netherlands provided redundant older workers there with a more comfortable level 
of protection from the financial consequences of redundancy than their British 
counterparts could enjoy. At the same time, however, the generous nature of social 
security arrangements in the Netherlands also increased the number of redundancies 
there. The reason for this is that the very existence of generous social security 
arrangements made employers less reluctant to declare workers redundant. After all, 
when generous benefits can buy labor union consent for downsizing, and collective 
funding makes it possible to redistribute the costs of these benefits onto competitors or 
to society at large, it becomes much easier for employers to release less-productive 
workers. There is clear evidence that in both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 
social security arrangements have had an impact on employment practices.
10
 But as 
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result of the more generous nature of the Dutch social security system, this impact was 
much greater there. I will return to this issue at length in the next two sections of this 
chapter.  
As a result of the combination of these “pull” and “push” factors (which, as we have 
seen above, can often not be distinguished from one another), the number of social 
security recipients in the Netherlands soared all the way from the 1970s up to the first 
half of the 1990s. The number of social security recipients was highest during the 1980s. 
Throughout this decade, more than 40 percent of all Dutch male workers aged fifty-five 
to sixty-four received a disability, sickness or unemployment benefit. In 1985, at its 
peak, the number exceeded fifty percent.
11
 In comparison, the percentage of British 
workers aged fifty-five to sixty-four who received social security benefits throughout 
the 1980s never exceeded nineteen percent. 
One pathway that provided an important “pull” factor (as well as a minor “push” 
factor, as we will see in the fourth section of this chapter) in the Netherlands has not yet 
been mentioned here: the early retirement route. Up to the mid-1980s, nearly all 
workers who retired early in the Netherlands did so through either the unemployment or 
disability/sickness route. After this period, two developments changed this. First, the 
number of older workers who received social security benefits first stabilized during the 
mid-1980s, and then dropped sharply from the early 1990s on. This was the result of a 
series of social security reforms aimed at reducing the inflow into the disability 
insurance, in particular. Second, an ever-larger group of workers came to retire early 
through one of the industry-wide early retirement schemes that were the result of 
collective bargaining. This latter development is of much interest to us here, because it 
meant that more and more workers came to retire early not necessarily because their 
employer deemed them redundant, but because they themselves wanted to do so. Table 
6.2 illustrates the growing importance of this private exit pathway. By 1992, more male 
workers aged sixty to sixty-four left the labor market through one of the industrial early 
retirement schemes than through the disability route.
12
 In that year, over forty percent of 
all male workers aged sixty to sixty-four received an industrial early retirement pension. 
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Table 6.2: The use of different early retirement pathways among male workers in 
the Netherlands, 1980-1992, by number of participants as a percentage of the age 
groups 55-59 and 60-64 
Year Age Disability Unemployment Bargaining 
for early 
exit 
Total 
 55-59     
1980  30.0 0.8  30.8 
1984  31.9 7.0  38.9 
1988  32.8 5.7  38.5 
 60-64     
1980  40.5 0.8  41.3 
1984  42.3 10.1 16.8 69.2 
1988  39.7 9.5 33.3 82.5 
1992  37.4 9.1 42.6 89.1 
Sources: Willem Trommel and Bert de Vroom, “The Netherlands: The Loreley-Effect of 
Early Exit.” In Naschold and De Vroom, Regulating Employment and Welfare, 58 for the 
period 1980-1988. The 1992 data for age group 60-64 were obtained through own 
calculations based on CBS, Sociaal-Economische Maandstatistiek (1993, various months); 
OECD, Labor Force Statistics (Paris: OECD, 1993); and Hendrika Lautenbach and Marc 
Cuijpers, “Meer ouderen aan het werk,” Sociaal-Economische Trends (2
nd
 quarter 2005) 13. 
 
Again, in the United Kingdom far fewer workers had the opportunity of retiring 
early voluntarily. In contrast with the Netherlands, the United Kingdom never saw the 
creation of collectively-funded early retirement schemes. As a result, only those 
workers with access to private pension provision could even consider retiring early – 
and this was about half the working population. There were, of course, some employers 
who offered early retirement pensions, but these were often only available to workers 
with access to private pension savings. This meant that in the United Kingdom, only the 
more fortunate workers had the option of retiring early by voluntary means.
13
 To 
compare: in 1979, it was estimated that some eighty percent of Dutch employees were 
covered by collective agreements making provision for some form or other of early 
retirement.
14
 
To summarize the above findings, British workers withdrew from the labor market 
to a much more moderate degree than did their Dutch counterparts, because of the 
absence of generous (semi-)public early exit pathways in the United Kingdom. But what 
then explains the absence of such pathways for British workers? To understand this, we 
need only to revisit the previous chapters of this book. In earlier chapters, I illustrated 
the continued inadequacy of state insurance for old age, disability and unemployment in 
the United Kingdom in the 1950s and 1960s. I also explained how this inadequacy 
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resulted from the unwillingness of large sectors of the labor union movement to accept 
redistribution of income and risk between different categories of workers. The return of 
high unemployment rates in the 1970s did not suddenly make these labor unions more 
willing to accept this. As a result, the only major policy response was the introduction 
of the Job Release Scheme in 1977, as described above. Social security benefits were 
not improved, there was to be no incorporation of labor market considerations into the 
invalidity benefit, and the state unemployment insurance did not adjust to grant special 
treatment to workers over a certain age. Considering the defeat of nearly every Labour 
initiative to improve public provision for old age, unemployment and disability in a 
redistributive contributory manner one decade earlier, it is hard to imagine how such 
measures could have been introduced in the United Kingdom. When Labour returned to 
power after a four-year absence in 1974, it needed all its powers of persuasion to get the 
TUC and employer interest groups to accept the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme 
– Labour’s final, watered-down version of superannuation. 
In the Netherlands, the situation was dramatically different. There, three decades of 
successful labor union pressure for solidarity between higher and lower income levels 
had resulted in a very generous welfare state by the time unemployment again became a 
major policy concern. When the Dutch labor union movement was faced with the 
economic woes of the 1970s and 1980s, it reacted by demanding more public protection 
from the financial consequences of unemployment. As a result, three major early exit 
pathways emerged in the Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s. The following three 
sections of this chapter analyze the emergence of these pathways. The first section deals 
with the pathway that has received most attention from scholars: the disability insurance 
route.  
 
THE DUTCH DISABILITY INSURANCE AND 
EXIT FROM THE LABOR MARKET 
When then-Minister of Social Affairs Gerard Veldkamp presented “his” Act on 
Disability Insurance to Parliament in April of 1963, he voiced the expectation that the 
number of sickness and disability benefit recipients would eventually stabilize at 
150,000 to 200,000.
15
 In reality, this number was surpassed within three years after the 
Act came into operation. At its peak, in the early 1990s, the number of disability benefit 
recipients in the Netherlands reached almost one million – which equated one in ten 
Dutchmen of working age.
16
 Figure 6.2 shows how exceptionally large the number of 
disability benefit recipients was in the Netherlands by 1990. While the number of 
disability benefit recipients was exceptionally large in the Netherlands across all age 
groups, it was staggeringly high among older workers. For every active labor market 
participant aged sixty to sixty-four, there were two disability benefit recipients in the 
same age group. In the United Kingdom, the opposite was the case: active labor market 
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 See Willem Velema, “De kroongetuige. Hoe het WAO-drama voorkomen had kunnen worden.” In J.G. 
Hibbeln and Willem Velema, Het WAO-debacle. De fatale missers van wettenmakers en uitvoerders 
(Amsterdam: Van Arkel, 1993) 15. 
16
 See Leo Aarts, Richard Burkhauser and Philip de Jong, Curing the Dutch Disease: an International 
Perspective on Disability Policy Reform (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996) 1. 
  
168 
participants outnumbered disability benefit recipients there by two to one. In the United 
States and Sweden, the ratio of active labor market participants to disability benefit 
recipients for the age group of sixty to sixty-four lay much closer to the British than to 
the Dutch pattern. In Germany, the ratio fell almost exactly in between that of the UK 
and that of the Netherlands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This huge increase in the number of Dutch disability benefit recipients after the 
introduction of the Act on Disability Insurance cannot be understood without 
accounting for the prevalent use of this Act to shed redundant workers – a development 
that was not foreseen by Veldkamp. It has been estimated that up to 1987 (when the 
insurance underwent its first major reform), some fifty percent of all disability insurance 
enrollment was related to worker redundancy.
17
 Judging from the above graph, this 
percentage may even be on the conservative side. It is now a well-known fact that 
almost immediately after its introduction, employers started to make use of the state 
disability insurance as an alternative to the costly dismissal route.
18
 Labor unions agreed 
to this because the outcome was so generous for workers (the unemployment benefits 
lasted only for two-and-a-half years and were granted on the condition that a worker 
looked for new work; a disability benefit could be granted indefinitely and did not 
involve the need to look for work). As mass dismissals became more common during 
the 1970s, the use of the state disability insurance as an alternative to dismissals also 
became more common. Since most redundant workers who ended up on disability 
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benefits belonged to an older age group, this in practice transformed this insurance into 
an early retirement pathway.  
But what then explains the prevalent use of the public disability insurance to shed 
workers in the Netherlands? Why did the same not occur in other countries? Part of the 
answer to these questions lies in the generosity of the 1966 Act on Disability Insurance, 
described at length in the previous chapter. This Act’s generosity made its use as an 
alternative to dismissals quite attractive – to workers because of its high benefit levels, 
and to employers because contributions were uniform among industries. In the United 
Kingdom and the United States, for example, lower disability benefits meant that a 
smaller range of workers could retire on them comfortably. Moreover, as contribution 
levels differed across industries in those two countries, it would have been less 
attractive for British and American employers to shed redundant workers through the 
disability insurance route. Yet, in Germany and Sweden, disability benefits were also 
high and contributions levels were also uniform among industries. Nevertheless, the use 
of the public disability insurance for redundancy purposes remained far more limited 
there than in the Netherlands. To understand this, we have to realize that it was not just 
quite attractive to use the public disability insurance as an alternative to dismissals in 
the Netherlands. It was also quite easy to do so. 
The ease with which the public disability insurance could be used as an alternative 
to dismissals stemmed from two more or less uniquely-Dutch features. First, in the 
Netherlands the responsibility for running the disability insurance lay almost completely 
with organized industry – not with the state. The decision on whether or not to award a 
social security benefit to a claimant was made by industrial insurance boards 
(bedrijfsverenigingen), which comprised representatives of labor unions and employers 
in a particular industry. Government supervision of these boards was quite weak due to 
a number of factors, all rooted in the confessional desire to limit government involve-
ment in the administration of social security as much as possible.
19
 Second, the Act on 
Disability Insurance contained a so-called labor market consideration clause (verdis-
conteringartikel), which allowed partially-disabled workers to receive a full benefit if 
their partial disability stood in the way of finding new work.
20
 This clause lent itself 
particularly well to the aim of shedding older workers. As workers of this age group 
were rarely able to find new work after losing their jobs, the ensuing administrative 
practice was that that they needed to be only marginally-handicapped in order to receive 
a full benefit. This made it quite easy for employers to release older workers through the 
disability insurance, simply because minor handicaps were quite common in this age 
group. As early as 1971, the chairman of the VNO Social Security Committee already 
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noted that larger companies, in particular, made full use of this opportunity. When the 
need for dismissals arose, the personnel and medical departments often decided together 
which employees could be released through the disability insurance.
21
 
According to the conventional literature on Dutch welfare state development, 
employers could only misuse the labor market consideration clause for labor shedding 
purposes because industrial insurance boards employed this clause in a way that 
diverged from its original meaning.
22
 At center stage in this accusation stands the 
statement, made by the Federation of Industrial Insurance Boards (Federatie van 
Bedrijfsverenigingen, the umbrella organization of industrial insurance boards) in 1973, 
that from then on, industrial insurance boards would assume that poor employment 
opportunities of partially-disabled workers were the result of discrimination unless the 
opposite could be proven. The conventional literature has described this decision as 
either a “very broad interpretation” or as a “fundamental alteration” of the original 
meaning of the labor market consideration clause.
23
 In the more popular discourse, this 
decision has come to be known as the outcome of a “mammoth alliance” (“monsterver-
bond”) between labor unions and employer interest groups.
24
  
As recent writings on the role of employer interest groups in welfare state develop-
ment have paid much attention to the role of so-called “cross-class alliances” between 
labor unions and employer interest groups in favor of welfare state development, it is 
worth taking a look at this accusation.
25
 After all, if labor unions and employer interest 
groups had indeed broadened the labor market consideration clause beyond its original 
meaning, then it becomes quite tempting to believe that they did so at least partly with 
the purpose of shedding redundant workers. The description of the 1973 statement of 
the Federation of Industrial Insurance Boards as the outcome of an “alliance” between 
labor unions and employer interest groups certainly adds substance to this notion.  
Yet a close examination of the events leading up to 1973 does not bolster the idea 
that the Federation’s statement was in any way the outcome of an alliance between labor 
unions and employer interest groups – let alone with the purpose of shedding redundant 
workers in mind. Moreover, the Federation’s statement did not constitute a “fundamen-
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tal alteration” of the labor market consideration clause. It is even doubtful whether it 
constituted a “very broad interpretation” of the clause. Instead, it can be explained 
entirely as evolving directly from the central purpose of the labor market consideration 
clause, which was to make sure that partially-disabled workers did not have to apply for 
an unemployment benefit – or even worse, social assistance – when they were not able 
to find a suitable job after becoming partially-handicapped. It is for exactly this reason 
that the Federation’s statement received full political support in 1973. The only parties 
who had doubts about it at the time were the employer federations. 
To understand the issue at hand here, it is first necessary to briefly sketch the 
background of the labor market consideration clause – which was not outlined in the 
previous chapter. The labor market consideration clause entered the Act on Disability 
Insurance because it had been part of the industrial injuries scheme. Like most of its 
foreign equivalents, the Dutch industrial injuries scheme contained a clause that gave 
medical officers some leeway in determining the level of disability, to deal with 
situations in which a strict medical assessment would result in an unjust outcome. The 
previous chapter showed that this was also the case in the United Kingdom, where the 
clause was used quite often.
26
 When the decision was made to merge the Dutch 
invalidity and industrial injuries schemes into a single disability insurance, there was a 
strong consensus that the labor market consideration clause of the industrial injuries 
schemes should be incorporated into the new insurance. Although the employer 
federations did express the fear that the incorporation of this clause in an Act that also 
applied to non-work-related disabilities might lead to very high numbers of disability 
benefit recipients, they supported its inclusion in the Act on Disability Insurance.
27
 In 
fact, as early as 1955, the employer federations had already voiced their opinion that 
beyond the purely medical assessment, age and ‘labor market invalidity’ would have to 
factor into determining the level of disability if there were to be a single disability 
insurance for all disabled.
28
 Thus came about section 21, paragraph 2, subsection a of 
the Act on Disability Insurance, which stated that: “In determining the level of disability, 
one ought to pay as much attention as practicable to the decreased ability to find work 
that is caused by the disability.”
29
  
The speed with which the employer federations agreed to transfer the industrial 
injuries’ labor market consideration clause to the new disability insurance can be at least 
partly explained by the rosy labor market situation at the time. When the Act on 
Disability Insurance passed Parliament in February of 1966, contemporaries could look 
back on nearly two decades of uninterrupted growth and low unemployment. They had 
good reason to believe that this situation would continue indefinitely. At the same time, 
however, economic difficulties in certain sectors of the economy, like textiles and 
shipbuilding, already provided a preview of what lay ahead. In these sectors, the need 
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for redundancy was slowly increasing, and with that, increased the use of the disability 
insurance as an alternative to dismissals. As a result, the labor market consideration 
clause was a source of concern almost immediately after the Act on Disability Insurance 
came into operation.  
Initially, it seems that the Common Medical Service, which advised the industrial 
insurance boards on determination of a claimant’s disability level, employed the labor 
market consideration clause in more or less the same way as formally endorsed by the 
Federation of Industrial Insurance Boards in 1973.
30
 Concerns over the staggering 
increase in the number of full disability benefit recipients soon led it to alter its stance, 
however. On November 12
th
,1970, a study group of the Common Medical Service 
judged that the labor market consideration clause was being used too frequently, since 
the inability of partially-disabled workers to find new work often could not proven to be 
related to their handicap. From then on, the study group decreed, medical officers were 
to advise a higher disability level only if a partially-disabled worker could prove that his 
or her inability to find new work was the direct result of his or her handicap. This 
severely limited the use of the labor market consideration clause, as this was often very 
difficult to prove. As a result, many more workers were declared fifty to sixty percent 
disabled, and these were then rarely ever able to find new work.
31
  
The new line of conduct of the Common Medical Service soon resulted in parlia-
mentary questions to then-Minister of Social Affairs Bauke Roolvink, whose answer 
was: “In certain cases, the determination of a less-than-full disability percentage occurs 
too swiftly…. In my opinion, an employee who loses his position through a disease or 
disability should receive a full disability benefit until the moment in which he finds new 
employment and it has been shown that he can perform the new labor permanently.”
32
 
The Minister also requested that the Social Insurance Council provide him with 
information on the matter. The Social Insurance Council then turned to the Federation 
of Industrial Insurance Boards for advice.  
In the meantime, a study group of the Federation of Industrial Insurance Boards had 
already launched an investigation into the new line of conduct of the Common Medical 
Service. Its conclusion was that neither the Act itself nor case law justified the Service’s 
strict interpretation.
33
 During the course of 1971, another study group tested the view of 
the Common Medical Service by examining the use of the labor market consideration 
clause in the industrial injuries scheme. As it turned out, there, medical officers always 
employed the labor market consideration clause unless intermediation by an officer 
resulted in the actual redeployment of a partially-handicapped worker. This study group 
                                                
30
 A good sign of this is that the proportion of full beneficiaries was already as high as 90 percent in 1970. 
See Leo Aarts and Philip de Jong, “The Dutch Disability Program and How it Grew.” In Aart, Burkhauser 
and De Jong, Curing the Dutch Disease, 39. 
31
 UWV, Archief GMD: Verslag bespreking delegaties Federatie van Bedrijfsverenigingen en de 
Gemeenschappelijke Medische Dienst over de toepassing van artikel 21, lid 2, sub a van de wao, 30 maart 
1973. 
32
 Philip de Jong and Pieter Vos, Het wao-debat: de centrale regelingen en de praktijk bij bedrijven 
(Amsterdam: Welboom Bladen, 1994) 22. 
33
 UVW, Archief FvB, doos 78: Notulen vergadering bestuur Federatie van Bedrijfsverenigingen, 14 april 
1971. 
  
173 
therefore concluded that the Common Medical Service was following the disability 
criteria of the invalidity scheme (which had not contained a labor market consideration 
clause) more closely than the criteria of the industrial injuries scheme. The correct 
interpretation of the labor market consideration clause was, this study group argued, that 
a partially-disabled worker should receive a full benefit when employers did not offer 
him or her work, regardless of the reason for this. Only when a worker refused a 
suitable job was it reasonable to refrain from applying the labor market consideration 
clause.
34
  
During 1971 and 1972, representatives from the Social Insurance Council, the 
Common Medical Service, and the Federation of Industrial Insurance Boards together 
discussed a new code of conduct. This eventually resulted in a circular issued by the 
Federation of Industrial Insurance Boards on May 25
th
, 1973, which stated that from 
then on, industrial insurance boards must assume that poor employment outlooks for 
partially-disabled workers resulted from discrimination unless the opposite could be 
proven. Thus, medical officers employed the labor market consideration clause in this 
way until its abolition in 1987.  
In reading the course of events described above, it becomes quite difficult to escape 
the conclusion that the Federation’s broad interpretation of the labor market considera-
tion clause was correct. The Federation’s interpretation of the labor market considera-
tion clause did not differ from the one employed by medical officers under the industrial 
injuries clause and, more important to the Federation, was in line with the parliamentary 
comments of then-Minister of Social Affairs, Roolvink.
35
 Moreover, the Federation’s 
interpretation also seemed to have accorded with jurisprudence of the Central Court of 
Appeal (Centrale Raad van Beroep), which had issued the verdict on July 7
th
 of 1972 
that if a partially-handicapped worker could only be reemployed with intensive 
counseling, he should be considered fully-disabled.
36
 
This does not, of course, mean that all involved parties were content with the 
Federation’s circular. Employer representatives to the Federation and Social Insurance 
Council certainly were not.
37
 Yet, in the words of the chairman of the combined Social 
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Insurance Committee of employer federations, these representatives grudgingly 
admitted that “on reading the relevant documents, the Act itself and that which has been 
written regarding its introduction, one has to conclude that the receipt of an unemploy-
ment and disability benefit should only rarely be combined. The reason for this is that 
during the granting of a disability benefit, account should be made for labor market 
considerations.”
38
 In private, the members of the combined Social Insurance Committee 
of employer federations also admitted that although frequent use of the labor market 
consideration article was undesirable, it did seem inevitable: in practice, employers did 
not hire partially-disabled workers.
 39
 Finally, employer representatives were also aware 
that part of the problem lay with employers themselves, as they had used the Act to 
downsize their workforces.
40
 Based on these considerations, employer representatives to 
the Federation and Social Insurance Council lent their blessing to the Federation’s 
circular. Yet, they did so only on the condition that the scope of medical officer 
mediation between employers and partially-disabled unemployed workers would be 
increased.
41
 
In their emphasis on the need to improve medical officers’ ability to mediate be-
tween employers and partially-disabled unemployed workers, the employer federations 
received full support from their union counterparts – although these certainly did not 
believe that the new code of conduct on the labor market consideration clause must 
depend on this expanded meditation. Such an expansion soon proved unfeasible, 
however, because of two factors. First, there seems to have been a clash of competen-
cies between the Common Medical Service and employment exchange centers. At the 
time, medical officers did sometimes mediate between partially-handicapped 
unemployed workers and employers, but what employer and union federations wanted 
was to set up a separate mediation apparatus for the Common Medical Service. The new 
Minister of Social Affairs, Jacob de Boer, apparently saw no need for this, though, 
because employment exchange centers could, in his opinion, fulfill this role.
42
 Second, 
and far more importantly, the inflow of partially-handicapped workers into the disability 
insurance increased so rapidly that the Common Medical Service simply did not have 
the capacity to guide all partially-handicapped workers to new work. As early as 1971, 
officers of the Common Medical Service had admitted that those over forty-five years 
of age received little to no career re-entry guidance.
43
 When the number of unemployed 
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increased further after the outbreak of the first oil crisis in 1973, and with that the use of 
the disability insurance for redundancy purposes increased, the Common Medical 
Service became even more overwhelmed. 
 If the outbreak of the first oil crisis gave employer federations good reason to 
withdraw their support for the use of the labor market consideration article, the 
Minister’s refusal to set up a separate mediation apparatus for the Common Medical 
Service finally gave them a good excuse to do so. In a report presented to the Minister 
of Social Affairs in late 1974, the employer representatives to the Social Insurance 
Council stated their objection to the current use of the labor market consideration article. 
As they had themselves agreed that the broad interpretation of the labor market 
consideration article was correct one year earlier, they realized that it would be futile to 
attempt to challenge this.
44
 As a result, they called for a statutory change of the clause.  
On examining the trajectory of the costs of the public disability insurance, it is not 
difficult to see why the employer federations did so. At the time of the introduction of 
the Act on Disability Insurance, contributions were set at a little over four percent of a 
worker’s wage. Within several years, this percentage had risen to over nine percent, and 
the employer federations feared that the number could double in years to come, also 
because the state disability insurance would be accompanied by a flat rate insurance for 
the self-employed in the near future.
45
 Yet there evidently was another side to this story 
as well. All involved parties were well aware that under the current circumstances, a 
partially-disabled and unemployed worker with a remaining work capacity of less then 
fifty percent had zero chances of finding new work even if he or she were still young.
46
 
Under such circumstances, the union federations argued, the financial consequences of 
the use of the labor market consideration clause simply had to be accepted.
47
  
Judging from the lack of governmental response to the employer federation’s plea 
for a statutory change of the labor market consideration clause, the government sided 
with the union federations on this. During the parliamentary treatment of the General 
Disability Act that was to create a flat rate insurance for the self-employed, the 
government merely admitted to having its doubts about “the practice that had grown by 
now,” to which it did not add whether it referred to the broad interpretation of the labor 
market consideration clause or to the massive inflow into the disability insurance in 
general. Significantly, though, the government did add that it could see no immediate 
cause for legislative changes.
48
 The employer federations also failed to convince the 
government, let alone their union counterparts, to go along with two other proposed 
measures to stem the increase in the number of disability benefit recipients. First, while 
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they argued for limiting the use of the labor market consideration clause for partially-
disabled workers, they argued against the inclusion of the labor market consideration 
clause in the flat rate disability insurance for the self-employed altogether.
49
 Second, 
they continued to argue for the introduction of premium differentiation across industries 
into the Act on Disability Insurance – as they had also done in the run-up to the creation 
of the Act.
50
  
The latter proposal shows that the employer federations were quite concerned about 
the redistributive effects of companies’ use of the disability insurance to shed redundant 
workers. In the previous chapter, I showed that in the run-up to the creation of the Act 
the employer federations had insisted on premium differentiation to prevent exactly 
this.
51
 Another sign of employer federations’ concern about this instance of redistribu-
tion can be found in their fierce opposition to the practice of allowing firms to offer 
private supplements to the public disability benefit. To smooth the process of releasing 
redundant staff through the public disability insurance, firms often offered private 
supplements for a few years, so that workers could – at least initially – enjoy full 
earnings replacement. The employer federations fiercely opposed this practice because 
they felt that it contributed to the transfer of normal company risks from one firm to 
another.
52
 They failed completely to stop this practice, however. By the late 1970s, 
nearly all collective agreements covering more than five thousand workers included 
provisions for the granting of private supplements in case of sickness, disability, or 
unemployment.
53
 
It would take quite some time before the employer federations’ objections to estab-
lished industry practices were heard by the government. In 1981, the government added 
a third clause to the labor market consideration article, giving the industrial insurance 
boards the ability to limit the use of this article to a certain time period. Yet they could 
still only do so if they could show that the inability of a partially-disabled worker to find 
new work had nothing to do with his or her disability. As a result, the effect of the 
introduction of this third clause was quite limited. In 1987, the government finally 
abolished the labor market consideration article altogether. In the same year, it also 
lowered the level of the worker benefit to seventy percent of the previous wage. It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to examine these measures at length; they can be partly 
explained by the growing need to curb public expenditure and, in the case of the 
abolition of the labor market consideration article, by the rosier labor market situation at 
the time. While these measures certainly lessened the inflow into the disability 
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insurance recipient ranks, at least after some time,
54
 they did not raise the labor market 
participation rates of older workers. For older workers, two early exit pathways still 
remained: the unemployment insurance route and the industry-wide early retirement 
schemes. The latter early exit pathway grew ever more popular in the late 1980s. In the 
final section of this chapter, I will analyze the development of this ‘private’ pathway. In 
the following section, I analyze how the Dutch public unemployment insurance 
developed into a major early exit route.  
 
EARLY EXIT THROUGH THE DUTCH UNEMPLOYMENT SYSTEM 
Dutch employer federation concerns over the effect of generous social insurances on the 
labor-shedding behavior of individual firms may have become more pressing after the 
Act on Disability Insurance came into operation, but they were in no sense new. The 
argument that too generous a benefit might prompt firms to release their workers more 
easily had already surfaced during the preparation of the 1949 Unemployment Act.
55
 
And as soon as the Unemployment Act came into effect, employers from industries with 
lower levels of unemployment complained that construction companies, in particular, 
drew huge amounts of money from the general unemployment fund.
56
 By the mid-1960s, 
the CSWV was well aware of the complaint that firms in certain industries transferred 
normal company risks to the general unemployment fund.
57
 In many cases this 
constituted a clear misuse of the public unemployment insurance. In November of 1967, 
representatives of the employer federation FCWV noted that individual employers 
sometimes contacted regional employment offices with the request that older workers 
be released from the obligation to look for new jobs.
58
 At the time, all employer 
federations fiercely condemned this practice.
59
 
 Some ten years later, however, the employer federations supported the introduction 
of legislation that did exactly this. In 1976, Parliament passed the Act on Extension of 
the Unemployment Benefit Duration for the Elderly (Wet tot Uitbreiding Uitker-
ingsduur WWV voor Ouderen), which did two things. First, it extended the duration of 
the unemployment benefit by a maximum of five years for all workers whose 
entitlement to an unemployment benefit ended when they were sixty years or older. This 
meant that a male worker who became unemployed at the age of fifty-seven-and-a-half 
(the normal duration of the unemployment benefit was two-and-a-half years) could 
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enjoy an unemployment benefit until he reached the official retirement age. Second, it 
released this age group from the obligation to look for new work. As a result, for those 
workers who were at least fifty-seven-and-a-half years old when their unemployment 
began, the unemployment benefit had become a semi-official early retirement pension.  
 The introduction of the 1976 Act was a costly affair that strongly contradicted the 
insurance character of the unemployment insurance. All employer federations 
nevertheless lent their full support to it. How can we explain this? It is again tempting to 
believe that the desire of some companies to release redundant workers more easily 
played a role in this. And indeed, it seems that at least some employers appreciated this 
side effect of the 1976 Act. When the work group on collective dismissals of the 
employer federation VNO discussed the coming introduction of the Act, its members 
agreed that it “on the one hand, provides a solution for employers in these times of 
reorganization and company closures.” They were well aware, however, of the Act’s 
downside: “on the other hand, the employer federations should guard against an 
increase in the burden of collective expenses, which will inevitable be the result of the 
statutory change.” The work group’s members concluded that the employer federations 
found themselves right in-between “Scylla and Charybdis”.
60
 
The above description illustrates the clear limitations of recent writings on employer 
interest in welfare state development. Generous public provision against unemployment 
can certainly make it easier for firms to shed redundant or less productive workers, but 
it can do so only at the expense of those firms that have less need to shed workers. This 
makes it somewhat misleading to argue that the welfare state can “improve the 
operation of markets” or has “productive purposes.”
61
 If there are gains to be achieved 
at all, then these will by definition be redistributive; gains for the few must be financed 
through higher contribution levels or an increase in taxation, which will inevitably come 
at the expense of others. It is for exactly this reason that both British and Dutch 
employer federations always insisted on premium differentiation across industries. It is 
also for this reason that the Dutch employer federations came to regret their support for 
the introduction of the labor market consideration clause in the Act on Disability 
Insurance. And finally, it is for this reason that the employer federations would most 
likely not have supported the introduction of the 1976 Act on Extension of the 
Unemployment Benefit Duration for the Elderly if they had not felt that the introduction 
of this Act was inevitable, and that their support for this Act could at least prevent the 
worse alternative: an extension in the duration of the unemployment benefit for all 
workers.  
Several years before, one aspect of the 1976 Act on Disability Insurance had already 
been subjected to debate. Above, I noted that individual companies sometimes 
contacted regional employment offices with their requests that older workers be 
released from the obligation to look for new jobs. In the late 1960s, this practice briefly 
took a more structured form, when the Social Insurance Council discussed the 
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introduction of so-called “non-activity arrangements” for older workers in the textile 
industry. As mentioned briefly before, the Dutch textile industry was one of the first 
industries to come under serious strain, mainly because of increased competition from 
low-cost industries in developing countries. By the late 1960s, the situation had become 
so dire that major layoffs seemed unavoidable. To prevent mass unrest in an industry 
that was already in economic difficulty, union and employer representatives in the 
textile industry had agreed to use the unemployment insurance as an early retirement 
pension by allowing workers from the age of sixty-two-and-a-half on to retire early with 
generous benefits. These workers would be relieved of the obligation to look for new 
jobs, and their public unemployment benefits would be complemented with private 
supplements to a full hundred percent of their previous wages during the first year of 
unemployment, and to ninety-five percent in the second year. They also agreed on a 
one-time bonus almost equal to the minimum wage, and on the continuation of the 
occupational pension buildup.
62
 In 1967, this agreement came under review of the 
tripartite Social Insurance Council.  
Despite the non-activity arrangements’ obvious unlawfulness (both the Unemploy-
ment Act and the Act on Unemployment Provision stated clearly that unemployment 
benefits could only be granted if a worker were actively in search of new work), the 
Social Insurance Council was divided over the issue. After a short discussion in the 
Board of Governors on Labor Affairs, in which only the chairman of the CSWV briefly 
considered agreeing to the measure on an ad hoc basis, all employer federations agreed 
that the non-activity arrangements were unacceptable. Many reasons were given for this. 
First, the practice clearly constituted misuse of the public unemployment benefit. 
Second, the granting of ad hoc support would inspire other sectors to copy the practice. 
Third, it would be completely unfair to other industries – whether or not these were also 
in distress – if the textile industry were able to reorganize its work force at the expense 
of the unemployment fund.
63
 Union representatives to the Social Insurance Council 
agreed on the unlawfulness of the measure, but nonetheless supported it for social 
considerations. They also argued that by releasing less-productive older workers, more-
productive younger ones could be taken on in their stead. The latter argument does not 
seem to have impressed the Council’s employer representatives, considering, for 
instance, that the whole point of the measure was to reduce the size of the workforce.
64
 
The Council’s state representatives apparently sided with the labor unions on the matter, 
for the Council did eventually give permission for the introduction of the non-activity 
arrangements.
65
  
                                                
62
 VU, FC, 18: Brief Federatie van Katholieke en Protestants-Christelijke werkgeversbonden aan de 
betrokken vakorganisaties, 24 oktober 1967. 
63 VNO, F119(4) Cie Sociale Verzekering RCO 1947-1970: Verslag vergadering Commissie Sociale 
Verzekering Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, 19 oktober 1967. 
64
 VU, FC, 18: Brief Federatie van Katholieke en Protestants-Christelijke werkgeversbonden aan de 
betrokken vakorganisaties, 24 oktober 1967; ARA, CSWV, 2.19.103.06, 140: Verslag vergadering 
Commissie Sociale Verzekering, 10 november 1967. 
65
 VNO, F119(4) Cie Sociale Verzekering RCO 1947-1970: Verslag vergadering Commissie Sociale 
Verzekering CSWV, 10 november 1967. 
  
180 
Several years later, when the employer federations were debating the Act on Exten-
sion of the Unemployment Benefit Duration for the Elderly, they faced what was 
essentially the introduction of non-activities arrangements on a much larger scale. In 
this case, the plan was to release all unemployed workers from the age of seventy-five-
and-a-half and up from the obligation to look for work. This naturally raised the 
question of whether or not the employer federations should again make a stand against 
this “illegitimate” use of the social insurance. As one employer representative noted, 
this was what they had done in the late 1960s, and the financial impact of the current 
plan would be many times greater.
66
 After much hesitation, the employer federations 
nevertheless gave their support to the introduction of the 1976 Act. They had two 
reasons to do so.  
First, and most importantly, they realized that some kind of improvement of the 
existing unemployment insurance legislation was inevitable. The problem of rising 
unemployment not only made this a top priority to the labor union movement; it also 
strengthened the unions’ demands. Realizing this, the employer federations came to 
regard the introduction of special measures for the elderly as a lesser evil. By supporting 
the introduction of this Act, they hoped to at least be able to prevent an increase in the 
duration of the unemployment benefit for all workers regardless of age – an additional 
demand of the labor unions. Second, the introduction of this legislation could help to 
stem the even-less-desirable practice of shedding workers through the public disability 
insurance. It is hard to say how important this second consideration was to the employer 
federations, however. In discussions in the Social Security Committee of the VNO, only 
the committee’s chairman noted that by giving support to this plan, the employer 
community could both deflect union calls for an increase in the duration of the 
unemployment benefit for all workers and help remove hidden unemployment from the 
public disability insurance. Several other members responded by asking whether such a 
division of unemployment and disability would make any difference in practice. One 
member even questioned the morality of sending older unemployed workers with partial 
handicaps to the unemployment insurance.
67
  
The employer federations also hoped to use the introduction of the 1976 Act as 
leverage for their attempts to introduce stricter job search requirements for workers 
drawing an unemployment benefit. At the time, workers drawing unemployment 
benefits were only required to look for, and accept, “suitable jobs,” which were defined 
as jobs that not only paid wages that were equal to those of their previous jobs, but also 
involved similar work activities or skill levels. The employer federations rightly 
emphasized that the current interpretation of the suitable job clause hindered economic 
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efficiency and opened the door for abuse.
68
 The union federations responded that their 
members would never accept a stricter definition of the concept, and the unions refused 
even to consider the establishment of a committee to investigate the matter.
69
 It would 
take many years before the government even dared to address this issue.
70
 
The employer federations were more successful in preventing an increase in the 
duration of the unemployment benefit for all workers. Important to this was that the 
state representatives to the Social-Economic Council sided with the employers on this 
during the preparation of a formal advice on the matter. In the end, the Social-Economic 
Council presented a divided report to the Minister of Social Affairs in late 1975. While 
all members of the Council agreed to an increase in the duration of the unemployment 
benefit for workers aged seventy-five-and-a-half and older, a minority, comprising only 
union representatives, argued for measures to improve matters for all long-term 
unemployed.
71
 The employer federations also successfully fought off another union 
demand, which was to expand the range of the new Act to the formerly self-employed 
as well.
72
 
In summary, a close examination of the introduction of the 1976 Act gives little 
evidence for the idea that the stance of the employer federations toward the Act was 
shaped in a major way by their appreciation for its effect on the companies’ ability to 
release redundant workers. The main motivation for their support was clearly to prevent 
the introduction of more far-reaching proposals. As we have seen above, the employer 
federations did realize that by making it easier to dismiss workers, the Act provided a 
solution for those companies who needed to downsize their workforces. Yet, they also 
realized the financial consequences of this. This latter effect – increased collective costs 
– continued to worry the employer federations, but not to such an extent that they felt it 
necessary to press their members to abstain from taking advantage of the redundancy-
related possibilities provided by the Act. The opinion of the executive committee of the 
VNO, for example, was simply that “once the arrangement is there, it should be possible 
to make use of it.” The VNO’s work group on collective dismissals agreed that “it is not 
the purpose of the employer federations to urge their members to be reticent about the 
use of the current legislation.” It added to this that “when firms do use the possibilities 
offered by this legislation, then they should also accept the resulting increase in 
collective burden and contributions.”
73
  
The 1976 Act on Extension of the Unemployment Benefit Duration for the Elderly 
continued to function in more or less its original form until after the turn of the twenty-
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first century. It thus operated for much longer than the labor market consideration clause 
in the Act on Disability Insurance, which was abolished in 1987. One reason for this 
difference was surely that even after the introduction of the 1976 Act, the public 
unemployment insurance remained a much less popular early exit pathway than the 
public disability insurance. Above, we have seen the importance of the public disability 
insurance as an early exit pathway in the 1980s and early 1990s. In the latter decade, it 
was industry-wide early retirement schemes that became increasingly important.  
 
THE INTRODUCTION OF INDUSTRY-WIDE 
EARLY RETIREMENT SCHEMES 
The above two sections showed that the practice of labor-shedding through the public 
disability and unemployment insurances emerged as an unintended side effect of an 
expansion of social rights. The introduction of the industry-wide early retirement 
schemes (known in the Netherlands as VUT-regelingen) differed from this in that these 
schemes were specifically designed to withdraw older workers from the labor market. 
One of the main arguments for their introduction was that they could create jobs for 
younger workers by encouraging older workers to leave the labor market early. They 
never really came to fulfill this aim, however. Once older workers were given the 
opportunity to retire early, they certainly starting doing so in mass numbers, but 
companies more frequently responded to this by downsizing than by hiring new workers 
to fill the vacant positions.
74
 Thus, what began as a solution to the youth unemployment 
problem soon became a subsidized early exit pathway for older workers and another 
instrument for employers to downsize their workforces.  
Just as labor union pressure for an extension of social rights had resulted in the 
transformation of the public disability and unemployment insurances into early exit 
pathways, labor unions were again the driving force behind the introduction of the 
industry-wide early retirement schemes. The idea of these schemes came from the 
Catholic union federation NKV, which issued a pamphlet in 1974 called Young for Old 
(Jong voor Oud) in which it argued for the introduction of a job replacement scheme 
that could serve the double aim of granting certain older workers the ability to retire 
early and of reintegrating younger unemployed workers into the workforce. The scheme 
would give workers aged sixty-two–and-a-half and older the option of leaving the 
workforce voluntarily in exchange for a benefit similar to the one currently granted to 
unemployed workers. Companies would then have to hire an unemployed worker to fill 
the vacancy, who would be appointed by the regional employment office. The NKV 
argued that the scheme would not be costly, since it did not alter the number of workers 
who received benefits; it merely replaced older workers with younger workers. The 
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unemployed worker did not have to be given exactly the same function that had been 
previously performed by the retired older worker.
75
 
From the start, there was much skepticism about the feasibility of replacing early-
retiring workers by younger workers. Among the skeptics were members of the 
committee of government-appointed external experts who investigated the NKV plan in 
1975. This committee concluded that any attempt to force employers to replace early-
retiring workers with younger workers would encounter fierce opposition, not in the 
least from the employer federations, while voluntary adherence would most likely result 
in far more ‘exits’ than ‘entries.’ Partly from this latter prediction, it also criticized the 
NKV’s low estimate of the scheme’s cost. Within this generally skeptical evaluation of 
the NKV’s plan, it did note that the scheme could add to the well-being of older workers 
with rough employment histories. Based on the latter consideration, it cautiously 
advised experimentation with a voluntary version of the scheme.
76
 
It is difficult to say what the attitude of organized industry was toward the idea of 
introducing voluntary early retirement schemes. While the employer federations were 
outright skeptical about their ability to address the problem of unemployed youth, they 
were again – as had been the case with the introduction of the Act on Extension of the 
Unemployment Benefit Duration for the Elderly described above – aware that these 
schemes could help certain industries to restructure. On several occasions, members of 
the VNO noted that the introduction of early retirement schemes could raise productiv-
ity by “clearing out” the number of employees.
77
 Counter to this benefit, however, stood 
several probable adverse effects. First, the introduction of early retirement schemes 
would be costly, since it would certainly not be possible to limit them to certain groups 
of older workers.
78
 Second, the schemes would result in a further deterioration of the 
ratio of active to inactive workers. Finally, once workers were given the option of 
retiring voluntarily, it was quite possible that the most productive older workers would 
also run off. On this last problem, employer representatives noted again the record of 
misuse of the public disability insurance.
79
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 Another problem with determining the overall attitude of organized industry toward 
the introduction of early retirement schemes is that different industries seem to have 
regarded it quite differently. For example, while the executive committee of the VNO 
both emphasized the early retirement schemes’ costs and the afore-mentioned problem 
of the most productive workers retiring early, some industries believed that early 
retirement might very well be self-financing.
80
 To the executive committee of the VNO, 
three other considerations were eventually of overriding importance. First, the 
committee realized that union pressure for the introduction of collective early retirement 
arrangements would only increase in the future.
81
 Second, it realized that the govern-
ment’s intention to cut back collective expenditure (in late 1977, a coalition of liberals 
and Christian-democrats announced for the first time a plan to take serious measures 
against the ongoing increase in collective expenditure) presented the union movement 
with a financial predicament, meaning that something might have to be offered to the 
unions in return for expense-curbing.
82
 Third, despite its skeptical stance toward the 
idea of introducing collective early retirement schemes, it greatly preferred this to some 
of the other ideas for redistributing labor that were circulating at the time. 
It is important to mention here that the NKV’s proposal was by no means the only 
plan that aimed to tackle the problem of unemployment by redistributing labor. Among 
other ideas were the introduction of part-time work on a large scale, a shorter work-
week, more vacation days, and a lowered retirement age. While the labor union 
movement resisted the idea of stimulating part-time work, the employer federations 
resisted all other ideas. The employer federations resisted a shorter work-week and 
more vacation days because these would apply to all workers, instead of just older 
workers, which made them far more costly. They also feared that these measures would 
be cumulative, since the labor union movement was determined to introduce a collective 
arrangement for early retirement.
83
 The labor unions also preferred early retirement to a 
shorter work-week and more vacation days.
84
 In sum, among all of the ideas put forward 
to redistribute labor, the idea of introducing early retirement schemes was the only one 
on which both sides of industry could agree.
85
  
Based on all of the above considerations, the employer federations cautiously stated 
their willingness to consider the introduction of early retirement schemes. They agreed, 
however, only under certain conditions. First, they demanded that employers be allowed 
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to dismiss a request for early retirement by a worker when this would have large-scale 
negative consequences for the firm’s operation. Second, they demanded that an early- 
retired worker not be allowed to perform paid labor of any sort. Finally, and by far most 
importantly, the employer federations insisted that early retirement schemes had to be 
completely private in character. The employer federations fiercely resisted the 
introduction of a public early retirement scheme because this would result in huge 
transfers of income between industries, and because a national scheme would be more 
difficult to terminate. The second condition seems to have been most problematic for 
the union federations. They preferred a public scheme for the same reason the employer 
federations opposed this. Without a redistributive effort across different industries, the 
union federations feared, some industries might not be able to afford early retirement 
schemes.
86
 In the end, however, the union federations were forced to give in. The early 
retirement schemes were to be based on industry-wide funds that would be financed on 
a pay-as-you-go basis. The industrial insurance boards would be responsible for their 
operation.  
Despite their insistence that older workers be allowed to retire early only on a 
temporary basis, the employer federations seem to have had little difficulty with the 
redistributive impact of the early retirement schemes on the income of younger and 
older workers. They also agreed to the continuation of both private and public pension 
buildup throughout a worker’s period of early retirement.
87
 State interference with the 
early retirement schemes remained as limited as possible. The state only interfered with 
them in two ways. First, it could extend the use of early retirement schemes to an entire 
sector through its ability to declare a collective agreement binding. Second, the 
government decided in 1979 that early retirement schemes should be treated like private 
pensions, which meant that the benefits, not the contributions, would be taxed.  
In 1976, the building, metal, and dock industries and the education sector were the 
first to experiment with early retirement schemes. In these sectors, sixty-three and sixty-
four-year-old workers were allowed to retire early on a benefit of about eighty percent 
of their previous wages. This experiment confirmed what the employer organizations 
and the committee of external experts had already suspected: in only about fifteen 
percent of the cases did firms refill vacant positions with unemployed workers.
88
 The 
experiment also demonstrated that early retirement was extremely popular among 
workers. As a result, the use of early retirement schemes soon spread in range and scope. 
By 1979, it was estimated that some eighty percent of Dutch employees were covered 
by collective agreements making provision for some form or other of early retirement.
89
 
The age limit also dropped rapidly. By the mid-1980s, it was very normal for a sixty-
year-old worker to retire early on a early retirement benefit. In some industries, workers 
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could even retire at the age of fifty-five.
90
 
For about the first ten years, the VUT apparently operated to the satisfaction of both 
workers and firms. From the late 1980s on, however, large firms, in particular, became 
more critical of the scheme. Among the reasons for this were concerns over the 
scheme’s costs, a growing paucity of qualified workers, and the absence of employer 
control over the exit route.
91
 But the scheme’s immense popularity among workers 
made it quite resistant to change. The trend of early exit through the VUT only 
stabilized from the mid-1990s on, and it would take until the turn of the century for a 
government to announce serious measures to stem the rampant use of the early 
retirement schemes. These measures are, however, far beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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7 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
During the past four decades, the comparative literature on welfare state development 
has been dominated by approaches that emphasize the implications of class conflict for 
welfare state outcomes. Most influential among these approaches has been the so-called 
power resources approach, which depicts welfare state development as mainly involving 
distributive conflict between workers and employers. As a result of their emphasis on 
class conflict, power resources scholars have displayed a strong tendency to view labor 
as a homogenous and disadvantaged group that needs to be compensated by the welfare 
state. In the view of power resources scholars, “the welfare state is a class issue. 
Logically and historically, its principal proponents and defenders are movements of the 
working class.”
1
 
This emphasis on class relations, and the resulting tendency to view labor as a 
homogenous and disadvantaged group, has had important consequences for our view of 
the involvement of organized labor in welfare state development. These consequences 
have by no means been limited to the writings of power resources scholars. Scholars 
from other backgrounds and scholarship traditions have also given little attention to the 
very diverse and often conflicting natures of workers’ demands for security against 
labor market risks. The tendency to view labor unions as the natural supporters of 
welfare state development, for example, is common among power resources scholars, 
so-called institutionalists, employer-centered scholars, and those who emphasize the 
importance of other societal groups like the self-employed.
2
 And although power 
resources scholars place most emphasis on labor’s relative power resources, there is a 
strong consensus that the political efficacy of left parties depends on strong trade 
unionism.  
 In this book, I have challenged this view of the involvement of organized labor in 
welfare state development. I have done so by arguing that labor union support for 
redistributive welfare state development cannot be taken for granted. Depending on the 
risk and income profile of their members, I have argued, unions value public welfare 
solutions, and especially their redistributive consequences, in quite different ways. 
Rather than viewing welfare state development as a political victory of labor over 
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capital, I have therefore emphasized the importance of the willingness of labor unions to 
redistribute income and risk within the labor category. It is for this reason that I have 
argued for the importance of the organizational blueprint of labor unions and have 
criticized the preoccupation of scholars with their organizational strength.  
 The starting point of my analysis has been that workers differ greatly in terms of 
income and exposure to labor market risks. The main purpose of the welfare state is to 
diminish these differences, so that all workers are adequately insured against labor 
market risks like unemployment, sickness, disability, and old age. In their ability to 
redistribute risks and resources between society’s more and less privileged members, 
public welfare solutions differ strongly from private ones. It is for this reason that 
unions representing only skilled, and thus privileged, workers often prefer private to 
public welfare solutions – or favor a combination of private and public insurances 
against labor market risks that involves no redistribution between more and less 
privileged workers. In this, they differ strongly from unions who also represent lower-
skilled, and thus less-privileged, workers. To make sure that all their members can 
achieve adequate insurance against labor market risks, such unions are far more willing 
to consider redistributive welfare solutions that result in a leveling of income and risk 
between more- and less-privileged workers.  
 I have demonstrated the importance of union structure through an empirical case 
study of labor union involvement in the development of the British and Dutch welfare 
states during roughly the first half of the postwar period. This period presented a crucial 
epoch in the development of the modern welfare state. In the first decades of the 
postwar period, all advanced industrial nations experienced a sharp increase in both 
public and private social expenditure. Yet they differed markedly both in the overall 
level of this increase and in the share of this increase accounted for by private and 
(redistributive) public programs. As a result, societies came to differ substantially in 
their ability to protect all their members against the risk of economic misfortune and 
dependency. As we have seen in the previous pages, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom were good examples of this difference. The pages also showed how this 
related to differences in labor union structure between the two countries.  
 In the Netherlands, the three industrially organized labor union federations proved to 
be the main initiators of plans that aimed to increase the generosity of public welfare 
programs through risk redistribution and systems of contributions and benefits that 
benefited lower-paid workers at the expense of higher-paid workers. In the United 
Kingdom, matters were quite different. During the entire period under investigation in 
this book, the TUC never initiated a single redistributive contributory initiative. 
Moreover, it gave at most lukewarm support to all of Labour’s public welfare initiatives. 
The reason for this lack of enthusiasm lay in the ‘craft’ or ‘occupational’ nature of many 
of its union members. These unions represented workers who stood to lose from the 
redistributive consequences of such initiatives, and thus organized against it. As a result, 
and even though it organized a relatively high percentage of all workers, the British 
union movement did anything but increase the political efficacy of the Labour Party.  
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 In the Netherlands, by contrast, the union movement so actively pushed for 
redistributive welfare initiatives that public welfare development there did not depend 
on the presence of a Labor-dominated government. The 1955 General Old Age Act, the 
1966 Sickness Act and Act on Disability Insurance, and acts that increased the 
generosity of the unemployment insurance and state pension in respectively, the mid- 
and late 1960s, all passed parliament under confessional-liberal governments – and thus 
with Labor in opposition. All these acts also came about after strong and prolonged 
pressure from the labor union movement, and all of them were prepared in detail during 
discussions between union and employer representatives in one of the country’s many 
corporatist bodies. This shows that labor unions do not have to organize a high 
percentage of workers to push for redistributive welfare proposals – after all, the Dutch 
union movement, even then, fell into, at most, the middle of the organizational density 
levels spectrum. Much more important is that unions are united in their support for these 
initiatives. 
 Three of the chapters of this book deserve to be summarized separately. These are 
chapters 3 to 5, in which I analyzed how the organizational structure of the British and 
Dutch labor union movements determined their stances on the development of public 
provision for the elderly, the unemployed, and the sick and disabled. Together with 
chapter 6, which will be discussed below, these chapters formed the empirical core of 
this book. Their findings on the way in which union structure affected the British and 
Dutch labor union movement positions on redistributive public welfare development 
during the first half of the postwar period can be summarized as follows.  
 In chapter 3, I compared the postwar development of public old-age pension 
provision in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. I began this chapter by 
contrasting the support of the TUC for a completely flat rate “egalitarian” pension 
system with the support of the three union federations in the Netherlands for a 
redistributive solution combining flat rate benefits with earnings-related contributions. I 
then analyzed the TUC’s unwillingness to support Labour’s proposal to introduce a 
similar system in the United Kingdom, and its later reluctance to align itself with 
Labour’s superannuation proposals. I showed how the TUC’s reluctance stemmed from 
the strong opposition of its craft and occupationally organized white-collar union 
members to the redistributive consequences of these proposals. I also showed how the 
failure of consecutive Labour governments to improve matters for Britain’s poorer 
pensioners related to this opposition. In the final section of this chapter, I returned to the 
Netherlands, to analyze how the three Dutch union federations’ success in increasing 
the public pension benefit related to their ability to promote its redistributive features. 
 In chapter 4, I compared the postwar development of public unemployment 
provision in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. I began this chapter by 
emphasizing that public unemployment development inevitably involves a redistribution 
of good and bad risks between different grades of workers. I then set out to show that 
British craft and occupationally organized unions were as opposed to any extension of 
risk reapportioning as they were to the introduction of a redistributive contributory 
system. I illustrated how this opposition complicated attempts to improve the generosity 
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of the public unemployment insurance in the United Kingdom. In the second part of the 
chapter, I contrasted this with the agreement of the “big three” in the Netherlands to 
increase the level of risk reapportioning among different categories of workers, and to 
introduce a contributory system that benefited lower-paid workers at the expense of 
other workers.  
 In chapter 5, I compared the postwar development of public provision for the sick 
and disabled in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. I began this chapter by noting 
the disparity in the treatment of work-related and non-work-related disabilities in the 
United Kingdom. I then analyzed the TUC’s opposition to several Labour attempts to 
improve public provision for non-work-related disabilities, and showed how this related 
to the resistance of many of its union members to the redistributive consequences of 
these initiatives. In the second part of the chapter, I contrasted the TUC’s stance with 
that of its Dutch counterparts. In this part, I demonstrated that the very generous 
outcome of public disability insurance development in the Netherlands was possible 
because the unions there pushed for highly distributive solutions.  
 Although the main purpose of this book has been to demonstrate how the organiza-
tional blueprint of labor unions affects their involvement in welfare state development, I 
have also aimed to contribute to the now-popular topic of employer interest group 
involvement in welfare state development. I have attempted to do so in two ways. First, 
I have explored the arguments of recent employer-oriented writings by looking at 
possible instances in which British and Dutch employer interest groups may have 
supported public welfare initiatives because they appreciated their “productive” or 
“redistributive” consequences. I have found no evidence of such instances. Second, I 
examined the ways in which union structure impacts employer interest group stances on 
welfare state development. I have suggested two ways in which union structure affects 
the positions employer interest groups adopt. 
 I have dealt with the first issue most thoroughly in chapters 4 and 6. Chapter 4 dealt, 
among other topics, with the introduction of a redundancy payments scheme in the 
United Kingdom in the first half of the 1960s. The introduction of such a scheme was 
first publicly proposed by a Conservative government and eventually introduced by a 
Labour government. Both governments justified the scheme by arguing that it would 
improve the operation of the labor market by facilitating labor mobility between more- 
and less-productive sectors. Chapter 6 dealt with the use of social security schemes for 
redundancy purposes in the Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s. This use was greatly 
facilitated by two important decisions made during this period. The more important of 
these was the 1973 decision to “broaden” the use of the labor market consideration 
clause of the 1966 Act on Disability Insurance. Second in importance was the 1976 
decision to extend the duration of the unemployment benefit for workers aged fifty-
seven-and-a-half and over, and release them from the obligation to look for work. These 
decisions greatly facilitated the use of the public disability insurance and public 
unemployment insurances to dismiss workers, in particular older ones, thereby 
effectively turning them into “early retirement pathways.” From the late 1970s on, a 
third such pathway emerged in the form of industry-wide retirement schemes.  
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 I have found no evidence that employer interest groups supported these decisions 
because they appreciated their productive or redistributive consequences. In both 
countries, employer interest groups were quite aware of the fact that such public 
“benefits” could only come about through substantial financial cost. In the United 
Kingdom, the BEC and its successor, the CBI, fiercely opposed the introduction of a 
redundancy scheme for mainly this reason. In the Netherlands, the decisions to 
“broaden” the use of the labor market consideration clause and to extend the duration of 
the unemployment benefit only came about after fierce union pressure – and despite 
hesitation or opposition on the part of organized employers. Following recent employer-
oriented writings, it would seem paradoxical that the Dutch employer federations had 
much less difficulty with the development of the one “pathway” to early retirement over 
which they had least control – the industry-wide early retirement schemes. These 
schemes were not nearly as useful in getting rid of redundant workers as were the public 
disability and unemployment insurances, and many productive workers did make use of 
them. The employer federations nevertheless proved more willing to go along with the 
development of these schemes because they were not public in character, did not lead to 
a misuse of social security schemes, and were deemed temporary.  
 The second way in which I aimed to contribute to thinking on the role of employer 
interest groups in welfare state development was by looking at ways in which union 
structure may affect employer groups’ positions. I have suggested that union structure 
impacts employer interest group stances in two ways. Both of these result from the way 
in which union structure shapes the stances of national labor union movements on 
redistributive welfare state development. First, when a large part of the labor union 
movement opposes redistributive welfare initiatives, employer interest groups are in a 
much stronger position to oppose them as well. Second, when many unions oppose such 
initiatives, these may become more costly for employers, thereby making important for 
employer groups to oppose them.  
 Chapter 3 presented evidence for both of these ways in which union structure affects 
the involvement of employer interest groups in welfare state development. The chapter 
illustrated how greatly the opposition of British craft and occupationally organized 
white-collar unions strengthened the opposition of British employer groups and the 
pension industry against Labour’s superannuation proposals. Not only did union 
opposition give these groups a powerful ally at the bargaining table; it also enabled 
them to direct attention to how bad a deal superannuation was for higher-paid workers. 
At the same time, employer interest groups in the United Kingdom realized very well 
that unions that opposed superannuation because of its redistributive consequences 
would do anything in their power to restore lost wage differentials at the bargaining 
table. This meant that if superannuation were to be implemented, it would severely 
complicate wage bargaining for employers. This consequence of superannuation greatly 
worried employer interest groups, which hardened their opposition against it.  
 In the Netherlands, the employer federations were faced with a union movement that 
was united in its support for redistributive welfare state development. This also worked 
in both of the above ways. On the one hand, it made it much more difficult for the 
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employer federations to resist such initiatives. On the other hand, it made these 
initiatives less threatening, and therefore more palatable, to them. In the Netherlands, 
the union movement was far more willing to accept that public, like private, insurance 
against labor market risks was part of the social wage, and therefore had to be financed 
out of the margin of pay increases. This greatly increased its political efficacy in two 
ways. First, it made public welfare development less costly to employers, thereby 
decreasing their resistance against it. Second, it greatly increased the bargaining power 
of labor unions, since it proved quite difficult for the employer federations to resist 
public welfare initiatives when the union movement offered that the costs of such 
initiatives be borne by workers themselves.  
 The above remarks served to summarize the main findings of this book. The 
remainder of this final chapter explores some of the broader analytical implications of 
these findings. The following section examines their implications for other welfare 
states. The penultimate section takes up the related, but distinct, area of labor market 
development. The chapter ends with a section that emphasizes the need to account for 
social solidarity.  
 
OCCUPATIONAL UNIONISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
DIVIDED WELFARE STATES 
In this book, I have demonstrated the importance of union structure though a compara-
tive case study of British and Dutch welfare state development during roughly the first 
three decades of the postwar period. This approach stemmed from my firm belief in the 
historic method and my appreciation for archival sources as a source of information. At 
the same time, it must be noted that the time-consuming use of archival sources has its 
limitations. These limitations manifest themselves clearly in the areas and period of 
time that one can reasonably expect to cover. I have attempted to circumvent these 
limitations by making numerous references to other countries, especially in the first two 
chapters. In this section of the final chapter, I aim to elaborate on these references by 
looking at the implications of my findings for welfare state development in countries 
other than the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. After all, the importance of union 
structure has by no means been limited to the development of the Dutch and British 
welfare states alone.  
 The dominance in those countries of, respectively, industrial and occupational 
unionism, and the fact that their welfare patterns do not easily fit into the explanatory 
framework of the power resources approach have made the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom ideally suited to illustrate the importance of labor union structure to welfare 
state outcomes. Most other advanced industrial nations fit more neatly into the 
explanatory framework that focuses on labor’s relative power resources. Yet this does 
not warrant the current preoccupation of scholarly investigations of those nations with 
union strength. The issue of how labor unions value redistributive welfare solutions is 
crucial for welfare state outcomes in all countries. This means that scholars should pay 
attention to the organizational features of all national labor union movements.  
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An excellent case in point here is Sweden. In the comparative literature on welfare 
state development, scholars often attribute the generous nature of the Swedish welfare 
state to the organizational strength of the labor union movement there. But what if the 
extraordinary organizational strength of the Swedish labor union movement had been 
combined with an equal strong entrenchment of occupational unionism as in the United 
Kingdom? In that case, the outcome might very well have been a much less generous or 
‘solidaristic’ welfare state. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the relation-
ship between Sweden’s high union density level and its generous welfare state features 
is in no way unidirectional.
3
 The relationship between the (overall) vertical nature of 
union organization in Sweden and its generous welfare state features is, by contrast, 
quite straightforward. In chapter 2 of this work I discussed the overall vertical nature of 
union organization in Sweden and its importance for wage bargaining outcomes. Its 
importance for welfare state outcomes has, no doubt, been equally important. 
The need for a reinterpretation of the role of labor union involvement in welfare 
state development is most pressing in nations in which occupational unionism is strong. 
This inevitably brings our attention to the Anglo-Saxon world. As explained in chapter 
2, occupational unionism also exists in the countries of continental Europe, and to a 
greater extent in some of these countries than in others. In many of these countries, 
occupational unionism has left its mark on the course of welfare state development. In 
chapter 1, I noted Esping-Andersen’s acknowledgement of the importance of craft 
unionism in Denmark to welfare outcomes there. Likewise, to understand the long 
persistence of special insurance schemes for white-collar workers in Germany and 
Belgium, for example, we have to account for the separate organization of white-collar 
workers there.
4
 Yet, as noted in chapter 2, in none of these countries has the importance 
of occupational unionism been as great as in the Anglo-Saxon world. As a result, the 
consequences of occupational unionism for welfare state outcomes have also been much 
greater in Anglo-Saxon countries.  
Because of its prominent position in the welfare state debate, the United States 
forms an excellent case in point here. Like its counterpart in the United Kingdom, the 
American labor union movement has always been organized on a largely occupational 
basis. As in the United Kingdom, the origins of occupational unionism in the United 
States lie in the early emergence of craft unions that catered only to certain professions 
of skilled, and thus relatively privileged, manual workers. From the moment lower-
skilled manual workers also started to organize en masse, this has led to great divides 
within the American labor union movement. These divides have been much greater 
there than in the United Kingdom. In the United States, craft unions not only prohibited 
lower-skilled workers from joining them; in the first decades of the twentieth century, 
the craft-organized AFL actually worked actively to obstruct lower-skilled workers 
from unionizing in separate, industrially organized, unions. It often did so in collabora-
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tion with employers.
5
 Moreover, during the 1930s, the AFL dissolved hundreds of 
federal unions and distributed their skilled members among craft unions.
6
 Thus, whereas 
the Dutch union federations and many of their continental European counterparts 
worked actively to organize all workers on an industrial basis and did not shy away 
from dissolving existing occupational unions to achieve this, the AFL did the exact 
opposite. 
 The consequences of this have received substantial attention from labor scholars. As 
early as 1920, the labor economist Robert Hoxie, for example, remarked that the 
American labor union movement “is essentially trade conscious, rather than class 
conscious. That is to say it expresses the viewpoint and interests of the workers in the 
craft or industry rather than those of the working class as a whole.”
7
 Nowadays, the 
realization that there is “little sense of ideological solidarity in the American worker 
movement” is commonplace among labor scholars.
8
 The “notoriously weak solidarity of 
American workers” has also been noted by the political scientists Jacob Hacker in his 
seminal work The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public and Private Social 
Benefits in the United States.
9
  
 Yet despite Hacker’s (brief) reference to it, the notoriously weak solidarity of the 
American labor union movement has not served as a prominent explanation for the 
emergence of a “divided welfare state” in the United States. In their attempts to explain 
the dismally-low level of public protection in the United States and the corresponding 
growth of occupational benefits that mostly cater to higher-paid workers, scholars of the 
American welfare state have paid much attention to labor’s organizational weakness and 
little to its occupational features. They have certainly given little attention to the 
possibility that the low level of public protection in the United States may be related to 
the resistance of occupationally organized unions to redistributive state intervention.
10
 
As a result, existing explanations for the AFL’s longstanding resistance to nearly any 
form of government intervention in the labor market and its meek support for the 
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development of public welfare programs during the postwar period seem quite 
insufficient.
11
  
In chapter 2, I briefly referred to the strong voluntarist inclinations of the AFL. 
These were especially strong in the decades before the War. Until its hesitant – or 
depending on one’s interpretation of events, reluctant – acceptance of the New Deal, the 
AFL opposed almost any instance of government intervention in the labor market. Such 
instances included the introduction of: the minimum wage, a public health insurance, a 
public unemployment insurance, and a national pension. The AFL also opposed 
measures like the introduction of legislation aimed at setting maximum work hours for 
male workers.
12
 In the literature, the voluntarist inclinations of AFL are generally 
explained through either its fears that this would undermine its future ability to attract 
workers or through its distrust of government institutions.
13
 The latter explanation, 
which centers around the conservative actions of US courts in that period and the many 
resulting judicial challenges to unions, does indeed have much merit.
14
 Yet there are 
nevertheless good reasons to believe that it alone cannot explain the strong voluntarist 
inclinations of the AFL at the time. As many of these reasons are similar to the ones put 
forward to disprove existing explanations for the TUC’s voluntarist inclinations in 
chapter 2, I will discuss them here only briefly.  
The most important problem with explaining the voluntarist inclinations of the AFL 
in the decades before the War through its fear of undermining its future ability to attract 
workers or through its distrust of government institutions, is that these fears were clearly 
not shared by all unions. The industrially organized Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions (CIO), for example, never developed equally-strong voluntarist inclinations.
15
 
Neither did the many local labor leaders who criticized the voluntaristic assumptions of 
the AFL on social insurance and other forms of “positive state action.”
16
 Needless to say, 
the doctrine of voluntarism was most clearly rejected by “socialist” union leaders.
17
 It is 
for this reason that political scientist Michael Rogin and labor historian Gary M. Fink 
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viewed the voluntarist inclinations of the AFL as “justified in terms of freedom” but 
“serving other purposes” and therefore being “above all an organizational ideology, 
serving organizational needs.”
18
 These needs may very well have required defending the 
privileged position of AFL members. Measures like the introduction of a national 
minimum wage, certainly conflicted with such needs, as we saw in chapter 2. 
As late as 1937, only one year before its eventual introduction, the AFL still voiced 
its opposition to the introduction of a national minimum wage. At the time, the CIO did 
support the introduction of a national minimum wage.
19
 The AFL displayed no such 
hostility toward the 1935 Social Security Act. Then again, the Social Security Act could 
hardly have been seen as a threat to the privileged position of its membership. Its largest 
program, old age insurance, for example, had little redistributive value.
20
 Moreover, it 
did not cover many of the nation’s poorest workers.
21
 The AFL did not press for the 
inclusion of all workers at the time (though it would do so in later years), did not 
support any of the more “radical” proposals that were circulating, and did not come 
forward with alternative, more redistributive, proposals of its own.
22
 For all this, it 
received much credit from the Act’s liberal drafters.
23
 The Social Security Act’s other 
major initiative, the introduction of federal-funded but state-administrated unemploy-
ment programs, was equally limited in ambition. The AFL nevertheless lent only 
grudging approval to these programs.
24
 
The AFL, like the CIO, did support a further extension of social security during the 
postwar period. At the time, AFL union members were actively engaged in private 
bargaining for extension of occupational benefits. This has led to much scholarly 
attention to the question of why “the labor movement chose to compromise its postwar 
agenda by pursuing private social protection at the bargaining table.”
25
 Most scholars 
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have answered this question by arguing that the unions were forced to do so because 
conservative opposition made it impossible for them to acquire adequate public 
provision.
26
 Some scholars have even argued that the pursuit of occupational welfare by 
unions was mainly designed to induce business support for public welfare policies by 
increasing the costs of fringe benefits.
27
 Others have relied on traditional voluntarist 
arguments.
28
 Finally, several scholars have pointed out that the spread of occupational 
benefits may have undermined the support of unions in which members were well-
provisioned through a combination of public and private benefits.
29
 
One could argue that this scholarly preoccupation with the union drive for private 
benefits during the postwar period is somewhat misguided. After all, the Dutch example 
shows that an expansion of private provision does not have to stand in the way of 
attempts to increase the generosity of public provision. Much more important than the 
question of why the American unions turned to private bargaining during the postwar 
period is how committed they were to the expansion of public provision and whether 
they were willing to support redistributive measures to achieve this. Tellingly, the 
existing literature on American welfare state development offers little evidence of 
instances in which American unions offered concrete proposals to improve public 
programs by increasing the redistribution of income and risk among workers.
30
 On the 
contrary, scholars have often noted the union movement’s meek support for liberal 
public welfare initiatives.
31
 This makes it quite tempting to present another view of the 
involvement of the American union movement in the development of the postwar 
American welfare state. After the War, public and private provision against labor 
market risks in the United States remained inadequate mainly for the nation’s lower-
paid, more risk-prone workers. To improve matters for these workers, there would have 
to be a substantial degree of risk and income distribution between different categories of 
workers. Although they were certainly committed to an expansion of public provision in 
principle, it is quite questionable whether the powerful occupationally organized unions 
in the United States would have accepted this.  
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THE IMPORTANCE OF UNION STRUCTURE FOR NATIONAL 
DIFFERENCES IN LABOR MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
Although the main concern of this book has been to explain cross-national differences 
in welfare state development, it has also paid much attention to cross-national 
differences in labor market features. The close relationship between the domains of 
“welfare” and “work” made this inevitable. All previous systematic attempts to 
understand national trajectories of welfare state development have emphasized its 
interaction with national labor market institutions, with the emphasis generally placed 
on the way in which the latter have influenced the former. In other words, national 
differences in labor market institutions are often used to explain national differences in 
welfare state outcomes. The findings of this work suggest that the relationship between 
the two domains is often somewhat more complex. 
 In chapter 2 of this work, I pointed out that the emphasis on class relations, and the 
related tendency to view labor as a homogenous and disadvantaged group, are by no 
means limited to the literature on welfare state development. Both are equally strong in 
the broader literature on labor markets. Two resulting tendencies have already received 
substantial attention in this work. The first is the strong tendency to assume that labor 
unions always bring an egalitarian agenda to the bargaining table, promoting wage 
compression among different categories of workers. With this comes the tendency to 
assume labor union support for the redistributive consequences of government 
intervention in the labor market. The second is the predilection to resort to “voluntarist,” 
anti-state, explanations for instances in which labor unions do not support redistributive 
government intervention in the labor market.  
My criticism of this interpretation of voluntarism, as my pointing to its relationship 
with the resistance of unions representing privileged workers against any attempt to 
reduce wage differentials among different categories of workers, need not be examined 
here, since I have already explored this fully in earlier sections of this work. Instead, I 
will focus here on two implications of my emphasis on union structure for our 
understanding of labor union involvement in wage bargaining and labor market 
development. The first is its consequence for our understanding of the development of 
so-called “neo-corporatist” institutions in many continental European countries. The 
second is its consequence for our understanding of why unions might support wage 
compression among different categories of workers.  
Just as the persistence of “voluntarism” has attracted substantial attention from 
scholars working on labor market development in what could roughly be described as 
the “Anglo-Saxon world”, so have scholars of labor market development in continental 
European countries emphasized the extent to which organized industry there became 
integrated into the postwar policy-making arena of the state. This formal integration of 
labor unions and employer interest groups into the policy-making arena of the state has 
often been described as a move towards “neo-corporatist” decision-making. Although 
thoroughly divided on its origins and even its exact definition,
32
 scholars generally 
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agree about the consequences of neo-corporatism. Most important of these is arguably 
the much more harmonious state of affairs between (and in the case of the first I should 
add among) unions and employer interest groups in neo-corporatist countries.
33
 The 
presence of neo-corporatist institutions has been used, among other factors, to explain 
unions’ much greater willingness to accept wage moderation and to refrain from the use 
of the strike weapon to achieve their goals.
34
 
Throughout this work, I have noted the presence of neo-corporatist institutions and 
their importance for decision-making in the Netherlands. I have nevertheless refrained 
from treating them as a separate explanatory force for the extremely generous and 
redistributive outcome of welfare state development in the Netherlands. I simply did not 
encounter enough evidence for this. Of course, the decision to make organized industry 
responsible for the implementation of social security schemes certainly contributed to 
the increase in the number of benefit recipients – especially with regards to the 
disability insurance, as shown in chapter 5.
35
 Yet it is much more difficult to argue that 
neo-corporatist decision-making institutions were indispensable for, or even facilitated, 
the unions’ push for higher pension benefits, an increase in the level and duration of the 
unemployment benefit, and the introduction of minimum benefit levels into the 
unemployment, sickness, and disability insurances. On the contrary, the previous 
chapters have made it abundantly clear that the employer federations were very adept at 
using platforms like the Social-Economic Council to derail union demands for this 
during endless discussions. In chapter 4, for example, I noted that it took nearly a 
decade and a half before the employer representatives to the Social-Economic Council 
agreed to an extension in the duration and level of the 1949 Unemployment Act benefit. 
In chapter 3, I analyzed how the employer federations managed to delay union demands 
for further increases in the public pension benefit during the 1950s and 1960s.  
There is another reason why I did not treat the presence of neo-corporatist institu-
tions as a separate explanatory force for the extremely generous and redistributive 
outcome of welfare state development in the Netherlands. This reason is that the 
emergence of such institutions in the Netherlands cannot be treated in isolation from the 
dominance of industrial unionism there. Just as the dominance of craft or occupational 
unionism contributed to the persistence of “voluntarism” in the United Kingdom, so can 
the dominance of industrial unionism in the Netherlands be seen as a major precondition 
for the emergence of a neo-corporatist mode of decision-making in the Netherlands. 
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This point deserves some elaboration, as it has not received much attention in the 
literature on neo-corporatism. 
Above, I have noted the existence of a wide variety of explanations for the transition 
to neo-corporatist modes of decision-making in many continental European countries 
during the postwar period. Over the years, scholars have attempted to explain this 
through, among other factors, the presence of either left or confessional parties there, 
the nations’ relatively small sizes, the presence of consensus democracy, the strength of 
national labor union movements, and the strong and disciplined nature of business 
representation there.
36
 Conspicuously absent among these explanations is the strong 
dominance of industrial unionism in these countries. Many scholars have noted the 
presence of “hierarchical and monopolistic peak union organizations” in neo-corporatist 
countries.
37
 Yet they have generally failed to mention that strong peak union organiza-
tions can only emerge when their member unions do not bicker among themselves over 
the division of labor’s share of the national income. For reasons that have been 
described above, the absence of such internal bickering depends on the presence of 
industrial unionism.  
 The United Kingdom is ideally suited to illustrate how the emergence of a strong 
neo-corporatist tradition depends on the presence of industrial unionism. Like the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom created many platforms designed to formally 
integrate organized industry into the decision-making arena of the state during the 
postwar period. Prominent among these were the bipartite National Joint Advisory 
Council, the tripartite National Economic Development Council, and several commit-
tees meant to facilitate tripartite consultation over social insurance matters.
38
 In contrast 
to the Dutch case, however, these councils and platforms never developed into 
influential advisory bodies. To understand this, it is crucial to note that the influence of 
such bodies depends on their ability to produce a uniform advice. When the union 
movement is itself deeply divided over issues related to public welfare development and 
other instances of government intervention in the labor market, it is hard to see how 
such uniformity might be achieved. If anything, this work has shown how strongly 
divided the British labor union movement was on many such issues.
39
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 Once we realize the importance of industrial unionism for the development of neo-
corporatist modes of decision-making, we may also review some of this mode’s 
supposed consequences. Above, I have already noted the tendency of scholars to argue 
that neo-corporatist decision-making leads to a more harmonious state of affairs. One 
could also argue that both the emergence of neo-corporatist institutions and the 
relatively harmonious nature of industrial relations in most of continental Europe have 
their origins in, or at least depend on, the dominance of industrial unionism there. 
Another supposed consequence of neo-corporatism can be dismissed immediately. This 
is the idea that it leads to more generous welfare state outcomes because it increases the 
political power of the “organized working class.”
40
 This idea has often been put forward, 
but rarely been investigated. Most of the time, it simply rests on the observation that the 
neo-corporatist nations of continental Europe have relatively high public spending 
levels.
41
 The findings of this study give little reason to assume that Dutch corporatist 
institutions increased the political power of the organized working class in the 
Netherlands. Instead, they emphasize the importance of a solidaristic union movement. 
Likewise, this study found that, in the British case, the absence of a strong neo-
corporatist did not decrease the political influence of the organized working class. On 
the contrary, the ability of Britain’s craft unions to block so many of Labour’s policy 
initiatives clearly demonstrates how immensely powerful the British labor union 
movement was.  
The findings of this study also have important implications for our understanding of 
why unions may support wage compression among different categories of workers. In 
chapter 2 of this study, I mentioned the popularity of the assumption that labor unions 
compress wages among different categories of workers, and scholars’ resulting use of 
cross-national differences in union density levels to explain cross-national differences in 
wage inequality. I have also noted that the assumption of labor union support for wage 
compression among different categories of workers generally rests on what is often 
called the “median voter model.” This model is based on the idea that in situations in 
which the mean wage is higher than the median wage (which is typically the case), a 
majority of union members will benefit from, and therefore favor, wage compression.
42
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The median voter model clearly does not work in nations in which the union movement 
is largely organized along occupational lines. In such nations, higher-paid workers 
organize separately, and can thus not be forced to support wage compression by a 
majority of lower-paid workers. In sum, to fully understand cross-national variation in 
wage inequality, scholars must start paying attention to union structure.  
In chapter 2 of this work I paid much attention to the strong resistance of craft and 
occupationally organized white-collar unions in the United Kingdom to any attempt to 
reduce wage differentials between their members and lower-skilled workers. This 
makes the United Kingdom an excellent example of how the median voter model does 
not work in nations characterized by strong occupational divisions. In the same chapter, 
I suggested several reasons why the median voter model may also come up short in 
explaining the redistributive efforts of the industrially organized Dutch union movement. 
Among other reasons, many of the redistributive initiatives put forward by the three 
Dutch union federations simply benefited too few workers for this. In the final section 
of this chapter, I will elaborate the consequences of this for our understanding of union 
support for redistributive welfare state development.  
 
MAPPING SOCIAL SOLIDARITY 
I began this book by noting the strong disparities in the degrees to which postwar 
Western societies have been able to achieve adequate protection for all their members 
against the risks of economic misfortune and dependency. I argued that improving our 
understanding of this disparity requires a fundamental reappraisal of the role of 
organized labor in welfare state development. As we have seen, the main purpose of the 
welfare state is not to compensate labor for its disadvantaged position on the labor 
market. Nor is it to redistribute income and risk from a small minority of affluent 
workers to a vast majority that suffers in destitution. Instead, it is mainly to assist those 
workers who cannot achieve adequate wages and security against labor market risks 
without a redistribution of income and risk from other occupational categories. For the 
most part, these vulnerable workers make up only a minority of the labor category. 
 One of the most striking features of the redistributive measures proposed in the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom during the period under investigation here is that 
they often benefited only a small minority group of very low-paid workers. Since these 
measures were far more successful in the Netherlands, several Dutch examples can be 
mentioned here. One excellent example is the introduction of a minimum benefit rate 
into the unemployment, disability and sickness insurance in the Netherlands during the 
1960s. As we have seen, this move benefited only twelve percent of all married men 
aged twenty-three and over, while its costs had to be borne by all insured workers. The 
choice to combine flat-rate benefits with earnings-related contributions in the 
Netherlands during the early 1950s was clearly also designed to benefit a minority of 
low-paid workers. Finally, the introduction of a statutory national minimum wage in the 
late 1960s and its subsequent increase relative to average wages likewise benefited only 
a small group of workers.  
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 More generally, it should be noted that the Netherlands was no exception to the rule 
that redistributive welfare measures often do not affect the highest income brackets.
43
 
Relatively low wage limits and contribution thresholds severely limited the redistribu-
tive scope of all social security schemes in the Netherlands, making it doubtful whether 
the “median worker” necessarily stood to gain from them. The 1949 Unemployment Act 
represents an extreme example. Up to the mid-1960s, this Act maintained a wage limit 
that severely limited the scope of risk reapportioning by excluding all workers who 
earned more than a hundred and twenty percent of the modal wage. This further 
suggests that the redistributive efforts of the three Dutch union federations cannot be 
explained through the notion that they believed this to be in the interests of “labor” as a 
whole or even a majority of workers. Instead, it suggests that they were prompted by the 
aim to make sure that all workers could count on a sufficient level of protection against 
the risk of unemployment – including the lowest-paid workers. In other words, the three 
union federations actively put the notion of worker solidarity into effect. 
 Unfortunately, the elusive concept of solidarity does not sit well with most social 
scientists and historians. Most scholars emphasize instead the importance of interests. 
Over the years, various welfare state scholars have focused on workers, the self-
employed, farmers, the middle classes, or, most recently, employers, as active and 
important players in redistributive welfare state development. (It should be noted that 
these groups together represent pretty much all of the economically active.) There has 
been much less attention paid to the circumstances under which groups or individuals 
may be willing to accept, or at least may not organize against, measures that run 
contrary to their economic interests. The findings of this study suggest that they will do 
so when they do not organize separately from those who stand to gain from these 
measures. 
The latter remark summarizes what may be the most important finding of this work. 
In the United Kingdom, privileged workers organized separately, and thus organized 
against all of Labour’s welfare initiatives that ran contrary to their interests. In the 
Netherlands, by contrast, privileged workers did not organize separately. As a result, 
they also did not rally against any of the redistributive initiatives put forward by the 
three union federations. This tells us much about the conditions under which solidarity 
is more likely to materialize. In his landmark work Rich Democracies, the political 
scientist Harold Wilensky argued that one of the reasons that many countries with neo-
corporatist bargaining arrangements have generous welfare states is that “corporatism 
leads to lower tax visibility.”
44
 The issue of visibility does indeed seem to be important. 
It is quite telling that the active support of the “big three” for wage compression and 
redistributive welfare state development during the first three decades of the postwar 
period has not resulted in any notable growth in Dutch occupational unions that cater 
only to privileged workers. Of course, part of the reason for this may have been that 
many privileged workers in the Netherlands reacted to the ‘socialist’ tendencies of the 
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big three, not by joining occupationally organized unions, but by not joining a labor 
union at all.
45
 Yet if anything, this tells us much about the relative importance of union 
structure compared to the importance of union strength.  
                                                
45
 See my remarks in footnote 94 on this. 
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SUMMARY 
 
The first decades of the postwar period undoubtedly represent a crucial epoch in the 
development of the modern welfare state. Within a time span of only two to three 
decades, all nations of the advanced industrial world created intricate systems of social 
protection that raised entire groups of the feeble out of poverty, significantly reduced 
market-generated income disparities, and greatly diminished the financial consequences 
of labor market risks like unemployment, sickness, disability, and old age. In the 
immediate postwar period, the bulk of the population living in the advanced industrial 
world relied on grossly inadequate levels of protection against hardships resulting from 
labor market risks. By the 1970s, most of them could count on very generous protection 
against such hardships. During this decade, more people were entitled to more generous 
levels of protection against labor market risks than ever before – and arguably ever 
since.  
 Compared to previous time periods, the welfare achievements of the first half of the 
postwar period were truly remarkable. Yet they were by no means equally remarkable in 
all nations of the advanced industrial world. While all advanced industrial nations 
experienced sharp increases in both public and private social expenditure during the first 
decades of the postwar period, they differed markedly both in the overall level of this 
increase and, perhaps more importantly, in the division within what is popularly known 
as the ‘public and private mix’. As a result, societies came to differ greatly in their 
ability to protect their members against the risks of economic misfortune and 
dependency. Most importantly, they came to differ greatly in their ability to provide 
adequate levels of social protection for all their members. In this study, I have set out to 
explain these differences by looking at the determinants of social solidarity in nations.  
My main argument is that a better understanding of the degree to which societies 
have been able to create adequate social protection for all their members demands a 
fundamental reinterpretation of the role of organized labor in welfare state development. 
I argue in particular against the convention of viewing welfare state development as part 
of the emancipation struggle of the worker movement. This view has resulted in a 
strong tendency to view labor unions as natural proponents of the welfare state and to 
see the success of welfare state development as dependent on labor’s relative power 
resources against capital. I argue against this interpretation by emphasizing that welfare 
state development is mainly about redistribution of income and risk among different 
categories of employers, the self-employed, and most of all, different categories of 
workers. I have set out to understand under what circumstances unions are willing to 
redistribute income and risk among workers. This, I argue, depends foremost on their 
organizational blueprint.  
 So far, the comparative literature on welfare state development has paid scant 
attention to the importance of the organizational blueprint of labor unions to their 
involvement in welfare state development. Part of the explanation for this can be found 
in the preoccupation of existing writings on welfare state development with class 
divisions. The emphasis on class divisions is particularly strong in the so-called “power 
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resources” literature. This literature, which has been the dominant analytical perspective 
on welfare state development since the 1970s, views welfare state development as 
primarily involving distributive conflict between workers and employers. One 
consequence of the emphasis on class as an explanatory concept for welfare state 
development is a strong tendency to view workers, and also employers and the self-
employed, as homogeneous groups in which group members share similar risks and 
resources, and thus similar interests. Another consequence is a strong tendency to define 
labor as a “subordinated” or “disadvantaged” group that needs to be “compensated” or 
“emancipated” by the welfare state. This has resulted in a strong tendency to view 
unions as the natural proponents of welfare state development, to emphasize the extent 
to which – as opposed to the way in which – workers organize into labor unions, and to 
view welfare state development as only involving distributive conflict between workers 
and employers – as opposed to distributive conflict among different categories of 
workers and among different groups of employers as well.  
 In chapter 1 of this book I criticize this view of the involvement of labor unions in 
welfare state development. I first show that welfare state development mainly involves a 
redistributive effort among different categories of workers, and then seek to understand 
under what circumstances unions are willing to push for or support such a redistributive 
effort. I argue that they will be willing to do so when they are characterized by a diverse 
membership profile in terms of income and risk. When unions represent both higher 
paid and lower paid members and members with ‘good’ as well as ‘bad’ risks”, they 
will emphasize broad worker solidarity and pursue welfare solutions that result in 
adequate social protection against labor market risks for all their members – even when 
this results in a redistribution of income and risk among their members. I further argue 
that such unions will be able to do so because higher paid, less risk-prone workers do 
not organize separately. I then argue that we therefore have to make a crucial distinction 
between ‘vertically’ or industrially organized unions that represent workers with a very 
diverse income and risk profile, and ‘horizontally’ or occupationally organized unions 
that seek to organize workers along occupational lines. Occupational unions that 
represent workers with relatively high wages and low risks strongly oppose redistribu-
tive welfare solutions.  
 Although the aim of this work is to develop an argument on the importance of labor 
union structure that is broadly applicable, the main comparison is for practical reasons 
restricted to the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The choice of these two countries 
can be easily defended. Differences in both the organizational strength and structure of 
their labor union movements make them ideally suited to illustrate the importance of the 
latter. In terms of pure organizational strength, the British labor union movement has 
outperformed its Dutch counterpart throughout the entire postwar period. Over the years, 
many scholars have noted that they found this difficult to reconcile with the continual 
inability of the British welfare state to provide adequate protection against labor market 
risk to all workers, and the very generous and redistributive nature of the Dutch welfare 
state. In the next chapters of this study I show that this can be explained by the 
dominance of industrial unionism in the Netherlands and of occupational unionism in 
  
223 
the United Kingdom. These chapters are based on archival sources of labor unions, 
employer organizations, and public bodies in both countries.  
 
In chapter 2 I first examine the causes of the dominance of industrial and occupational 
unionism in respectively the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. I show that 
occupational unionism never established a firm footing in the Netherlands because of 
the country’s much later industrialization, the subsequent power of social ideals during 
the formative period of the Dutch labor union movement, and the impact of religious 
cleavages in Dutch society. I also show that the dominance of industrial unionism in the 
Netherlands is emblematic for continental European countries, while the dominance of 
occupational unionism in the United Kingdom is mirrored by those countries that were 
once part of its economic and political sphere of influence. I then focus on the United 
Kingdom, and show that the strong commitment of the British labor union movement to 
voluntarism, or the idea that the state has to abstain from direct intervention in the labor 
market, is closely related to the resistance of British occupationally organized unions 
against any attempt to redistribute income in favor of lower paid workers. I do so 
mainly by analyzing the longstanding resistance of the main British labor union 
confederation, the TUC, to the introduction of a statutory national minimum wage in the 
United Kingdom. I then compare the successful resistance of British occupationally 
organized unions to any attempt to redistributive wages with the successful pursuit of 
wage leveling by continental European union federations like the Dutch NVV, CNV, 
and KAB.  
A crucial argument put forward in chapter 2 is that the successful pursuit of wage 
leveling in the Netherlands cannot be explained by the so-called “median voter model.” 
One of the most important reasons for this is that union membership in the Netherlands 
is not concentrated among those members who have profited most from the conse-
quences of many wage leveling initiatives. Another reason is that the most probably 
median union member, the skilled manual worker, may himself not subscribe to the 
belief that wage leveling and redistributive welfare development are to his or her 
advantage. After all, in the United Kingdom, craft unions representing skilled manual 
workers have always been the fiercest opponents of any attempt to level wages. This 
means that the wage leveling efforts of the Dutch union federations cannot be explained 
by arguing that this followed naturally from the interests of a majority of their workers. 
I therefore suggest that these efforts resulted from solidaristic motives.  
 I conclude the chapter with an analysis of the involvement of employer interest 
groups in welfare state development – as this has received much academic attention in 
recent years. I suggest two ways in which union structure affects the stance of employer 
interest groups towards welfare state initiatives. First, employer interest groups will not 
be able to exploit worker divisions when they are faced with an industrially organized 
labor union movement. Second, redistributive welfare initiatives are less costly to them 
when they are faced with an industrially organized labor union movement. After all, 
under such circumstances there are no unions who may attempt to regain lost wage 
differentials during future wage negotiations. Both reasons suggest that employer 
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interests groups will be more cooperative towards welfare state development when they 
are faced with an industrially organized union movement. I conclude the chapter by 
giving several reasons for the failure of recent attempts to explain employer interest 
groups’ support for welfare state initiatives by arguing that their members had an active 
interest in the development of public welfare programs.  
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 demonstrate how the organizational structure of the British and 
Dutch labor union movements determined their stance on the development of public 
provision for the elderly, the unemployed, and the sick and disabled. These chapters 
focus on the period ranging from roughly the 1940s to the 1970s. Together with chapter 
6, these chapters form the empirical core of this book.  
 
In chapter 3 I compare the postwar development of public old-age pension provision in 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. I first contrast the support of the TUC for a 
completely flat rate “egalitarian” pension system with the support of the three union 
federations in the Netherlands for a redistributive solution combining flat rate benefits 
with earnings-related contributions. I then analyze the TUC’s unwillingness to support 
Labour’s proposal to introduce a similar system in the United Kingdom, and its later 
reluctance to align itself with Labour’s superannuation proposals. I show how the 
TUC’s reluctance stemmed from the strong opposition of its craft and occupationally 
organized white-collar union members to the redistributive consequences of these 
proposals. I also show how the failure of consecutive Labour governments to improve 
matters for Britain’s poorer pensioners related to this opposition. In the final section of 
the chapter I return to the Netherlands to analyze how the three Dutch union federa-
tions’ success in increasing the public pension benefit related to their ability to promote 
its redistributive features. 
  
In chapter 4 I compare the postwar development of public unemployment provision in 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. I first emphasize that public unemployment 
insurance development inevitably involves a redistribution of good and bad risks 
between different grades of workers. I then set out to show that British craft and 
occupationally organized unions were as opposed to any extension of risk reapportion-
ing as they were to the introduction of a redistributive contributory system. I illustrate 
how this opposition complicated attempts to improve the generosity of the public 
unemployment insurance in the United Kingdom. In the second part of the chapter I 
contrast this with the agreement among the “big three” in the Netherlands to increase 
the level of risk reapportioning among different categories of workers, and to introduce 
a contributory system that benefited lower-paid workers at the expense of other workers.  
  
In chapter 5 I compare the postwar development of public provision for the sick and 
disabled in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. I start by noting the disparity in 
the treatment of work-related and non-work-related disabilities in the United Kingdom. 
I then analyze the TUC’s opposition to several Labour attempts to improve public 
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provision for non-work-related disabilities, and show how this related to the resistance 
of many of its union members to the redistributive consequences of these initiatives. In 
the second part of the chapter I contrast the TUC’s stance with that of its Dutch 
counterparts. I demonstrate here that the very generous outcome of public disability 
insurance development in the Netherlands was possible because the unions there pushed 
for highly distributive solutions. Like in the previous two chapters, I also contrast the 
cooperative stance of the Dutch employer federations with the strong opposition of 
British employer groups to any increase in the generosity of social insurance benefits.  
 
In chapter 6 I deal with the use of social security schemes for redundancy purposes in 
the Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s. I analyze how the public sickness and disability 
insurances, and the public unemployment insurance came to be used for such purposes 
during this period. I also analyze the development of industry-wide early retirement 
schemes (called VUT-schemes). I criticize recent attempts to show that the use of such 
schemes for redundancy purposes was an important motive for employer interest groups 
to support welfare initiatives. I show that the use of social security schemes for 
redundancy purposes in the Netherlands instead was an unintended side-effect of union 
attempts to increase the protection of workers against the financial consequences of 
labor market risks. I also show that the employer federations strongly opposed the 
decisions that made the use of social security schemes for redundancy purposes possible.  
 
In Chapter 7 I summarize the main conclusions of this book and explore some of its 
most important implications. I emphasize that the importance of union structure is not 
limited to the development of the British and Dutch welfare states. I do so by looking at 
the implications of the findings of this book for several other countries. Because of its 
importance and the dominance of craft unionism there, I pay most attention to the 
United States. I then suggest several reasons why the implications of this work are of 
importance for the broader literature on labor market development as well. I first 
emphasize the importance of union structure as a determinant of wage variation in 
developed countries, referring back to the TUC’s opposition to the introduction of a 
statutory national minimum wage. Finally, I demonstrate how the development of so-
called “neo-corporatist” decision-making institutions in continental European countries 
related to the dominance of industrial unionism in those countries. 
SAMENVATTING 
 
Gedurende de eerste decennia van de naoorlogse periode heeft zich in de westerse 
wereld een ontwikkeling voorgedaan die is uitgemond in de geboorte van de moderne 
verzorgingsstaat. De resultaten van deze ontwikkeling zijn verbluffend geweest. Binnen 
een tijdsbestek van slechts twee tot drie decennia zijn alle westerse landen er in 
geslaagd systemen van sociale bescherming te creëren die de armoede sterk hebben 
teruggedrongen, door de markt gegenereerde inkomensverschillen aanzienlijk hebben 
verkleind, en de financiële consequenties van arbeidsmarktrisico’s als werkloosheid, 
ziekte, arbeidsongeschiktheid en ouderdom in grote mate hebben verminderd. Tegen de 
tijd dat de ontwikkeling van de moderne verzorgingsstaat als voltooid werd beschouwd, 
zo rond de jaren zeventig van de vorige eeuw, konden meer mensen op een meer 
genereus niveau van bescherming tegen arbeidsmarktrisico’s rekenen dan ooit tevoren – 
en misschien zelfs ooit daarna.  
Het succes van de moderne verzorgingsstaat is in alle westerse landen groot geweest. 
Maar dit betekent niet dat dit succes in elk van deze landen ook even groot is geweest. 
Niet alleen de totale groei in publieke en private uitgaven aan sociale zekerheid is in 
sommige landen onmiskenbaar groter geweest dan in andere landen; ook in de verdeling 
van wat vaak wordt aangeduid als de “publieke en private sociale mix” heeft zich een 
grote variatie voorgedaan. Het resultaat hiervan is geweest dat westerse samenlevingen 
sterk zijn gaan verschillen in de mate waarin zij hun leden kunnen beschermen tegen de 
risico’s van economische tegenspoed en afhankelijkheid. Ze zijn met name komen te 
verschillen in de mate waarin zij sociale bescherming kunnen bieden aan al hun leden. 
Deze studie poogt dit verschil te verklaren door te kijken naar wat de mate bepaalt 
waarin samenlevingen in staat zijn sociale solidariteit te cultiveren.  
Het hoofdargument van dit boek is dat een beter begrip van verschillen in de mate 
waarin samenlevingen er in geslaagd zijn adequate sociale bescherming te bieden aan al 
hun leden een fundamentele herziening vereist van de rol van werknemersorganisaties 
in de ontwikkeling van verzorgingsstaten. Dit boek zet zich met name af tegen de 
gewoonte om de ontwikkeling van de naoorlogse verzorgingsstaat te zien als een 
onderdeel van de emancipatiestrijd van de arbeidersbeweging. Deze gewoonte heeft 
geleidt tot een sterke tendens om vakbewegingen als de natuurlijke voorstanders van 
verzorgingsstaatontwikkeling te zien en verzorgingsstaatvariatie te interpreteren als een 
uitkomst van de verschillende relatieve machtsverhoudingen van ‘arbeid’ en ‘kapitaal’. 
Dit boek verzet zich tegen deze interpretatie en stelt de vraag onder welke omstandig-
heden vakbonden bereid en in staat zijn inkomen en risico’s tussen werknemers te 
herverdelen. Het antwoord op deze vraag is dat dit afhangt van de manier waarop de 
vakbeweging is georganiseerd.  
 
 Tot op heden heeft de manier waarop nationale vakbewegingen zijn georganiseerd 
nauwelijks aandacht gekregen in de literatuur over verzorgingsstaatvariatie. Dit kan 
voor een deel worden verklaard door de preoccupatie van de bestaande literatuur met 
klassenverhoudingen. De nadruk op klassenverhoudingen is met name sterk in de sinds 
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enkele decennia dominante “power resources” literatuur, die verzorgingsstaatontwikke-
ling interpreteert als een politieke strijd tussen werknemers en werkgevers. Een van de 
consequenties van de preoccupatie met klassenverhoudingen is een sterke neiging om 
werknemers, maar ook werkgevers en zelfstandigen, te zien als homogene groepen met 
vergelijkbare middelen en risico’s. Een andere consequentie is de neiging om 
werknemers een achtergestelde positie op de arbeidsmarkt toe te kennen. Uit dit laatste 
volgt de gewoonte om vakbonden als de natuurlijke voorstanders van verzorgingsstaat-
ontwikkeling te zien, de nadruk te leggen op de mate waarin – in plaats van de manier 
waarop – vakbewegingen werknemers organiseren, en verzorgingsstaatontwikkeling 
exclusief te zien als een verdelingsconflict tussen werknemers en werkgevers – in plaats 
van als een verdelingskwestie tussen verschillende categorieën van zowel werknemers 
als werkgevers. 
 In Hoofdstuk 1 van dit boek bekritiseer ik deze manier van kijken naar de rol van 
werknemersorganisaties in verzorgingsstaatontwikkeling. Door te benadrukken dat 
sociale zekerheidsprogramma’s met name voor herverdeling tussen verschillende 
categorieën van werknemers zorgen stel ik de vraag onder welke omstandigheden 
vakbonden bereid en in staat zijn inkomen en risico’s tussen werknemers te herverdelen. 
Als antwoord op deze vraag suggereer ik dat zij hiertoe bereid zullen zijn wanneer ze 
werknemers met zowel hoge als lage inkomens en zowel slechte als goede risico’s 
vertegenwoordigen. In zulke omstandigheden zullen zij streven naar brede werknemers-
solidariteit en oplossingen zoeken waarbij al hun leden op voldoende bescherming tegen 
arbeidsmarktrisico’s kunnen rekenen – ook wanneer dit tot herverdeling binnen de 
werknemerscategorie leidt. Ik stel verder dat dergelijke vakbonden hiertoe in staat 
zullen zijn doordat werknemers met hogere inkomens en betere risico’s zich niet apart 
organiseren. Vervolgens beweer ik dat hierdoor een cruciaal onderscheid moet worden 
gemaakt tussen verticaal georganiseerde vakbonden die een heterogene groep van 
werknemers vertegenwoordigen en horizontaal georganiseerde vakbonden die door hun 
gerichtheid op specifieke beroepsgroepen werknemers vertegenwoordigen met 
gelijksoortige inkomens en risico’s. Horizontaal georganiseerde vakbonden die 
werknemers met hogere inkomens en betere risico’s vertegenwoordigen zijn fel gekant 
tegen herverdelingsinitiatieven. 
 Om het belang van het onderscheid tussen verticale en horizontale organisatie van 
nationale vakbewegingen aan te tonen vergelijk ik de ontwikkeling van de naoorlogse 
verzorgingsstaat in Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk. In hoofdstuk 1 licht ik de 
keuze voor deze twee landen toe. Door de onderlinge verschillen in zowel de mate als 
de manier van vakbondsorganisatie leent een vergelijking tussen deze twee landen zich 
uitstekend om het relatieve belang te laten zien van de manier waarop werkgevers zijn 
georganiseerd ten opzichte van de mate waarin zij dat doen. Gedurende bijna de hele 
naoorlogse periode heeft de organisatiegraad van werknemers in Nederland lager 
gelegen dan in het Verenigd Koninkrijk. In de vergelijkende literatuur over verzorgings-
staatontwikkeling is vaak geconstateerd dat dit moeilijk te rijmen valt met de relatief 
genereuze en meer op herverdeling gebaseerde verzorgingsstaat in Nederland. In de 
volgende hoofdstukken laat ik zien dat dit te verklaren is door de sterke dominantie van 
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respectievelijk op industriebasis en beroepsgewijs georganiseerde vakbonden in 
Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Ik doe dit met behulp van het gebruik van 
archiefbronnen van werknemers- en werkgeversorganisaties en verschillende 
overheidsinstanties in de beide landen.  
 
In Hoofdstuk 2 ga ik kort in op de oorzaken voor de dominantie van respectievelijk 
industriegewijze en beroepsgewijze vormen van vakbondsorganisatie in Nederland en 
het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Ik laat zien dat dit onderscheid moet worden begrepen in het 
licht van de latere industrialisatie in Nederland en de kracht van het socialistische 
gedachtegoed en wellicht het verzuilingsideaal op het moment dat de grootschalige 
organisatie van werknemers daar van de grond kwam. Ook laat ik hier zien dat de 
grotendeels industriegewijze en beroepsgewijze vakbondsorganisatie in achtereenvol-
gens Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk kenmerkend zijn voor respectievelijk 
continentaal Europa en de Angelsaksische wereld. Vervolgens richt ik mij op het 
Verenigd Koninkijk, waarbij ik laat zien dat de sterke afkeer van de Britse vakbeweging 
tegen overheidsbemoeienis met de arbeidsmarkt nauw verbonden is met het verzet van 
beroepsgewijze vakbonden daar tegen elke poging om inkomen en risico’s te 
herverdelen ten gunste van werknemers met een slechtere positie op de arbeidsmarkt. 
Als hoofdvoorbeeld behandel ik hier het langdurige verzet van de Britse vakcentrale, de 
TUC, tegen de invoering van een wettelijk nationaal minimumloon in het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk. Ik besluit dit deel van het hoofdstuk door het succesvolle verzet van Britse 
beroepsbonden tegen elke poging om inkomen te herverdelen af te zetten tegen het 
succesvolle streven naar nivellering door continentaal Europese vakcentrales als de 
Nederlandse NVV, CNV en KAB. 
 Van cruciaal belang in dit hoofdstuk is mijn conclusie dat het succesvolle 
nivelleringsstreven van de drie grote vakcentrales in Nederland niet kan worden 
verklaard door modellen als het “median voter model”, die zich richten op de interne 
machtsverhoudingen binnen vakbonden. Hiervoor geef ik drie redenen. Allereerst wijs 
ik er op dat de kern van georganiseerde arbeiders in beide landen gevormd wordt door 
geschoolde handarbeiders of “blauwe boorden”-werknemers. In het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk organiseert deze werknemerscategorie zich in beroepsbonden die zich tegen 
elke vorm van herverdeling verzetten. In Nederland organiseert deze werknemerscate-
gorie zich in industriebonden die juist streven naar nivellering. Ten tweede wijs ik er op 
dat veel herverdelingsinitiatieven van de Nederlandse vakcentrales slechts een hele 
kleine minderheid van laagbetaalde werknemers begunstigen, terwijl alle andere 
werknemers hier de prijs voor moeten betalen. Ten derde wijs ik er op dat modellen die 
zich richten op de interne machtsverhoudingen binnen vakbonden niet kunnen verklaren 
waarom de verliezers van herverdelingsinitiatieven deze herverdeling accepteren of zich 
hier in ieder geval niet tegen verzetten – bijvoorbeeld door over te stappen naar op 
beroepsbasis georganiseerde vakbonden. Ik suggereer vervolgens dat de herverdelings-
initiatieven van de Nederlandse vakcentrales voortvloeiden uit het motief van 
werknemerssolidariteit.  
  
230 
 Aan het eind van dit hoofdstuk ga ik ten slotte in op de rol van werkgeversorganisa-
ties in verzorgingsstaatontwikkeling, omdat deze de laatste jaren veel aandacht heeft 
gekregen in de literatuur. Ik laat zien dat de manier waarop de vakbeweging is 
georganiseerd op twee manieren invloed heeft op de houding van werkgeversorganisa-
ties ten aanzien van verzorgingsstaatinitiatieven. Allereerst zullen verzorgingsstaatini-
tiatieven die door de hele vakbeweging gesteund worden minder snel ondermijnd 
kunnen worden door werkgeversorganisaties, waardoor zij een belang krijgen om 
constructief aan deze initiatieven mee te werken. Ten tweede zullen verzorgingsstaatini-
tiatieven die door de hele vakbeweging gesteund worden minder kosten met zich 
meebrengen voor werkgevers, waardoor zij minder reden hebben om zich hier tegen te 
verzetten. Dit laatste komt doordat er geen vakbonden zijn die zullen proberen 
eventuele herverdelingsconsequenties van deze initiatieven tijdens loononderhandelin-
gen terug te winnen. Ten slotte geef ik verschillende redenen voor het falen van recente 
pogingen om te laten zien dat werkgeversorganisaties actieve steun aan verzorgings-
staatinitiatieven kunnen geven omdat hun leden hier van zouden kunnen profiteren.  
 
Hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5 vormen drie empirische hoofdstukken die als een eenheid 
kunnen worden beschouwd. In deze hoofdstukken vergelijk ik de betrokkenheid van de 
Nederlandse en Britse vakbewegingen met respectievelijk de ontwikkeling van publieke 
en private pensioenvoorzieningen, werkloosheidsverzekeringen, en ziekte- en 
arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekeringen. De analyse richt zich op ruwweg de directe 
naoorlogse periode tot en met de jaren zeventig van de vorige eeuw. Ik laat in deze 
hoofdstukken zien dat de drie Nederlandse vakcentrales voortdurend met initiatieven 
kwamen die tot doel hadden om de generositeit van publieke verzekeringen te vergroten 
door middel van herverdeling van risico’s en de creatie van contributiesystemen die in 
het voordeel werkten van lager betaalde werknemers en in het nadeel van hoger 
betaalde werknemers. Ik vergelijk dit met het succesvolle verzet van Britse beroepsbon-
den tegen elk initiatief dat voor herverdeling tussen hoger en lagerbetaalde werknemers 
zou zorgen. Dit maakte het voor de TUC onmogelijk om net als de Nederlandse 
vakcentrales met herverdelingsinitiatieven te komen. Ook kon de TUC hierdoor geen 
volledige steun geven aan de initiatieven van verschillende Labour-regeringen die tot 
doel hadden om minder gepriviligeerde werknemers een betere bescherming tegen 
arbeidsmarktrisico’s te bieden. Ik laat zien hoe dit verschil in de participatie van de 
beide vakbewegingen in de uitbouw van de Britse en Nederlandse verzorgingsstaat 
heeft geleid tot sterk verschillende verzorgingsstaatuitkomsten – met name op het 
gebied van sociale bescherming voor minder geprivilegieerde werknemers. Ook laat ik 
zien hoe de grotere bereidheid van Nederlandse werkgeversorganisaties om mee te 
werken aan de uitbouw van de verzorgingsstaat kan worden verklaard door het grotere 
vermogen van de Nederlandse vakcentrales om aan te dringen op herverdeling van 
inkomen en risico’s tussen werknemers.  
 
In hoofdstuk 6 richt ik mij op een ontwikkeling die zich vanaf de jaren zeventig met 
name in Nederland in toenemende mate voordeed: het oneigenlijk gebruik van 
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verzorgingsstaatarrangementen om overtollige werknemers af te vloeien. Deze 
ontwikkeling kan worden beschouwd als een consequentie van de genereuze uitbouw 
van de Nederlandse verzorgingsstaat in combinatie met uitvoering door vertegenwoor-
digers van het bedrijfsleven. In dit hoofdstuk laat ik zien hoe dit gebruik samenhing met 
het streven van de Nederlandse vakcentrales om alle werknemers adequate bescherming 
tegen arbeidsmarktrisico’s te bieden. Ik bekritiseer hierbij recente bijdragen die beweren 
dat dit oneigenlijk gebruik een belangrijk motief is geweest voor werkgeversorganisa-
ties om mee te werken aan de uitbouw van verschillende verzorgingsstaatinitiatieven. Ik 
laat hier zien dat deze bijdragen voorbij gaan aan de financiële consequenties van dit 
oneigenlijk gebruik. Ook laat ik hier zien dat deze consequenties voor de betrokken 
werkgeversorganisaties reden waren om zowel voor als na de totstandkoming van deze 
verzorgingsstaatinitiatieven aan te dringen op maatregelen om dit gebruik tegen te gaan. 
Ik doe dit door te kijken naar drie verschillende manieren om werknemers af te laten 
vloeien, namelijk de ziekte- en arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekeringen, de werkloos-
heidsverzekering, en de VUT.  
 
In hoofdstuk 7 vat ik de belangrijkste conclusies van voorgaande hoofdstukken nog 
eens samen en kijk ik naar de implicaties van mijn bevindingen. Ik benadruk hier dat het 
belang van de manier waarop de vakbeweging is georganiseerd zich niet beperkt tot de 
ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse en Britse verzorgingsstaten. Ik ga in op de mogelijke 
consequenties van mijn bevindingen voor een aantal andere verzorgingsstaten, waarbij 
ik met name aandacht besteed aan de Verenigde Staten. Net als haar Britse tegenhanger 
wordt de Amerikaanse vakbeweging gekenmerkt door een grotendeels beroepsgewijze 
organisatie. In de bestaande literatuur over de “onderontwikkeling” van de Amerikaanse 
verzorgingsstaat heeft de beroepsgewijze organisatie van de Amerikaanse vakbeweging 
nauwelijks aandacht gekregen. In dit hoofdstuk laat ik het belang van deze beroepsge-
wijze organisatie zien door het voortdurende gebrek aan enthousiasme van de AFL voor 
pre- en naoorlogse verzorgingsstaatinitiatieven te koppelen aan de tweedeling op de 
Amerikaanse arbeidsmarkt. Vervolgens laat ik zien dat de bevindingen van dit boek ook 
van belang zijn voor de bredere literatuur over arbeidsmarktontwikkeling. Eerst laat ik 
zien dat verschillen in interne vakbondsorganisatie een grote rol spelen bij het ontstaan 
van verschillen in loonongelijkheid tussen landen. Hierbij grijp ik terug op hoofdstuk 2 
waarin ik het verzet van Britse beroepsorganisaties tegen nivellering heb vergeleken 
met het succesvolle nivelleringsstreven van de Nederlandse vakcentrales. Ten slotte laat 
ik zien dat industriële vakbondsorganisatie van groot belang is voor het ontstaan van 
zogenaamde “neo-corporatistische” instituties. Een kort overzicht van de literatuur 
hierover laat zien dat verticale vakbondsorganisatie op zijn minst een voorwaarde is 
voor het ontstaan van neo-corporatistsche besluitvorming. 
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